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Middle East and North Africa
Middle East and North Africa
Authoritarian resilience
Authoritarian resilience
Introduction
Introduction
How many countries belong to the MENA region?
How many countries belong to the MENA region?
The right answer is 19-25
The right answer is 19-25
Dark red: always mentioned; red: mentioned more than once; light red: mentioned once
World Bank 2003: 21
IMF 2003: 24
UNHCR 2010: 19
FAO 2015: 20
UNAIDS 2019: 20
UNICEF 2021: 20
UNSD 2021: 25
Factors that homogenize the region
Factors that homogenize the region
Language
Arabic, Farsi, Turkish, Kurdish, Hebrew
Natural Resources
Most of the region is rich in natural resources such as oil and gas, for example the classic oil states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.
Countries that do not have large oil resources have other natural resources to fall back on, such as phosphates in Morocco, for example, or metal deposits in countries such as Algeria and Mauritania.
Economic situation
Economic situation
Qatar has the fourth highest GDP per capita after Singapore, Luxembourg, and Ireland. But other countries are also reaching numbers comparable to the Global South.
United in the form of government
United in the form of government
Almost every country in the Middle East and North Africa is ruled by an authoritarian government.
In the MENA region, the Freedom Index is directly linked to the Democracy Index; a democratic country in this region also achieves “free” status in the Freedom Index.
Theoretical concept: Authoritarian Resilience
Theoretical concept: Authoritarian Resilience
A Stroll through the Empirical Landscape of Arab Authoritarianism Studies
A Stroll through the Empirical Landscape of Arab Authoritarianism Studies
Before 2011: Authoritarian Durability and “Arab Exceptionalism”
Focus on explaining why Arab regimes remained durable.
Emphasis on elite politics, institutions, patronage, and co-optation.
Repression seen as a constant background factor, not a main variable.
Implicit belief in “Arab exceptionalism” (Arab states uniquely resistant to democratization).
After 2011: Shift toward Repression and Civil–Military Relations
Shift toward studying how regimes responded to mass protests.
Strong focus on repression dynamics and the protest–repression nexus.
Civil–military relations become central to explaining regime survival or collapse.
Repression understood as a variable, adaptive strategy, not a fixed characteristic.
Before 2011: Authoritarian Durability and “Arab Exceptionalism”
Before 2011: Authoritarian Durability and “Arab Exceptionalism”
Resilience through Refined Athoritarian Statecraft
Resilience through Refined Athoritarian Statecraft
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran
Jordanian police during demonstration
Sednaya prison in Syira
Strong coercive institutions (mukhabarat - secret-police and intelligence services, high security spending)
Mix of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression
Liberalization is cyclical: periods of opening followed by renewed control
Journal of Democracy Volume 21, Number 1 January 2010 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press
Resilience through Managed Reform
Resilience through Managed Reform
Use of reform language to avoid real democratization
Elections and competition strictly controlled to disadvantage opposition
Opposition faces the dilemma of cooptation or political irrelevance
Journal of Democracy Volume 21, Number 1 January 2010 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press
Economic Resilience (Rentierism)
Economic Resilience (Rentierism)
Oil and gas rents provide financial independence from citizens.
“No taxation, no representation”: weak accountability and civic pressure.
Centralized, corrupt states use wealth to buy stability; foreign aid plays a similar role in non-oil states.
Journal of Democracy Volume 21, Number 1 January 2010 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press
After 2011: Shift toward Repression and Civil–Military Relations
After 2011: Shift toward Repression and Civil–Military Relations
Maria Josua & Mirjam Edel (2021) The Arab uprisings and the return of repression, Mediterranean Politics, 26:5, 586-611, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2021.1889298
Types of Post-Uprising Repression
Types of Post-Uprising Repression
Maria Josua & Mirjam Edel (2021) The Arab uprisings and the return of repression, Mediterranean Politics, 26:5, 586-611, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2021.1889298
Dimesnions of repression
Dimesnions of repression
Maria Josua & Mirjam Edel (2021) The Arab uprisings and the return of repression, Mediterranean Politics, 26:5, 586-611, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2021.1889298
Case study: United Arab Emirates
Case study: United Arab Emirates
It is a federation comprehensive of seven countries that has grown into one of the most influencing economic centres of the world.
