Research

We investigate the strategic use of incompetence in a laboratory experiment where individuals communicate beliefs about their own abilities when an undesirable task must be assigned in a group. We exogenously vary the gender stereotype of the task to examine its impact on the gender gap in strategic incompetence. We find that individuals strategically downplay competence, and when stereotypes apply, a gender gap emerges with experience. Consistent with self-stereotyping, this gap arises from individuals distorting private beliefs downward when their gender is believed to be less able. Our findings highlight how stereotypes reinforce inequality through undesirable task assignment.

We investigate the channels through which honesty oaths shape behavior and communication in settings with asymmetric information. We manipulate whether oath-taking is public and investigate three non-pecuniary costs of oath-breaking. Our results highlight the importance for oath-takers of image costs related to self-image, and image costs stemming from how other players perceive them, while suggesting a lesser concern for passive observation. Despite the significant impact of oaths on oath-takers, the mere knowledge that an oath has been signed is neither sufficient nor necessary to generate trust in oath-takers: instead, less informed players rely on their experience.

Is dishonestly earned money treated more as a windfall gain or as the result of costly effort? We found that in the context of risk taking, individuals treat dishonestly earned money more like a windfall gain from luck than as an effort-based gain. The effect is especially prevalent among risk averse liars. However, increasing the moral cost of lying ex post eliminates the difference between risk taking with dishonest money and with money earned from costly effort. This cannot result from a selection effect in our settings but it suggests that moral costs induce an entitlement effect.