The rising complexity in the design and manufacturing stages of such electronic devices coupled together with the need for a shorter turnaround time has caused the semiconductor industry to move towards a distributed manufacturing ecosystem where some or most of the hardware IP cores and processes are supplied and handled by third-party vendors. Any of these intermediate entities could compromise the integrity of the manufactured device by introducing hardware Trojans. Hardware Trojans are malicious circuits that can be incorporated to the hardware IP at any stage in the microelectronic manufacturing process. The Trojan circuitry could be present at the IC, printed circuit board, or system (consisting of multiple boards) level. We have developed trust verification technologies to detect hardware Trojans at various hardware abstractions, including IP, IC, and PCB.
Related Publication:
Hoque, T., Yang, K., Karam, R., Tajik, S., Forte, D., Tehranipoor, M., & Bhunia, S. (2020). Hidden in Plaintext: An Obfuscation-based Countermeasure against FPGA Bitstream Tampering Attacks. ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems, 25(1).
Hoque, T., Chakraborty, R. S., & Bhunia, S. (2020). Hardware Obfuscation and Logic Locking: A Tutorial Introduction. IEEE Design & Test, 37(3), 59-77. (Refereed)
Alaql, A., Hoque, T., Forte, D., & Bhunia, S. (2019). Quality Obfuscation for Error-Tolerant and Adaptive Hardware IP Protection. In 2019 IEEE 37th VLSI Test Symposium (VTS). IEEE. (Refereed)
Karam, R., Hoque, T., Butler, K., & Bhunia, S. (2017). Mixed-granular architectural diversity for device security in the Internet of Things. In 2017 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST).