Thomas D. Carroll

Research Overview:

Broadly speaking, my research explores conditions for communication and cooperation between people from culturally, historically, or religiously distant ways of life.

In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophy is a clarifying activity that arises in response to conceptual confusion. In Philosophical Investigations, he writes, “A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.” (§122) Many philosophical problems arise from an inattention to the historical or social contexts in which claims are made; this lack of attention to contexts risks misunderstanding and equivocation in philosophical analyses.

My research draws on Wittgenstein’s philosophical approaches to consider historical and contemporary problems in philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, and comparative ethics in contextually sensitive ways. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes philosophical problems as stemming from uncritical juxtapositions of language from different spheres of life or from distant cultures. Close attention to contexts of discourse and careful attention to similarities across cases as well as checking one’s own expectations in philosophizing may be helpful for addressing the philosophical problems one stumbles into. Drawing on these metaphilosophical ideas, my research in philosophy of religion and comparative ethics pays close attention to cultural and religious diversities (including divergences among different contexts of diversity). Over the last few years, I have been exploring the theme of the clarification of language being an expression of an ethical sensibility in both Wittgensteinian and Confucian philosophical traditions.

This research has led to various short and long form publications. My articles have appeared in journals such as Dao, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Metaphilosophy, Philosophy East and West, Religious Studies, and Sophia, and I have written chapters that have been published within edited volumes on Wittgenstein and pedagogy (Springer), interreligious encounters (Brill), and cognitive science of religion (Bloomsbury). My first book, Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion, was published by Palgrave in 2014, while my new book, Rethinking Philosophy of Religion with Wittgenstein, has just been published with Bloomsbury.

Ongoing research projects include studies of Wittgenstein and Chinese philosophy, religious epistemology in cross-cultural and inter-religious perspective, and philosophies of race and religion.

When possible (according to the publisher's requirements), I have included links to some of the publications below.

Publications:

Books:

Rethinking Philosophy of Religion with Wittgenstein: Religious Diversities and Racism (Bloomsbury Academic, 2025).

[Google Books]

[Reading Sample - Chapter 1]

Book Overview:

This book contends that Wittgenstein’s philosophy—often in conversation with other philosophical approaches—is a helpful resource for seeing religious diversities, for noticing aspects of religions that might otherwise escape one’s attention or be obscured by biases, and for uncovering and contemplating ethical aspects of this acknowledgment. In contemplating expanding philosophy of religion, this book has two focal points: Chinese philosophical and religious traditions and the intertwining of racism and religion in the United States. Attending to these foci for expansive philosophy of religion highlights two related features of Wittgenstein’s philosophy relevant to philosophical inquiry into religions: the relevance of contextual backgrounds to the interpretation of ways of life and the importance of reflection on the existential purposes that may be invoked in philosophical inquiry.

Four overlapping themes appear across the book. First, critical studies of the term “religion” are important for pointing out philosophical problems relating to globally engaged philosophy of religion. Second, going beyond the category of belief to consider diverse religious phenomena (such as rituals, practices, institutions, forms of belonging, and pragmatic forms of religious engagement) is valuable for interpreting a variety of religious traditions. Third, attention to social contexts helps avoid oversimplification in interpretation of philosophical arguments and religious phenomena. Fourth, this book contends that the work of clarification is not just empirical and theoretical but also ethical and even existential, leading philosophers to reflect on their own purposes in doing philosophy as well as address recalcitrant biases and stereotypes that persist in their social contexts.

Table of Contents:

Introduction

Chapter 1: “CrissCrossing Landscapes of Religiosities”

Chapter 1 offers a critical overview of the themes of this book. In the preface to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein remarks on how the approach taken in that book will not follow a uniform structure but instead will “criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought” (Philosophical Investigations, Preface). Since this book takes inspiration from Wittgenstein’s remark, exploring philosophical problems about religions that appear in particular discursive contexts in the United States and China, often at the boundaries of cultures, ideologies, religions, forms of secularism, and academic disciplines, the chapter will begin by exploring Wittgenstein’s philosophy and its bearing on diversifying philosophy of religion. First, I detail the philosophical approaches that emerged in Wittgenstein’s mature period, especially from the Investigations, the “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” and On Certainty as they pertain to understanding and philosophizing about religions. Reading these texts helps one to see a set of complementary concerns and approaches relating to interpreting linguistic, social, and epistemic practices that Wittgenstein found useful for addressing or otherwise dispelling philosophical confusion. Second, I also briefly introduce the two focal points of the book in diversifying philosophy of religion: Chinese philosophies and religions and the intertwining of racism and religion in the United States, and lastly, I conclude the chapter with some preliminary reflection on the sorts of hermeneutical approaches that may be helpful in clarifying religious diversities.

