Research Overview:
Broadly speaking, my research explores the conditions for communication and cooperation between people from culturally, historically, or religiously distant ways of life.
In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophy is a clarifying activity that arises in response to conceptual confusion. In Philosophical Investigations, he writes, “A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.” (§122) Many philosophical problems arise from an inattention to the historical or social contexts in which claims are made; this lack of attention to contexts risks misunderstanding and equivocation in philosophical analyses.
My research draws on Wittgenstein’s philosophical methods to consider historical and contemporary problems in philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, and comparative ethics in contextually sensitive ways. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes philosophical problems as stemming from uncritical juxtapositions of language from different spheres of life or from distant cultures. Close attention to contexts of language use and careful attention to similarities across cases, as well as checking one’s own expectations in philosophizing, may be helpful for addressing the philosophical problems one stumbles across. Drawing on these metaphilosophical ideas, my research in philosophy of religion and comparative ethics pays close attention to cultural and religious diversities (including divergences among different contexts of diversity).
Over the last few years, I have been exploring the theme of the clarification of language being an expression of an ethical sensibility in both Wittgensteinian and Confucian philosophical traditions. Current research projects include studies of Wittgenstein and Chinese philosophy, religious epistemology in cross-cultural and inter-religious perspective, and philosophies of race and religion. I am currently working on a book project bringing together these various threads in rethinking philosophy of religion in a way inspired by Wittgenstein's philosophy.
When possible (according to the publisher's requirements), I have included links to some of the publications below.
Publications:
Book:
Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014). [Google Books]
Book Overview:
The commonly held view that Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion entails an irrationalist defense of religion known as ‘fideism’ loses plausibility when contrasted with recent scholarship on Wittgenstein’s corpus, biography, and other sources. This book reevaluates the place of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of religion and charts a path forward for the subfield by advancing three themes. The first is that philosophers of religion should question received interpretations of philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, as well as the meanings of key terms used in interpretations, such as ‘fideism’. The second theme is that Wittgenstein’s philosophy, across his corpus, pursues a particular end: a searching clarity or perspicuity. The third theme is that with the rise of various religious movements within societies and around the world in recent decades, philosophy of religion has important tasks in clarifying global conversations on living well amidst human diversities and contemplating philosophy as a vocation.
Table of Contents:
Introduction: “On Reading Wittgenstein on Religion”
The Introduction orients readers to the thesis and central themes of Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion. The seven chapters of the book together present a reassessment of the reception of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of religion. Contrary to the fideistic tendencies of some readings of Wittgenstein on religion, the book contends that Wittgenstein’s ethic of perspicuity may inspire those who also value clarity to pursue a searching knowledge of cultural variance and thus contribute to contemplation of what it means to live well amidst cultural diversity.
Chapter 1: “Problems of Interpretive Authority in Wittgenstein’s Corpus”
Chapter 1 identifies a variety of problems involved in developing a principled reading of Wittgenstein. In setting the stage for the book, this chapter explores hermeneutical problems of reading Wittgenstein’s works with an eye to their relevance to philosophy of religion. I explore the merits of some interpretive schemes readers have used in approaching Wittgenstein. While some of the sources that concern religions include private diaries and correspondences never intended for publication, these important but problematic texts merit close attention. I argue that these sources should be read against the central themes and arguments of the texts Wittgenstein did prepare for publication. One such central theme, the ethic of perspicuity, coordinates his readings of Wittgenstein’s corpus.
Chapter 2: “Wittgenstein, Biography, and Religious Identity”
Chapter 2 argues that studying Wittgenstein's biography is relevant to understanding his philosophical achievements and shortcomings. For Wittgenstein, philosophy was a personal practice as much as an academic discipline and one can see this practice in action in his life. I contend that the fragmentary and enigmatic remarks on religion found in places across his corpus can be better appreciated against the background of Wittgenstein’s life. The purpose of this chapter is to better appreciate the sources of discontinuity between Wittgenstein, who appears to have been alienated and possibly self-loathing, and his philosophy, which contains powerful resources for dismantling the very forces that bewitched him.
