Publications

• "Contract Renegotiations and Cooperation in Public Contracts: an Empirical Test" Working Paper 2026
  Abstract: This paper examines whether repeated renegotiations undermine cooperation in long-term public contracts. Drawing on reference-point theory, it tests the prediction that successive revisions may weaken relational performance through shading. Using a novel panel dataset linking EU procurement contracts to Contract Modification Notices, cooperation is proxied by sentiment measures derived from renegotiation texts. Fixed-effects regressions relate renegotiation tone to its order within each contract. The results provide new evidence on the dynamic relational effects of contractual adaptation in public procurement.

• (Avec E. Auriol) “Contract Renegotiations in Public-Private Partnerships: Enhancing Commitment Mechanisms or Strengthening Oversight of Contract Modifications?”, Working paper 2024

Abstract: Governments increasingly rely on public–private partnerships (PPPs) to close infrastructure investment gaps under fiscal constraints. Yet the frequent renegotiation of PPP contracts raises concerns about governance. While renegotiations can lower costs by adjusting risk premiums after exogenous shocks, excessive renegotiation may generate moral hazard. We develop a model to examine the trade-off between commitment and flexibility in traditional public procurement and PPPs, focusing on the allocation of risk to contractors. Using new data on public contract renegotiations in the EU, we show that traditional procurement contracts are more rigid than PPPs: when renegotiations occur, they are larger in scope and perceived more negatively by public authorities. By contrast, PPPs are more relational, involving frequent but limited adjustments that are generally viewed more favorably.

• (Avec C. Staropoli), "Green Public Procurement in France: Where do we Stand?", Handbook Green Public Procurement: a Global Perspective (Ed. Jordi Rosell), Forthcoming 2026.