Chapter 2: “‘Grasping the Difficulty in Its Depth’: Wittgenstein and Globally Engaged Philosophy”

Chapter 2 considers the question of the aptness of Wittgenstein’s philosophy for efforts aimed at diversifying the field. Comparative philosophers sometimes use expressions of Wittgenstein’s (e.g.,“language-games,” “form of life,” and “family resemblance”) in attempts to conceive of the discipline of philosophy in a broad, open, and perhaps global way. These Wittgenstein-inspired approaches indicate an awareness of the importance of cultural and historical diversity for approaching philosophical questions. While some philosophers have taken inspiration from Wittgenstein in embracing contextualism in philosophical hermeneutics, Wittgenstein himself was more instrumental than contextual in his treatment of other philosophers; his focus in his writings was on his own philosophical problems. Does this mean that Wittgensteinian philosophy is a poor resource after all for comparative, cross-cultural, or globally engaged philosophy (i.e., if it is properly Wittgensteinian)? Building upon the methodological concerns of 1, in this chapter I examine the relevance of Wittgenstein to contextually sensitive philosophy through studies of his conceptions of history and culture, his interest in Spengler’s philosophy of history, and recent scholarship by Hans-Johann Glock and Hans Sluga on the place of contextualism in Wittgenstein’s analysis of philosophical problems. Ultimately, this chapter advances the view that there are strong resources in Wittgenstein’s philosophy for those seeking a more globally engaged approach to the field, and philosophy of religion in particular.

Chapter 3: “Wittgenstein and Ascriptions of ‘Religion’”

Chapter 3 considers the relevance of Wittgenstein’s philosophical methods to considering problems relating to the concept of religion. When conducting philosophy of religion in a globally engaged way, the nature and boundaries of the concept of religion itself become a problem for philosophical examination. The last few decades have seen an increasing amount of studies of the history of the term “religion” and how it figures in conceptions of “the secular” and of cultural differences generally. A recurrent theme in these studies is that “religion” carries associations with Protestant Christianity and thus is not as universal a category as it might appear. The aim of this chapter is to use Wittgenstein’s contextually sensitive philosophy to obtain greater clarity about the contexts of ascription of religion status to various phenomena and thus to gain perspective on claims made by scholars who investigate the genealogy of the term. While there is good reason to be circumspect about uncritical use of the term “religion” (no less in philosophizing about religions or conducting interreligious dialogue), I argue that instead of abandoning the term or proffering a critical theory of religion, investigation of ascriptions of religion will help philosophers to perceive more clearly the social dynamics that have led to someone or thing being called religious and thus avoid equivocations that could obstruct the ends of philosophical inquiry or dialogue. This in turn sets the stage for the philosophical study of diverse religious phenomena—from beliefs to practices, institutions, and varied modes of religious belonging—a topic that will be the major focus of the following chapters.

Chapter 4: “The Problem of Evil in Critical and Comparative Philosophy of Religion”

Chapter 4 applies the contextually sensitive philosophical approach developed in the previous chapters to consider what is at stake in two recent uses of the problem of evil in expanding philosophy of religion. In particular, this chapter examines the work of Franklin Perkins in comparative exploration of problems of evil in classical Chinese philosophy (especially in Confucian and Daoist texts) and of Biko Mandela Gray in hermeneutically using the problem to critique narratives used to justify police violence against Black Americans. Approaching these cases with an eye to contexts of argumentation shows how the concept of family resemblances is helpful for making sense of the radically different philosophical projects across the broad field of philosophy. Rather than seeing these cases as varied forms of a common problem of evil, this chapter argues instead that the hermeneutical concerns animating both Perkins’s and Gray’s respective philosophical projects serve to remind philosophers generally of the value of metalevel attention to one’s own and others’ local contexts and existential purposes in doing philosophy of religion.