Chapter 3: “A History of Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion”
Chapter 3: ‘A History of Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion’ explores historically how the ideas of ‘meaning as use’, ‘language-games’, and ‘forms of life’ were of interest to philosophers of religion in the middle to late twentieth century due to the influence of verificationist tendencies in theories of meaning and austere naturalistic metaphysics. In the chapter, I trace the development of criticisms of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, with special attention given to the work of Kai Nielsen. Critics such as Nielsen have detected an intellectually evasive or protective trend in Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, and interpretations of Wittgenstein that suggest or propose a strong identification of language-games with religions clearly ought to be left behind.
Chapter 4: “The Traditions of Fideism”
(This chapter is an adaptation of my 2008 article of the same name.) Chapter 4 presents a perspicuous approach to the histories of philosophy and theology through tracing the genealogies of the critical term ‘fideism’ used in philosophical and theological classification and appraisal. Taking a cue from Wittgenstein, I propose that it is best to see how the term was actually used in its original context and to construct extensions of the term carefully from this original use. I trace the use of ‘fideism’ from its origins in French Protestant and Catholic theological discourses to its current uses in philosophy, concluding that the term is helpful in interpretations only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word.
Chapter 5: “On ‘Fideism’ as an Interpretive Category”
Chapter 5 considers the adequacy of ‘fideism’ for approaching Wittgenstein through comparisons with analyses of James and Kierkegaard. I argue that what emerges from this historical study of reception and interpretation is that the meaning of this critical term has continued to shift through twentieth century philosophical scholarship, and thus the question of whether or not any particular philosopher is a fideist is not straightforward. While a narrative may be traced showing threads of late nineteenth century French Protestant fideism in James’s writings, connections with Kierkegaard and fideism remain speculative and liable to introduce more misunderstanding than clarity. Unless narrowly circumscribed, use of the term ‘fideism’ in interpreting Wittgenstein is likely to introduce more confusion than insight.
Chapter 6: “Religions, Epistemic Isolation, and Social Trust"
Chapter 6 considers whether Wittgenstein’s philosophy provides resources that may be used to epistemically isolate and protect religious beliefs and practices from public criticism. I argue that a central theme in Wittgenstein’s philosophy – the social nature of linguistic meaning – is incompatible with the idea that religious discourses are conceptually cut off from other discourses. The chapter explores the remarks on the idea of a private language in Philosophical Investigations in order to show how the isolationist reading of Wittgenstein does not fit well with central features of his developed philosophy. Drawing on the work of Stanley Cavell on and Annette Baier, I argue that trust is a requirement for establishing and maintaining the cooperative venture of language.
Chapter 7: “Wittgenstein's Ethic of Perspicuity and Philosophy of Religion”
Chapter 7 considers the import of the perspicuity reading of Wittgenstein for contemporary philosophy of religion. In this chapter, I survey critically Stephen Mulhall’s therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein, D. Z. Phillips’ conception of contemplative philosophy, and John Clayton’s ideal of clarification of defensible differences. I also explore H. H. Price’s early criticisms of analytic philosophy, that philosophers have duties to their students and to the public that go beyond the mere analysis of concepts. Bringing together Price and Wittgenstein, I explore the role perspicuous philosophy of religion could play at a time in global history characterized by unprecedented contact across cultures and between peoples and in which traditionalist religious movements appear to be on the rise.
