Research

Previous studies have shown that an oath can reduce lying in individual settings. Can it reduce lying in groups, a context where lying is more prevalent? Results from a lab experiment reveal that the impact depends on the incentive structures and procedures. A mandatory oath reduces lying when group members’ payoffs are independent, but only has a marginal effect when payoffs are dependent. Voluntary oath-taking enhances the effectiveness under both incentive structures by fostering intrinsic motivation to keep promises. The findings highlight the importance of peer effects and oath-taking procedures on the effectiveness of an oath in group settings.

We investigate the channels through which honesty oaths shape behavior and communication in settings with asymmetric information. We manipulate whether oath-taking is public and investigate three non-pecuniary costs of oath-breaking. Our results highlight the importance for oath-takers of image costs related to self-image, and image costs stemming from how other players perceive them, while suggesting a lesser concern for passive observation. Despite the significant impact of oaths on oath-takers, the mere knowledge that an oath has been signed is neither sufficient nor necessary to generate trust in oath-takers: instead, less informed players rely on their experience

Is dishonestly earned money treated more as a windfall gain or as the result of costly effort? We found that in the context of risk taking, individuals treat dishonestly earned money more like a windfall gain from luck than as an effort-based gain. The effect is especially prevalent among risk averse liars. However, increasing the moral cost of lying ex post eliminates the difference between risk taking with dishonest money and with money earned from costly effort. This cannot result from a selection effect in our settings but it suggests that moral costs induce an entitlement effect.