Chapter 5: “Epistemology and Acknowledging Religious Differences”

Chapter 5 considers whether or to what extent Duncan Pritchard’s approach to hinge epistemology of religion is helpful for thinking about religious epistemology more broadly (i.e., beyond Christianity). Pritchard has for nearly two decades been developing and defending “Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism,” a view built from Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of religious belief. Drawing on ideas from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Pritchard’s view is that religious beliefs, such as “God exists,” are hinge propositions, commitments to ways of seeing and knowing the world, not propositional attitudes about the world that are justified by evidence. This chapter argues that Pritchard’s quasi-fideism, while fitting for some forms of Christian thought and reasonable as a partial interpretation of On Certainty, overlooks the variety of ways in which Wittgenstein writes about certainties and religious beliefs; the ultimate aim of the chapter is to develop a Wittgensteinian approach to the epistemology of religions that registers the different epistemic dynamics in play among diverse religious traditions. The first part of this chapter critically examines Pritchard’s views on interpreting Wittgenstein on religious belief and the development of the notion of quasi-fideism. In order to discern the different ways in which Wittgenstein’s philosophy approaches the dynamics of religious beliefs, the second part of the chapter considers Wittgenstein’s remarks on “hinges” and “grounds” in On Certainty. The third part of this chapter explores whether a hinge epistemology of religions could address a wide variety of ways in which beliefs operate within diverse religious traditions, including both theistic traditions such as Christianity and nontheistic traditions like Buddhism. Depending on social context and historical tradition, religious beliefs may be in some cases susceptible to revision based on inquiry, evidence, or experience and in other cases hardened against revision.

Chapter 6: “Chinese Religious Diversities and Philosophy of Religion”

Chapter 6 provides a case study on Wittgensteinian approaches to diversifying philosophy of religion through inquiry into forms of religious engagement in China. Drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” this chapter identifies five themes relevant to globally engaged philosophy of religion that appear when paying close attention to Chinese religious diversities: the significance of the reception and use of concepts of religion; the plurality of ways that religiosities may at times be combined, the pragmatic ways that people may adopt religious practices, beliefs, and values; the plausible combination of avowed atheism with nontheistic religious ideas and practices; and the impact of state power over social manifestations of religions as well as what may even be classified as a religion. Attention to these diversities will help philosophers avoid confusion based on unwarranted generalizations about what religiosity must be and contribute to opening scholars’ imaginations to the wide range of human possibilities when it comes to religiosities and potentially generate new insights on similar phenomena in other social contexts.

Chapter 7: “Baldwin and Wittgenstein on White Supremacism and Religion”

Chapter 7 turns our attention to ethical and existential problems relating to the entanglement of racism and religion in American society. Approaching hinge epistemology with an eye to religious diversities has the added benefit of allowing for fresh insight into philosophical problems less frequently studied; one such problem is the interconnection between racism and local forms of religion in the United States. The ongoing resilience of white supremacism in the United States and its ambiguous relationship to religious traditions is a vexing problem for those committed to egalitarian ethics and pluralist democratic society. To shed light on this problem, this chapter contends that James Baldwin’s exploration of racism and religion in The Fire Next Time may be put into constructive conversation with Wittgenstein’s consideration of fundamental epistemic commitments in On Certainty. Out of this engagement, I argue that white supremacism in the United States may be interpreted as being like a Wittgensteinian grounding or “hinge” commitment and that this viewpoint illuminates some of the ways in which white supremacism may interact with various kinds of religious commitments. This chapter develops further the previous chapter’s insights into religiously diverse hinge epistemology in order to perceive some of the ways in which racist grounding commitments can become intertwined with forms of religious commitment. This combined analysis putting Baldwin and Wittgenstein into constructive conversation depicts the extent to which fundamental commitments about race affect people deeply, including the formation of their ethical and civic values, existential and religious commitments, and range of empathetic capacity. Furthermore, the chapter also details similarities between Baldwin and Wittgenstein when it comes to their contentions that there is ethical value in the clarification of language and work on oneself.