The seven Emirates are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah.
The leader of the federation is Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan since 2022.
The seven Emirates are each ruled by a different family, but they are bounded by the Union they created.
The Government
The Government
The UAE is a constitutional Federation.
The highest governmental, executive and legislative authority is the Federal Supreme Council (FSC), which is composed of the rulers of the seven emirates, it selects a president and vice president from among its members, and the president appoints a prime minister and cabinet.
The unicameral legislative is the Federal National Council (FNC), actually invested with only advisory powers, has been elected every four years since 2006. Since 2019, a law was created to ensure that half of the council members must be women. In the same year, women resulted to be the majority of the voters.
Each Emirate has its own tribe composed by the members of the ruling family. Each tribe has its own leader, the sheik, that composes the FSC.
GDP and oil production
GDP and oil production
GDP of Emirates is one of the highest of the world. Although this could suggest a government capacity to address and solve inequality, it actually demonstrates that wealth is unevenly distributed and in the hands of few, as Emirates is a monarchy with no democratic features whatsoever.
The production of petroleum and natural gas contributes about one-third of the nation’s GDP
The Persian Gulf and its coastal areas are the world's largest single source of petroleum, and related industries dominate the region.
The federation’s economy is dominated by the petroleum produced primarily in the Abu Dhabi emirate. The wealthiest of the emirates, Abu Dhabi contains one of the largest concentrations of the world’s proven oil reserves and contributes a significant portion of the national budget: it is responsible of 95% of the country's oil production.
The largest petroleum concessions are held by an ADNOC subsidiary, and Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO). These companies are both pillars of economic stability and influencers of global oil prices, making the Arab world an integral player in the world's energy future.
In resource-rich countries like the UAE, control of corruption is critical in preventing the diversion of resources and ensuring that the country's wealth is used for the benefit of its citizens.
Democracy index
Democracy index
The country ranks in top 25 per cent of countries globally with regard to Basic Welfare, Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement, it falls among the bottom 25 per cent in most other factors.
Political parties are forbidden, the candidates for the FNC run singularly and independently.
The first elections were held less than twenty years ago, in 2006
The current head of government or other chief national authority was not elected through free and fair elections.
The suffrage is not universal, there is no public accountability for the procedures by which the rulers of each emirate draw up the lists of eligible voters
There is no political participation for its citizens. There are no political parties, no free elections, and no legislative authority with real power.
The Federal National Council, ostensibly the representative body, is half-appointed and half-elected by a narrow electorate of less than 35% of Emirati citizens. It holds no actual legislative or oversight power.
Approximately 90 percent of the UAE’s population consists of noncitizens who lack political rights and electoral opportunities, including thousands of stateless residents. There is no clear process for obtaining citizenship without Emirati parentage or marriage to an Emirati man.
Labor and professional unions are banned, as are independent civil society organizations.
Feminist organizations and youth movements are also prohibited, leaving Emirati society void of collective structures capable of defending public interests or influencing national policies.
Women are generally placed at a distinct disadvantage under laws governing marriage and divorce. Among other disparities, a Muslim woman’s male guardian must approve her marriage. Muslim women are forbidden to marry non-Muslims. There is no law that prohibits spousal rape.
There are not free and independent media. The 1980 Publications and Publishing Law regulates all aspects of the media and prohibits criticism of the government.
A 2014 counterterrorism law prescribes punishments including the death penalty for offenses like “undermining national security” and possession of material that opposes or denigrates Islam.
Especially Abu Dhabi conceals a closed, authoritarian regime that tolerates no form of dissent, prohibits independent civil society, and imposes strict control over the press.