Edited Book:
John Clayton, Religions, Reasons and Gods: Essays in Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion, co-editor and contributor with Anne M. Blackburn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). [Google Books]
Book Overview:
Traditional theistic proofs are often understood as evidence intended to compel belief in a divinity. John Clayton explores the surprisingly varied applications of such proofs in the work of philosophers and theologians from several periods and traditions, thinkers as varied as Ramanuja, al-Ghazali, Anselm, and Jefferson. He shows how the gradual disembedding of theistic proofs from their diverse and local religious contexts is concurrent with the development of natural theologies and atheism as social and intellectual options in early modern Europe and America. Clayton offers a fresh reading of the early modern history of philosophy and theology, arguing that awareness of such history, and the local uses of theistic argument, offer important ways of managing religious and cultural difference in the public sphere. He argues for the importance of historically grounded philosophy of religion to the field of religious studies and public debate on religious pluralism and cultural diversity.
Peer-Reviewed Articles:
"Baldwin and Wittgenstein on White Supremacism and Religion." Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 91/2, June 2023: 346-363. [LINK]
This article contends that James Baldwin’s exploration of racism and resistance to it in The Fire Next Time may be put into conversation with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s consideration of fundamental epistemic commitments in On Certainty. Out of this constructive engagement, I argue that white supremacism in the United States may be interpreted as being like a Wittgensteinian grounding or "hinge” commitment and that this viewpoint illuminates some of the ways in which white supremacism may interact with various kinds of religious commitments. This combined analysis depicts the extent to which fundamental commitments about race deeply affect people, including the formation of their ethical and civic values, existential and religious commitments, and range of empathetic capacity and also details similarities between Baldwin and Wittgenstein when it comes to their contentions that there is ethical value in the clarification of language and work on oneself.
“‘Grasping the Difficulty in its Depth’: Wittgenstein and Globally-Engaged Philosophy,” Sophia, 60/1, March 2021, pp. 1-18. [PDF]
In recent years, philosophers have used expressions of Wittgenstein’s (e.g. “language-games,” “form of life,” and “family resemblance”) in attempts to conceive of the discipline of philosophy in a broad, open, and perhaps global way. These Wittgenstein-inspired approaches indicate an awareness of the importance of cultural and historical diversity for approaching philosophical questions. While some philosophers have taken inspiration from Wittgenstein in embracing contextualism in philosophical hermeneutics, Wittgenstein himself was more instrumental than contextual in his treatment of other philosophers; his focus in his writings was on his own philosophical problems. Does this mean that Wittgensteinian philosophy is a poor resource after all for comparative, cross-cultural, or globally-engaged philosophy (i.e. if it is properly Wittgensteinian)? In this article, I examine the relevance of Wittgenstein to contextually-sensitive philosophy through studies of his conceptions of history and culture, his interest in Spengler’s philosophy of history, and recent scholarship by Hans-Johann Glock and Hans Sluga on the place of contextualism in Wittgenstein’s analysis of philosophical problems. Ultimately, this article advances the view that there are strong resources in Wittgenstein’s philosophy for those seeking a more globally-engaged approach to the field.
"Moments of Reticence in the Analects and Wittgenstein," Philosophy East and West, 70/3, July 2020, pp. 679-698. [PDF]
Despite the cultural distance between the Analects of Confucius and the writings of Wittgenstein, both link ethical cultivation with care in language use. This article explores that link by studying the both the implicit and explicit forms of reticence found in the textual sources. The objective is to bring into view some indirect modes of teaching within and across traditions, a dynamic that may be useful for future cross-cultural study of philosophical, religious, and/or ethical traditions.
“Wittgenstein and the Xunzi on the Clarification of Language,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 17/4, December 2018, pp. 527-545. [PDF]
Broadly speaking, language is part of a social activity in both Wittgenstein and Xunzi 荀子, and for both clarification of language is central to their philosophical projects; the goal of this article is to explore the extent of resonance and discord that may be found when comparing these two philosophers. While for Xunzi, the rectification of names (zhengming 正名) is anchored in a regard for establishing, propagating, and/or restoring a harmonious social system, perspicuity is for Wittgenstein represented as a philosophical end in itself. The article ventures study in particular the themes of perspicuity and aspect-perception in Wittgenstein together with the topics of correcting names and the cultivation of the heart-mind (xin 心) in the Xunzi. The aspiration of this project is to gain an overview of the role(s) of clarification projects in different philosophical traditions, all while not overlooking the different historical contexts and philosophical ends of these two philosophers.