Chapter 8: “Religious Diversities, Racism, and the Ethics of Clarification”

Chapter 8 offers a critical retrospective view of the book and the four themes that have animated the previous chapters. A central contention of this book is that Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical problems and to thinking about religions can contribute constructively but also critically to work aimed at diversifying the field. This chapter offers a critical overview of the themes the previous chapters have explored in connection with diverse forms of religion, the work of clarification, and philosophy of religion and then puts this work in conversation with some contemporary approaches aimed at expanding the range and nature of philosophy of religion. In particular, the chapter emphasizes that attention to religious diversities includes consideration of (1) the discursive contexts of terms like “religion,” (2) various religious phenomena, (3) the importance of social contexts, including forms of power within those contexts, for understanding the formation of religiosities, and (4) ethical aspects of clarificatory work itself in philosophy of religion (in terms of work on oneself and within one’s communities). Ultimately, the chapter considers the extent to which Wittgensteinian clarification of religious diversities and self-reflexive introspection is commensurate with contemporary research on hermeneutical justice. While Wittgenstein’s ethic of clarification reveals elements of epistemic and hermeneutical injustice, its aim is not to develop one overarching ethical point of view when it comes to philosophy of religion but rather to develop practices of self-reflexive local clarification.

Conclusion

Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014).

[Google Books]

Book Overview:

The commonly held view that Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion entails an irrationalist defense of religion known as ‘fideism’ loses plausibility when contrasted with recent scholarship on Wittgenstein’s corpus, biography, and other sources. This book reevaluates the place of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of religion and charts a path forward for the subfield by advancing three themes. The first is that philosophers of religion should question received interpretations of philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, as well as the meanings of key terms used in interpretations, such as ‘fideism’. The second theme is that Wittgenstein’s philosophy, across his corpus, pursues a particular end: a searching clarity or perspicuity. The third theme is that with the rise of various religious movements within societies and around the world in recent decades, philosophy of religion has important tasks in clarifying global conversations on living well amidst human diversities and contemplating philosophy as a vocation.

Table of Contents:

Introduction: “On Reading Wittgenstein on Religion”

The Introduction orients readers to the thesis and central themes of Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion. The seven chapters of the book together present a reassessment of the reception of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of religion. Contrary to the fideistic tendencies of some readings of Wittgenstein on religion, the book contends that Wittgenstein’s ethic of perspicuity may inspire those who also value clarity to pursue a searching knowledge of cultural variance and thus contribute to contemplation of what it means to live well amidst cultural diversity.

Chapter 1: “Problems of Interpretive Authority in Wittgenstein’s Corpus”

Chapter 1 identifies a variety of problems involved in developing a principled reading of Wittgenstein. In setting the stage for the book, this chapter explores hermeneutical problems of reading Wittgenstein’s works with an eye to their relevance to philosophy of religion. I explore the merits of some interpretive schemes readers have used in approaching Wittgenstein. While some of the sources that concern religions include private diaries and correspondences never intended for publication, these important but problematic texts merit close attention. I argue that these sources should be read against the central themes and arguments of the texts Wittgenstein did prepare for publication. One such central theme, the ethic of perspicuity, coordinates his readings of Wittgenstein’s corpus.

Chapter 2: “Wittgenstein, Biography, and Religious Identity”

Chapter 2 argues that studying Wittgenstein's biography is relevant to understanding his philosophical achievements and shortcomings. For Wittgenstein, philosophy was a personal practice as much as an academic discipline and one can see this practice in action in his life. I contend that the fragmentary and enigmatic remarks on religion found in places across his corpus can be better appreciated against the background of Wittgenstein’s life. The purpose of this chapter is to better appreciate the sources of discontinuity between Wittgenstein, who appears to have been alienated and possibly self-loathing, and his philosophy, which contains powerful resources for dismantling the very forces that bewitched him.

Chapter 3: “A History of Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion”

Chapter 3: ‘A History of Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion’ explores historically how the ideas of ‘meaning as use’, ‘language-games’, and ‘forms of life’ were of interest to philosophers of religion in the middle to late twentieth century due to the influence of verificationist tendencies in theories of meaning and austere naturalistic metaphysics. In the chapter, I trace the development of criticisms of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, with special attention given to the work of Kai Nielsen. Critics such as Nielsen have detected an intellectually evasive or protective trend in Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, and interpretations of Wittgenstein that suggest or propose a strong identification of language-games with religions clearly ought to be left behind.

Chapter 4: “The Traditions of Fideism”

(This chapter is an adaptation of my 2008 article of the same name.) Chapter 4 presents a perspicuous approach to the histories of philosophy and theology through tracing the genealogies of the critical term ‘fideism’ used in philosophical and theological classification and appraisal. Taking a cue from Wittgenstein, I propose that it is best to see how the term was actually used in its original context and to construct extensions of the term carefully from this original use. I trace the use of ‘fideism’ from its origins in French Protestant and Catholic theological discourses to its current uses in philosophy, concluding that the term is helpful in interpretations only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word.

