with Phil Strahan and Jun Yang
This paper studies banks’ investment in risk management human capital following the Global Financial Crisis and the advent of stress testing. Our results suggest that ‘Too Big to Fail’ distortions may have weakened large banks’ incentive to invest in risk management talent. Stress testing, which focuses on the largest banks, spurred demand for skilled quantitative risk managers, but only narrowly in anticipation of a test and following poor performance on a test. Stress testing does not affect demand for the over 90% of risk management jobs not linked to passing tests, limiting its effectiveness in improving risk management practices.
Media coverage: American Banker, Duke University's FinReg Blog
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) increases competition and limits pay-for-luck by rewarding executives for outperforming rivals. This study tests whether institutional investors reduce RPE use when they own stakes in competing firms. Contrary to this, the Big Three asset managers – BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street – demonstrate strong preferences for RPE, reflected in portfolio firms’ RPE adoptions, say-on-pay vote support, and peer group selections. No evidence suggests that common ownership by these or other institutional investors reduces RPE, as confidence bounds and point estimates are near zero. Overall, the rising prevalence of RPE challenges concerns about anticompetitive effects from common ownership.
Media coverage: CLS Blue Sky Blog
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) intensifies competitive pressure by tying executive compensation to the profits of rivals. We show that these contracts make loan syndication harder by reducing banks’ willingness to participate in loans underwritten by banks named in their RPE contracts. Lead arranger banks, which are more frequently named in RPE, hold larger shares of the loans they syndicate, and their borrowers receive smaller and fewer loans and face higher spreads. Our results highlight the tension between the normal benefits of competition versus the need for cooperation in loan syndication.
with Phil Strahan and Jun Yang
We test whether measures of potential influence on regulators affect stress test outcomes. The large trading banks – those most plausibly ‘Too big to Fail’ – face the toughest tests. In contrast, we find no evidence that either political or regulatory connections affect the tests. Stress tests have a greater effect on the value of large trading banks’ portfolios; the large trading banks respond by making more conservative capital plans; and, despite their more conservative capital plans, the large trading banks still fail their tests more frequently than other banks. These results are consistent with a public-interest view of regulation, not regulatory capture.
Using novel data on explicit compensation benchmarking peer groups, I document that small public firms engage in upward compensation benchmarking to a much greater extent than larger firms. Small firms choose aspirational peers that reflect their executives’ shifting opportunity sets. For these firms, compensation benchmarking is indicative of future growth and performance, and the rate at which pay adjusts toward peer levels is sensitive to executives’ outside employment opportunities. Growing and outperforming small firms strategically use upward benchmarking to adjust pay in an effort to retain valuable managerial talent.
Media coverage: CLS Blue Sky Blog
with Phil Strahan and Jun Yang
This article describes the evolution of the U.S. banking system, with an emphasis on the rise of shadow banking in the modern era. Shadow banking describes the movement of liquidity transformation from banks to a set of institutions and financial arrangements in the securities markets and outside the traditional regulatory framework. This movement occurred in part from value-enhancing innovation, and in part from less valuable efforts to avoid bank regulations. Both the Global Financial Crisis and the financial disruptions around the 2020 COVID-19 Crisis centered on shadow banks. As we show, “regulatory arbitrage” and shadow bank growth continue apace, suggesting future financial instability.
with Carl J. Schreck III, Stephen Bennett, Jason Cordeira, Jake Crouch, Jenny Dissen, Andrea Lang, David Margolin, Adam O’Shay, Jared Rennie, and Michael Ventrice
Day-to-day volatility in natural gas markets is driven largely by variability in heating demand, which is in turn dominated by cool-season temperature anomalies over the northeastern quadrant of the United States (“Midwest–East”). Energy traders rely on temperature forecasts at horizons of 2–4 weeks to anticipate those fluctuations in demand. Forecasts from dynamical models are widely available, so the markets react quickly to changes in the model predictions. Traders often work with meteorologists who leverage teleconnections from the tropics and the Arctic to improve upon the model forecasts. This study demonstrates how natural gas prices react to Midwest–East temperatures using the anomalous winters of 2011/12 and 2013/14. These examples also illustrate how energy meteorologists use teleconnections from the Arctic and the tropics to forecast heating demand.