“Wittgenstein and the Analects on the Ethics of Clarification,” Philosophy East and West, 66/4, October 2016, pp. 1148-1167. [PDF]
Scholars of early Confucianism such as Roger Ames and Chad Hansen argue that the doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming) ought to be understood not as involving a metaphysically robust conception of truth that regulates the meaning of language but instead as a social practice established in connection with the performative end of social harmony. This article draws some comparisons between the Confucian rectification of names, as represented by Ames and Hansen, and Wittgenstein’s philosophical pursuit of clarity, arguing that the two may help shed light on each other. While the ethics of clarification presents itself in the Analects and Wittgenstein in mutually illuminating ways, a key difference between the two lies in perspicuity operating as an ultimate end for Wittgenstein, while for Confucianism rectification of names itself serves the ultimate end of renewal of social harmony.
“The Problem of Relevance and the Future of Philosophy of Religion,” Metaphilosophy, January 2016, 47/1, pp. 39-58. [PDF]
Despite the growth in research in philosophy of religion over the last several decades, recent years have seen a number of critical studies of the subfield in an effort to redirect the methods and topics of inquiry. In addition to problems of religious parochialism described by critics such as Wesley Wildman, I argue that the subfield is facing a problem of relevance. In responding to this problem, I suggest philosophers of religion should do three things: first, be critically self-aware about their aims of inquiry; second, investigate concepts used by other philosophers, scientists, and religious studies scholars to identify and dispel confusion about religions; and third, following the model of applied ethics, work to clarify concepts and advance arguments of contemporary practical urgency.
“The Traditions of Fideism,” Religious Studies, March 2008, 44/1, pp. 1-22. [PDF]
Philosophers and theologians acknowledge that "fideism" is difficult to define but rarely agree on what the best characterization of the term is. In this article, I investigate the history of use of "fideism" to explore why its meaning has been so contested and thus why it has not always been helpful for resolving philosophical problems. I trace the use of the term from its origins in French theology to its current uses in philosophy and theology, concluding that "fideism" is helpful in resolving philosophical problems only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word.
Book Chapters and Essays in Collections:
“Wittgenstein, Naturalism, and Interpreting Religious Phenomena,” in Robert Vinten (ed.) Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion, Bloomsbury Publishers, 2023.
In this chapter, I explore in what senses Wittgenstein might be taken to support as well as to oppose naturalist approaches to interpreting religious phenomena. First, I provide a short overview of some passages from Wittgenstein’s writings—especially the “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough”—relevant to the issue of the naturalness of religious phenomena. Second, I venture some possibilities regarding what naturalism might mean in connection with Wittgenstein. Lastly, I explore the bearing of Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion for the interpretation of religious phenomena. Ultimately, I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion depict a way of thinking about the naturalness of religious phenomena, and that naturalistic depiction is part of the clarificatory work of philosophy. Wittgenstein reminds himself and his readers that religiosity is not something mysterious, per se; it is a core possibility within human life, one which can anchor meaningful living.
“Wittgenstein and Ascriptions of ‘Religion’,” in Gorazd Andrejc and Daniel Weiss (eds.) Interpreting Interreligious Relations with Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Brill Publishers, 2019. [PDF]
Recent years have seen an increasing amount of studies of the history of the term “religion” and how it figures in conceptions of “the secular” and of cultural differences generally. A recurrent theme in these studies is that “religion” carries associations with Protestant Christianity and thus is not as universal a category as it might appear. The aim of this paper is to explore some resources in Wittgenstein’s philosophy to obtain greater clarity about the contexts of ascription of religion-status to various phenomena and thus to gain perspective on claims made by scholars who investigate the genealogy of the term. While there is good reason to be circumspect about uncritical use of the term “religion” (no less in philosophizing about religions or conducting interreligious dialogue), I argue that instead of abandoning the term or proffering a critical theory of religion, investigation of ascriptions of religion will help philosophers to perceive more clearly the social dynamics that have led to some- one or thing being called religious and thus avoid equivocations that could obstruct the ends of philosophical inquiry or dialogue.