Chapter 5: “On ‘Fideism’ as an Interpretive Category”

Chapter 5 considers the adequacy of ‘fideism’ for approaching Wittgenstein through comparisons with analyses of James and Kierkegaard. I argue that what emerges from this historical study of reception and interpretation is that the meaning of this critical term has continued to shift through twentieth century philosophical scholarship, and thus the question of whether or not any particular philosopher is a fideist is not straightforward. While a narrative may be traced showing threads of late nineteenth century French Protestant fideism in James’s writings, connections with Kierkegaard and fideism remain speculative and liable to introduce more misunderstanding than clarity. Unless narrowly circumscribed, use of the term ‘fideism’ in interpreting Wittgenstein is likely to introduce more confusion than insight.

Chapter 6: “Religions, Epistemic Isolation, and Social Trust"

Chapter 6 considers whether Wittgenstein’s philosophy provides resources that may be used to epistemically isolate and protect religious beliefs and practices from public criticism. I argue that a central theme in Wittgenstein’s philosophy – the social nature of linguistic meaning – is incompatible with the idea that religious discourses are conceptually cut off from other discourses. The chapter explores the remarks on the idea of a private language in Philosophical Investigations in order to show how the isolationist reading of Wittgenstein does not fit well with central features of his developed philosophy. Drawing on the work of Stanley Cavell on and Annette Baier, I argue that trust is a requirement for establishing and maintaining the cooperative venture of language.

Chapter 7: “Wittgenstein's Ethic of Perspicuity and Philosophy of Religion”

Chapter 7 considers the import of the perspicuity reading of Wittgenstein for contemporary philosophy of religion. In this chapter, I survey critically Stephen Mulhall’s therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein, D. Z. Phillips’ conception of contemplative philosophy, and John Clayton’s ideal of clarification of defensible differences. I also explore H. H. Price’s early criticisms of analytic philosophy, that philosophers have duties to their students and to the public that go beyond the mere analysis of concepts. Bringing together Price and Wittgenstein, I explore the role perspicuous philosophy of religion could play at a time in global history characterized by unprecedented contact across cultures and between peoples and in which traditionalist religious movements appear to be on the rise.

Edited Book:

John Clayton, Religions, Reasons and Gods: Essays in Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion, co-editor and contributor with Anne M. Blackburn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). [Google Books]

Book Overview:

Traditional theistic proofs are often understood as evidence intended to compel belief in a divinity. John Clayton explores the surprisingly varied applications of such proofs in the work of philosophers and theologians from several periods and traditions, thinkers as varied as Ramanuja, al-Ghazali, Anselm, and Jefferson. He shows how the gradual disembedding of theistic proofs from their diverse and local religious contexts is concurrent with the development of natural theologies and atheism as social and intellectual options in early modern Europe and America. Clayton offers a fresh reading of the early modern history of philosophy and theology, arguing that awareness of such history, and the local uses of theistic argument, offer important ways of managing religious and cultural difference in the public sphere. He argues for the importance of historically grounded philosophy of religion to the field of religious studies and public debate on religious pluralism and cultural diversity.

Peer-Reviewed Articles:

“Wittgenstein, Religious Diversity, and Communicative Reticence.” AGATHEOS: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Forthcoming.

Attempts to communicate across boundaries involving religions or cultures may fail before anything is asserted. While it is common in comparative philosophy of religion to focus on the compatibility or conflict between what is said by different interlocutors about metaphysical commitments or ethical values, this article instead examines reticence. Reticence has many forms in connection with religious and philosophical traditions. These include eloquent silences, speech acts counseling care in language use, circumspection about sharing ideas, declarations of inexpressibility, and political reticence. Drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “Lectures on Religious Belief” and On Certainty as well as work by Alessandra Tanesini on silence and speech acts, this article considers communicative and epistemic aspects of diverse religious encounters that may give rise to varied reticent moments. The aim is to enhance thinking about inter-religious and cross-cultural discourses by exploring the ways in which reticent moments are salient, if frequently overlooked, aspects of complex communicative situations.

