My main areas of specialization are Kant and ethics. Below you will find links to some of my papers and descriptions of works in progress. You can click the title of a paper for a pre-print version, or use the DOI link to access the published version.
Book - Kantian Ethics and the Attention Economy (2024). Palgrave Macmillan - Co-authored with Clinton Castro
Abstract: Our relationship with mobile phones and social media undermines our autonomy in a variety of ways. People typically use their phones far more than they would like. They report feeling alienated from their usage but they find it difficult to stop or cut back. In our book, we argue that the attention economy interferes with what Kant calls "humanity"— our capacity to set and pursue our own ends. There are good reasons to believe that we have moral obligations (to ourselves and to others) to respect this capacity. If so, then we ought to restructure our relationship with technology. We begin by explaining what autonomy is and why it matters morally. We then argue for individual-level duties we have to ourselves and to others (especially teachers to students, parents to children, employers to employees, and developers to users). We conclude with a discussion of collective autonomy as we explain how certain features of the attention economy (e.g., that it contributes to polarization) have placed a drag on democratic legitimacy and our capacity for rightful self-determination.
Here is our APA blog post about the book.
"Should I Use ChatGPT to Write my Papers?" (2024) Philosophy and Technology 37 (117) 1-28. (DOI Link). Co-authored with Clinton Castro.
Abstract: We argue that students have moral reasons to refrain from using chatbots such as ChatGPT to write certain papers. We begin by showing why many putative reasons to refrain from using chatbots fail to generate compelling arguments against their use in the construction of these papers. Many of these reasons rest on implausible principles, hollowed out conceptions of education, or impoverished accounts of human agency. They also overextend to cases where it is permissible to rely on a machine for something that once required human cognition. We then give our account: you have a moral obligation to respect your own humanity (i.e., your capacity to set and pursue your own ends), and the process of writing a humanities paper is important for the cultivation of your humanity. We conclude by considering objections and offering replies. In the end, we argue that the moral reasons students have to refrain from using chatbots depend crucially on instructors’ ability to make writing assignments worthwhile. This relies on instructors having the right kind of institutional support, which sheds light on implications that this duty has for administrators, legislators, and the general public.
"Modal Robustness Matters: A Reply to the Problem of Collective Harm" (forthcoming) Social Theory and Practice (Link to manuscript)
Abstract: In this paper, I defend a new way for consequentialists to reply to cases of collective harm. First, I explain why some of the popular proposals fail to generate compelling reasons in certain cases. I then suggest how consequentialism could respond to the issue by including modal robustness as a morally relevant consequence. Making a collectively caused harm more counterfactually robust is a bad consequence of an action, even when the individual action does not “make a difference.” Thus, we have an additional pro tanto reason to abstain from contributing to a collective harm.
"On the Duty to be an Attention Ecologist" (2022) Co-authored with Clinton Castro; Philosophy & Technology 35 (1): 13 (DOI link)
Abstract: The attention economy — the market where consumers’ attention is exchanged for goods and services — poses a variety of threats to individuals’ autonomy, which, at minimum, involves the ability to set and pursue ends for oneself. It has been argued that the threat wireless mobile devices pose to autonomy gives rise to a duty to oneself to be a digital minimalist, one whose interactions with digital technologies are intentional such that they do not conflict with their ends. In this paper, we argue that there is a corresponding duty to others to be an attention ecologist, one who promotes digital minimalism in others. Although the moral reasons for being an attention ecologist are similar to those that motivate the duty to oneself, the arguments diverge in important ways. We explore the application of this duty in various domains where we have special obligations to promote autonomy in virtue of the different roles we play in the lives of others, such as parents and teachers. We also discuss the consequences of our arguments for employers, software developers, and policy makers.
Is there a Duty to be a Digital Minimalist? (2021) Co-authored with Clinton Castro; Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (4): 662-673. DOI Link
Abstract: The harms associated with wireless mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) are well documented. They have been linked to anxiety, depression, diminished attention span, and decreased relationship satisfaction. Perhaps what is most worrying from a moral perspective, however, is the effect these devices can have on our autonomy. In this paper, we argue that there is an obligation to foster and safeguard autonomy, and we suggest that wireless mobile devices pose a serious threat to our capacity to fulfill this obligation. We defend the existence of an imperfect duty to be a “digital minimalist.” That is, we have a moral obligation to be intentional about how and to what extent we use these devices. The empirical findings already justify prudential reasons in favor of digital minimalism, but the moral duty is distinct from and independent of prudential considerations.
"Autonomy and Well-being: Refining the Argument against Persuasive Advertising" (2022) Journal of Business Ethics 175 (4): 689–99. DOI Link
Abstract: Critics of persuasive advertising argue that it undermines the autonomy of consumers by manipulating their desires in morally problematic ways. My aim is this paper is to refine that argument by employing a conception of autonomy that is not at odds with certain forms of manipulation. I argue that the charge of manipulation is not sufficient for condemning persuasive advertising. On my view, manipulation of an agent’s desires through advertising is justifiable in cases where the agent accepts (or would accept) the process through which the desires were developed. I show how the standard manipulation objection proves too much as it would also condemn cases of that kind. I argue that this distinction is especially important when we consider the implications of “new media.” In addition to increasing vulnerability to manipulation, new media have considerable impacts on well-being. By siding with the traditional autonomy argument, we would be compelled to take an implausible stand against all forms of manipulation through advertising, but I suggest that only a proper subset of those cases are morally problematic. This conclusion opens up a space for persuasive advertising that is permissible while nevertheless condemning cases that violate consumers’ autonomy.
"Bolstering the Keystone: Kant on the Incomprehensibility of Freedom" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (2):261-298 (2020) DOI Link
Abstract: In this paper, I give an explanation and defense of Kant's claim that we cannot comprehend how freedom is possible. I suggest that this is a significant point that has been underappreciated in the secondary literature. My conclusion has a variety of implications both for Kant scholars and for those interested in Kantian ideas more generally. Most notably, if Kant is right that there are principled reasons why freedom is beyond our comprehension, then this would lift an undesirable explanatory burden off the shoulders of his ethical and metaethical views. It would be a boon for Kantians if they could ground their lofty claims about the unique, elevated status of rational agency without committing to an implausible view of libertarian freedom. On the negative side, there are certain debates concerning moral motivation and transcendental idealism that might have to change in response to Kant's claims about the incomprehensibility of freedom.
"Consequentialism, Collective Action, Causal Impotence" (co-authored with Adam Pham; Ethics, Policy & Environment 23 (3): 336–49 (2020). DOI Link
Abstract: This paper offers some refinements to a particular objection to act consequentialism, the “causal impotence” objection. According to proponents of the objection, when we find circumstances in which severe, unnecessary harms result entirely from voluntary acts, it seems as if we should be able to indict at least one act among those acts, but act consequentialism appears to lack the resources to offer this indictment. Our aim is to show is that the most promising response on behalf of act consequentialism, the threshold argument, cannot offer a fully general prescription about what to do in cases of collective action.
"Moral Feeling and Transcendental Freedom"
Kant on Moral Self-Opacity
Collective harm paper. Title redacted for peer review.
Bioethics Paper. Title redacted for peer review.
“A Kantian Solution to the Problem of Collective Harm”
Paper about Chat GPT
Cracks in the Keystone (my dissertation)