Dozens of activists, academics, and human rights defenders are imprisoned simply for peacefully expressing their views or signing petitions calling for political reform.
Imperialism
Imperialism
The UAE seeks influence without governance and power without accountability. The fragmentation, weak institutions, and global neglect of African and Middle Eastern countries like Sudan, Libya, and Yemen provide a fertile field for the UAE’s meddling.
Case study: Egypt
Case study: Egypt
Egypt Overview and Authoritarian Structure
Population= 110 million ; one of the region’s largest economies GDP= US $400 billion (2024)
Military dominates politics and economy since the 2013 military coup
Freedom House (2024) rates Egypt 18/100 (Not Free), reflecting harsh restrictions on political rights, media, and civil society
Gender Gap Index: Rank 134/146 (WEF)
https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-world/2025
Repression with Legitimacy: How Egypt Resists Democratic Pressures
Egypt as a “liberalized autocracy”(Diamond, 2010): a regime that adopts democratic forms (elections, parliament, constitution) but preserves authoritarian substance. Limited pluralism and controlled elections provide a façade of legitimacy while power remains concentrated in the military and security apparatus
Since the 2013 coup, the regime has expanded control through anti-terror laws, censorship, and the criminalization of dissent -> “counter-revolutionary upscaling” (Josua & Edel, 2021)
External rents sustain the system: $1.5 billion in U.S. aid each year ($200 billion since 1946).
Geopolitical value: Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, its role in counter- terrorism, and control of the Suez Canal make Western partners prioritize e stability over democratization
The Illusion of Democracy: Institutions without Accountability
Egypt maintains elections and a parliament, but these institutions operate under tight control of the presidency and military
Laws and constitutions are used to simulate pluralism while ensuring the same elite remains in power.
State media and pro-regime religious institutions help frame Sisi’s rule as a national duty rather than an autocracy.
“Legitimation through stability” (Joshua & Edel, 2021)
Economy and Democratic Backsliding
Egypt’s economy as a rentier-state logic (Diamond, 2010): it relies on external rents (aid, strategic income) rather than taxation, weakening accountability and strengthening authoritarian rule.
Since 2013, the military has become a dominant economic actor, controlling major industries and benefiting directly from state contracts. This fusion of economic and political power blocks private initiative and weakens the middle class, limiting pressure for reform.
Persistent inflation (>30%) and low growth (3%) keep citizens reliant on state subsidies and public jobs
Rule of Law Index (2020): 125/128 —> minimal accountability or judicial independence
The regime mixes economic patronage and coercion to maintain “stability without democracy” (Josua & Edel, 2021)
Control Over Consent: Egypt’s Authoritarian Resilience
Egypt’s regime remains stable without democracy, blending coercion, legitimacy, and external support.
Egypt’s case shows that authoritarianism evolves: repression today is more adaptive, legalistic, and internationally integrated.
The regime’s endurance challenges the linear idea of democratic transition that dominated post-Arab Spring expectations.
Authoritarian power now relies not only on coercion, but on economic dependency, digital control, and external legitimization.
Can democracy survive where security, stability and economic aid are constantly prioritized over participation and accountability?
Egypt is not an exception- it’s a mirror of regional and global trends where stability often wins over freedom.
“Repression has returned, but it has changed its form” – Joshua & Edel, 2021
Case study: Democratic backsliding in Tunisia
Case study: Democratic backsliding in Tunisia
What factors contributed to democratic backsliding in Tunisia?
What factors contributed to democratic backsliding in Tunisia?
Tunisia was initially considered the success story of the Arab Spring.
Background: From One-Party Rule to Fragmentation
Background: From One-Party Rule to Fragmentation
· Under Ben Ali, the RCD (Democratic Constitutionalist Rally) was the only ruling party; citizens knew little about other parties and political competition.
· After 2011, the number of parties increased dramatically—from 9 to 110—creating fragmentation.