“On Atheistic Hinges.” Religions (2025) 16(7): 870, Special Issue: New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion. [LINK]

Over the last couple of decades, philosophers have been drawing on ideas from Wittgenstein’s late work On Certainty in developing an approach to epistemology known as “hinge epistemology.” Hinge epistemology has been of particular interest to philosophers of religion because it considers the role that deep commitments to particular propositions may have within epistemic life, arguably mirroring what is seen in some religious traditions. The issue that motivates the present article is whether or to what extent it is helpful to think of forms of atheism as being grounded in hinge commitments. After considering various forms of atheism, this article advances the view that there are some forms of atheism that do exhibit core grounding commitments that may be helpfully interpreted as hinges. In developing this argument, the article considers two case studies of apparent atheistic hinges: the “secular faith” of Martin Hägglund and expressions of atheism one may find in contemporary Chinese society. While many atheistic beliefs are contingent upon still more fundamental epistemic commitments, some forms of atheism may be held strongly or with such a sense of import that interpretation by means of the notion of hinge commitment will be illuminating.

“The Philosophical Investigations in Philosophy of Religion”. JoLMA: The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts (2024) 5: 37-64, Special issue: Perspectives on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. [LINK]

Despite overlooking religious topics, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations has had a large impact in philosophy of religion. This article surveys that influence and the reasons for it. In what follows, I first describe the reception of certain key concepts from the Philosophical Investigations in philosophy of religion. Second, I examine a few scattered remarks on religious topics in the text. Third, I consider the relevance of the book for contemporary philosophy of religion. I argue that the dialogical nature of the Investigations, allowing different generations of readers to engage it with their particular philosophical problems, is key to its long-term influence.

"Baldwin and Wittgenstein on White Supremacism and Religion." Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 91/2, June 2023: 346-363. [LINK]

This article contends that James Baldwin’s exploration of racism and resistance to it in The Fire Next Time may be put into conversation with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s consideration of fundamental epistemic commitments in On Certainty. Out of this constructive engagement, I argue that white supremacism in the United States may be interpreted as being like a Wittgensteinian grounding or "hinge” commitment and that this viewpoint illuminates some of the ways in which white supremacism may interact with various kinds of religious commitments. This combined analysis depicts the extent to which fundamental commitments about race deeply affect people, including the formation of their ethical and civic values, existential and religious commitments, and range of empathetic capacity and also details similarities between Baldwin and Wittgenstein when it comes to their contentions that there is ethical value in the clarification of language and work on oneself.

“‘Grasping the Difficulty in its Depth’: Wittgenstein and Globally-Engaged Philosophy,” Sophia, 60/1, March 2021, pp. 1-18. [PDF]

In recent years, philosophers have used expressions of Wittgenstein’s (e.g. “language-games,” “form of life,” and “family resemblance”) in attempts to conceive of the discipline of philosophy in a broad, open, and perhaps global way. These Wittgenstein-inspired approaches indicate an awareness of the importance of cultural and historical diversity for approaching philosophical questions. While some philosophers have taken inspiration from Wittgenstein in embracing contextualism in philosophical hermeneutics, Wittgenstein himself was more instrumental than contextual in his treatment of other philosophers; his focus in his writings was on his own philosophical problems. Does this mean that Wittgensteinian philosophy is a poor resource after all for comparative, cross-cultural, or globally-engaged philosophy (i.e. if it is properly Wittgensteinian)? In this article, I examine the relevance of Wittgenstein to contextually-sensitive philosophy through studies of his conceptions of history and culture, his interest in Spengler’s philosophy of history, and recent scholarship by Hans-Johann Glock and Hans Sluga on the place of contextualism in Wittgenstein’s analysis of philosophical problems. Ultimately, this article advances the view that there are strong resources in Wittgenstein’s philosophy for those seeking a more globally-engaged approach to the field.

"Moments of Reticence in the Analects and Wittgenstein," Philosophy East and West, 70/3, July 2020, pp. 679-698. [PDF]

Despite the cultural distance between the Analects of Confucius and the writings of Wittgenstein, both link ethical cultivation with care in language use. This article explores that link by studying the both the implicit and explicit forms of reticence found in the textual sources. The objective is to bring into view some indirect modes of teaching within and across traditions, a dynamic that may be useful for future cross-cultural study of philosophical, religious, and/or ethical traditions.

