Abstract:
This article describes the evolution of the U.S. banking system, with an emphasis on the rise of shadow banking in the modern era. Shadow banking describes the movement of liquidity transformation from banks to a set of institutions and financial arrangements in the securities markets and outside the traditional regulatory framework. This movement occurred in part from value-enhancing innovation, and in part from less valuable efforts to avoid bank regulations. Both the Global Financial Crisis and the financial disruptions around the 2020 COVID-19 Crisis centered on shadow banks. As we show, “regulatory arbitrage” and shadow bank growth continue apace, suggesting future financial instability.
Bank Stress Testing, Human Capital Investment and Risk Management
Abstract:
This paper studies banks’ investment in risk management practices following the Global Financial Crisis and the advent of stress testing. Banks that experienced greater losses during the Crisis exhibit stronger demand for risk management talents. Banks increase their demand for highly skilled stress test labor in anticipation of a test and following poor performance on a test. Following this higher demand, banks exhibit lower systematic risk and lower profitability. While stress testing has modernized banks’ internal risk management by spurring the acquisition of highly skilled risk management talent, recent changes to the tests could erode its efficacy.
How Perception affects Housing Prices: Evidence from Failed Auctions
Abstract:
In Australian real estate markets, about a third of properties are sold at auction. We show that properties that fail auctions sell later for a 2.6% discount. This effect increases for properties failing multiple auctions and when no bids are made. Consistent with a causal channel, the effect holds when auction failure is instrumented by the tendency of owners to anchor on nearby better properties (and thus set reserve prices too high). Prices cluster just below salient round numbers, and the discount fades over time, inconsistent with our effects reflecting unobserved property characteristics. We test for several mechanisms and conclude that most of the pricing discounts reflect stigma, which reduces potential buyers’ willingness to pay.
Syndicated Lending, Competition and Relative Performance Evaluation
Abstract:
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) intensifies competitive pressure by tying executive compensation to the profits of rivals. We show that these contracts make loan syndication harder by reducing banks’ willingness to participate in loans underwritten by banks named in their RPE contracts. Lead arranger banks which are more frequently named in RPE hold larger shares of the loans they syndicate, and their borrowers face higher spreads. These banks, in turn, lose market share to banks less likely to be named in RPE. Our results highlight the tension between the normal benefits of competition versus the need for cooperation in loan syndication.
Deposit Market Power, Funding Stability and Long-Term Credit
Abstract:
This paper shows that banks raising deposits in more concentrated markets have more funding stability, which enhances banks’ ability to extend longer-maturity loans. We show that banks raising deposits in concentrated markets exhibit less pro-cyclical financing costs and profits, which in turn reduces the funding risk of originating long-term illiquid loans. Consistently, banks with deposit HHI one standard deviation above average extend loans with about 20% longer maturity than those with deposit HHI one standard deviation below average. Deposit concentration also allows banks to charge lower maturity premiums. Access to banks raising funds in concentrated markets improves growth in industries traditionally reliant on long-term credit.
Who Supplies PPP Loans (and Does it Matter)? Banks, Relationships and the Covid Crisis
Abstract:
We analyze bank supply of credit under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). The literature emphasizes relationships as a means to improve lender information, which helps banks manage credit risk. Despite imposing no risk, however, PPP supply reflects traditional measures of relationship lending: decreasing in bank size; increasing in prior experience, in commitment lending, and in core deposits. Our results suggest a new benefit of bank relationships, as they help firms access government-subsidized lending. Consistent with this benefit, we show that bank PPP supply, based on the structure of the local banking sector, alleviates increases in unemployment.
Banks as Lenders of First Resort: Evidence from the Covid-19 Crisis
Abstract:
In March 2020, banks faced the largest increase in liquidity demands ever observed. Firms drew funds on a massive scale from preexisting credit lines in anticipation of cash flow and financial disruptions stemming from the advent of the COVID-19 crisis. The increase in liquidity demands was concentrated at the largest banks, who serve the largest firms. Precrisis financial condition did not constrain large banks’ liquidity supply. Coincident inflows of funds from both the Federal Reserve’s liquidity injection programs and depositors, along with strong preshock bank capital, explain why banks were able to accommodate these liquidity demands.
Bank Stress Testing: Public Interest or Regulatory Capture?
Abstract:
We test whether measures of influence on regulators affect stress-test outcomes. The large trading banks—those most plausibly Too Big to Fail—face the toughest tests. Supervisory stress tests have a greater effect on large trading banks’ portfolios; the large banks respond by making more conservative (initial) capital plans; and, despite their more conservative capital plans, the large banks still fail their tests more frequently than other banks. In contrast, while we find little evidence that political or regulatory connections affect the quantitative element of the stress tests, these connected banks do face less scrutiny under its qualitative dimension.