“Clarifying Conversations: Understanding Cultural Difference in Philosophical Education,” in Michael A. Peters, and Jeff Stickney, (eds.) A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education: Pedagogical Investigations, Springer, 2017. [PDF]
The goal of this essay is to explain how Wittgenstein’s philosophy may be helpful for understanding and addressing challenges to cross-cultural communication in educational contexts. In particular, the notions of “hinge,” “intellectual distance,” and “grounds” from On Certainty will be helpful for identifying cultural differences. Wittgenstein’s dialogical conception of philosophy in Philosophical Investigations will be helpful for addressing that cultural difference in conversation. While here can be no panacea to address all potential sources of confusion, Wittgenstein’s philosophy has strong resources that are helpful for curbing some of our human tendencies to misunderstand another person.
“The Debate over 'Wittgensteinian Fideism' and Phillips' Contemplative Philosophy of Religion,” in Ingolf U. Dalferth, and Hartmut von Sass, (eds.), The Contemplative Spirit: D. Z. Phillips on Religion and the Limits of Philosophy, Mohr Siebeck, 2010. [PDF]
When surveying the scholarly literature over Wittgensteinian fideism, it is easy to get the sense that the principal interlocutors, Kai Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips, talk past one another, but finding the right words for appraising the distance between the two voices is difficult. In this paper, I seek to appreciate this intellectual distance through an exploration of the varying philosophical aims of Nielsen and Phillips, of the different intellectual imperatives that guide their respective conceptions of philosophical practice. In so doing, I seek to show how a contemplative mode in philosophy may be used to appraise a philosophical dispute and the terms of disagreement. In this case, a contemplative approach to understanding the dispute would frame Nielsen’s and Phillips’ contributions against the backdrop of the ends they conceive philosophy to have.
"Wittgenstein and Method in the Study of Religion," Time, Memory, and Cultural Change, ed. S. Dempsey and D. Nichols, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conferences, Vol. 25., 2009. [Link] [PDF]
For better or worse, philosophers and other scholars of religions have been tempted to read Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” as offering a method to replace Frazer’s apparently problematic comparative-evolutionary framework for the interpretation of ritual practices. While the expectation of finding a theory in Wittgenstein’s text is understandable, it is liable to mislead. The desire to build theories is often what Wittgenstein wishes to quell in his writings. Since method remains a much-disputed topic in religious studies, debates over the usefulness of Wittgenstein persist. Far from providing a theory of religions, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic practice of philosophy is occasional, driven by exposure to a particular interlocutor or author.
Shorter Publications:
Book Review: Mu Peng, Religion and Religious Practices in Rural China (New York: Routledge, 2019), Reading Religion, 2021. [Link]
This is a review of Mu Peng's recent book on popular religion in rural China.
Book Review: Miles Hollingworth. Ludwig Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), Reading Religion, 2019. [Link]
This is a review of Miles Hollingworth's recent intellectual biography of Wittgenstein.
“Response to Brian R. Clack,” Sophia, September 2015, 54/3, pp. 381-383. [PDF]
This short paper is a response to Brian R. Clack's review of Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion.
“Fideism,” Encyclopedia of the Bible and its Reception, Vol. 8, De Gruyter, 2013. [PDF]
This is a short encyclopedia entry on the term.
Book Review: A. W. Moore. Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in Kant’s Moral and Religious Philosophy (London and New York, Routledge, 2003), Heythrop Journal, 46/4: 609-611, 2005. [PDF]
This is a review of A. W. Moore's book on Kant.