“Wittgenstein and the Xunzi on the Clarification of Language,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 17/4, December 2018, pp. 527-545. [PDF]

Broadly speaking, language is part of a social activity in both Wittgenstein and Xunzi 荀子, and for both clarification of language is central to their philosophical projects; the goal of this article is to explore the extent of resonance and discord that may be found when comparing these two philosophers. While for Xunzi, the rectification of names (zhengming 正名) is anchored in a regard for establishing, propagating, and/or restoring a harmonious social system, perspicuity is for Wittgenstein represented as a philosophical end in itself. The article ventures study in particular the themes of perspicuity and aspect-perception in Wittgenstein together with the topics of correcting names and the cultivation of the heart-mind (xin 心) in the Xunzi. The aspiration of this project is to gain an overview of the role(s) of clarification projects in different philosophical traditions, all while not overlooking the different historical contexts and philosophical ends of these two philosophers.

“Wittgenstein and the Analects on the Ethics of Clarification,” Philosophy East and West, 66/4, October 2016, pp. 1148-1167. [PDF]

Scholars of early Confucianism such as Roger Ames and Chad Hansen argue that the doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming) ought to be understood not as involving a metaphysically robust conception of truth that regulates the meaning of language but instead as a social practice established in connection with the performative end of social harmony. This article draws some comparisons between the Confucian rectification of names, as represented by Ames and Hansen, and Wittgenstein’s philosophical pursuit of clarity, arguing that the two may help shed light on each other. While the ethics of clarification presents itself in the Analects and Wittgenstein in mutually illuminating ways, a key difference between the two lies in perspicuity operating as an ultimate end for Wittgenstein, while for Confucianism rectification of names itself serves the ultimate end of renewal of social harmony.

“The Problem of Relevance and the Future of Philosophy of Religion,” Metaphilosophy, January 2016, 47/1, pp. 39-58. [PDF]

Despite the growth in research in philosophy of religion over the last several decades, recent years have seen a number of critical studies of the subfield in an effort to redirect the methods and topics of inquiry. In addition to problems of religious parochialism described by critics such as Wesley Wildman, I argue that the subfield is facing a problem of relevance. In responding to this problem, I suggest philosophers of religion should do three things: first, be critically self-aware about their aims of inquiry; second, investigate concepts used by other philosophers, scientists, and religious studies scholars to identify and dispel confusion about religions; and third, following the model of applied ethics, work to clarify concepts and advance arguments of contemporary practical urgency.

“The Traditions of Fideism,” Religious Studies, March 2008, 44/1, pp. 1-22. [PDF]

Philosophers and theologians acknowledge that "fideism" is difficult to define but rarely agree on what the best characterization of the term is. In this article, I investigate the history of use of "fideism" to explore why its meaning has been so contested and thus why it has not always been helpful for resolving philosophical problems. I trace the use of the term from its origins in French theology to its current uses in philosophy and theology, concluding that "fideism" is helpful in resolving philosophical problems only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word.

Book Chapters and Essays in Collections:

“Wittgenstein, Naturalism, and Interpreting Religious Phenomena,” in Robert Vinten (ed.) Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion, Bloomsbury Publishers, 2023.

In this chapter, I explore in what senses Wittgenstein might be taken to support as well as to oppose naturalist approaches to interpreting religious phenomena. First, I provide a short overview of some passages from Wittgenstein’s writings—especially the “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough”—relevant to the issue of the naturalness of religious phenomena. Second, I venture some possibilities regarding what naturalism might mean in connection with Wittgenstein. Lastly, I explore the bearing of Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion for the interpretation of religious phenomena. Ultimately, I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion depict a way of thinking about the naturalness of religious phenomena, and that naturalistic depiction is part of the clarificatory work of philosophy. Wittgenstein reminds himself and his readers that religiosity is not something mysterious, per se; it is a core possibility within human life, one which can anchor meaningful living.