Economic Promises and Early Disillusionment
Economic Promises and Early Disillusionment
· Ennahdha and PDP (Progressive Democratic Party) promised 590,000 jobs and unemployment reduction from 18% to 8%.
· Troika was an unofficial name for the alliance between the three parties (Ennahda, Ettakatol, and CPR); Moncef Marzouki became president.
· According to September 2011 Arab Barometer: 46% of Tunisian felt less secure than in 2010; GDP contracted by 2%.
· Poor management of protests (2012) and failure to address corruption.
Governance Challenges and Corruption
Governance Challenges and Corruption
· Extensive corruption networks persisted after the revolution.
· Attempted judicial reform: 80 judges fired for corruption in 2011, reinstated in 2013 due process violations.
Polarization and Party Instability
Polarization and Party Instability
· Two main poles: Ennahdha (Islamist) vs Nidaa Tounes (anti-Islamist).
· Nidaa Tounes won in 2014 but was highly fractured; formed coalition with Ennahdha despite promises.
· Security crises: three terrorist attacks in 2015 and ISIS battle in 2016.
· “Party tourism” many representatives resigned from their original parties and joined others (Nate Grubman, 2022)
Institutional Weakness
Institutional Weakness
· 2014 Constitution promised rights and independent judiciary, but implementation lagged.
· Municipal elections delayed until 2018.
· Constitutional Court never fully established—only one of four members appointed.
Public Disillusionment
Public Disillusionment
· October 2019 survey: two-thirds felt worse off financially and in security than before the revolution.
· 62% believed corruption worsened; 71% believed unemployment increased.
Nate Grubman (2022)
Rise of Kais Saied
Rise of Kais Saied
· 2019 elections: Saied, an outsider and constitutional law professor, won 73% of votes.
· Anti-party rhetoric and image of integrity resonated with frustrated citizens.
July 25, 2021: Democratic Backsliding
July 25, 2021: Democratic Backsliding
· Saied invoked Article 80, dismissed PM, froze parliament, suspended parts of the constitution.
· Appointed himself head of the public prosecutor’s office; began ruling by decree.
Why Did Democracy Fail?
Why Did Democracy Fail?
· Institutional fragility: no Constitutional Court to check presidential power.
· Polarization and distrust of parties.
· Economic stagnation and health crises (COVID-19).
Consequences
Consequences
· Arrests of MPs and trials of civilians in military courts.
· Restrictions on freedom of assembly and media.
· Closure of anti-corruption commission.
· Civil society participation index dropped
Comparative Insight
Comparative Insight
Civil society participation index
Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?
UGTT (Tunisian General Labor Union) initially adopted a broadly supportive tone toward Saied’s exceptional measures.
Party institutionalization and polarization
Party institutionalization and polarization
Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, e.g., level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system.
Both Tunisia and Israel exhibit high levels of political polarization, but the outcomes differ due to democratic stability. In Tunisia, the sharp spike in polarization in 2021 created a fertile ground for Kais Saied’s power grab, accelerating democratic backsliding.
Government Effectiveness Estimate
Government Effectiveness Estimate
Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
Key Sources
Key Sources
Nate Grubman, ‘Transition Arrested,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 33, No. 1, January 2022.
Arab Barometer Wave VIII (2023-2024) – Tunisia Country Report.
V-Dem Dataset Version 15 (2024) – Civil Society, Polarization, Judicial Independence, GDP indicators.
World Bank Group Indicators – Government Effectiveness.
Discussion
Discussion
Can authoritarianism in the MENA region still be considered “exceptional,” or have the uprisings disproven that idea permanently?
Are security-sector reforms possible in highly repressive systems, or do they require regime change first?
What responsibilities do Western states and tech companies bear for enabling (digital) repression in the MENA region?
What can the Arab uprisings teach us about repression and authoritarian resilience worldwide (e.g., China, Russia, Iran)?
How can researchers safely study repression in highly repressive contexts without endangering themselves or their informants?
Is international pressure effective in reducing repression, or does it often backfire?
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