“Wittgenstein and Ascriptions of ‘Religion’,” in Gorazd Andrejc and Daniel Weiss (eds.) Interpreting Interreligious Relations with Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Brill Publishers, 2019. [PDF]

Recent years have seen an increasing amount of studies of the history of the term “religion” and how it figures in conceptions of “the secular” and of cultural differences generally. A recurrent theme in these studies is that “religion” carries associations with Protestant Christianity and thus is not as universal a category as it might appear. The aim of this paper is to explore some resources in Wittgenstein’s philosophy to obtain greater clarity about the contexts of ascription of religion-status to various phenomena and thus to gain perspective on claims made by scholars who investigate the genealogy of the term. While there is good reason to be circumspect about uncritical use of the term “religion” (no less in philosophizing about religions or conducting interreligious dialogue), I argue that instead of abandoning the term or proffering a critical theory of religion, investigation of ascriptions of religion will help philosophers to perceive more clearly the social dynamics that have led to some- one or thing being called religious and thus avoid equivocations that could obstruct the ends of philosophical inquiry or dialogue.

“Clarifying Conversations: Understanding Cultural Difference in Philosophical Education,” in Michael A. Peters, and Jeff Stickney, (eds.) A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education: Pedagogical Investigations, Springer, 2017. [PDF]

The goal of this essay is to explain how Wittgenstein’s philosophy may be helpful for understanding and addressing challenges to cross-cultural communication in educational contexts. In particular, the notions of “hinge,” “intellectual distance,” and “grounds” from On Certainty will be helpful for identifying cultural differences. Wittgenstein’s dialogical conception of philosophy in Philosophical Investigations will be helpful for addressing that cultural difference in conversation. While here can be no panacea to address all potential sources of confusion, Wittgenstein’s philosophy has strong resources that are helpful for curbing some of our human tendencies to misunderstand another person.

“The Debate over 'Wittgensteinian Fideism' and Phillips' Contemplative Philosophy of Religion,” in Ingolf U. Dalferth, and Hartmut von Sass, (eds.), The Contemplative Spirit: D. Z. Phillips on Religion and the Limits of Philosophy, Mohr Siebeck, 2010. [PDF]

When surveying the scholarly literature over Wittgensteinian fideism, it is easy to get the sense that the principal interlocutors, Kai Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips, talk past one another, but finding the right words for appraising the distance between the two voices is difficult. In this paper, I seek to appreciate this intellectual distance through an exploration of the varying philosophical aims of Nielsen and Phillips, of the different intellectual imperatives that guide their respective conceptions of philosophical practice. In so doing, I seek to show how a contemplative mode in philosophy may be used to appraise a philosophical dispute and the terms of disagreement. In this case, a contemplative approach to understanding the dispute would frame Nielsen’s and Phillips’ contributions against the backdrop of the ends they conceive philosophy to have.

"Wittgenstein and Method in the Study of Religion," Time, Memory, and Cultural Change, ed. S. Dempsey and D. Nichols, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conferences, Vol. 25., 2009. [Link] [PDF]

For better or worse, philosophers and other scholars of religions have been tempted to read Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” as offering a method to replace Frazer’s apparently problematic comparative-evolutionary framework for the interpretation of ritual practices. While the expectation of finding a theory in Wittgenstein’s text is understandable, it is liable to mislead. The desire to build theories is often what Wittgenstein wishes to quell in his writings. Since method remains a much-disputed topic in religious studies, debates over the usefulness of Wittgenstein persist. Far from providing a theory of religions, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic practice of philosophy is occasional, driven by exposure to a particular interlocutor or author.

Shorter Publications:

“Philosophy of Religion and Wittgenstein,” Dialogue: A Journal of Religion and Philosophy, Issue 62, April 2024.

This is a short piece for non-specialists on the relevance of Wittgenstein to philosophy of religion.

Book Review: Mu Peng, Religion and Religious Practices in Rural China (New York: Routledge, 2019), Reading Religion, 2021. [Link]

This is a review of Mu Peng's recent book on popular religion in rural China.

Book Review: Miles Hollingworth. Ludwig Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), Reading Religion, 2019. [Link]

This is a review of Miles Hollingworth's recent intellectual biography of Wittgenstein.

“Response to Brian R. Clack,” Sophia, September 2015, 54/3, pp. 381-383. [PDF]

This short paper is a response to Brian R. Clack's review of Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion.

“Fideism,” Encyclopedia of the Bible and its Reception, Vol. 8, De Gruyter, 2013. [PDF]

This is a short encyclopedia entry on the term.

Book Review: A. W. Moore. Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in Kant’s Moral and Religious Philosophy (London and New York, Routledge, 2003), Heythrop Journal, 46/4: 609-611, 2005. [PDF]

This is a review of A. W. Moore's book on Kant.

Google Sites

Report abuse