Research

We examine how individuals strategically claim incompetence to avoid undesirable tasks in group settings, such as non-promotable tasks or household chores. Using a laboratory experiment, we exogenously vary the gender stereotype associated with a task to study its impact on self-reported ability and task allocation. Our findings show that individuals downplay their competence to successfully evade task assignment. When tasks are gender-stereotyped, gender gaps in strategic incompetence emerge with experience. These gaps seem to be driven by self-stereotyping when individuals become aware of gender stereotypes: individuals internalize stereotype beliefs about gendered ability, adjusting their private self-assessments downward when their gender is perceived as less competent. This behavior reinforces unequal task distribution and contributes to persistent workplace inequality. Our results underscore the role of stereotype awareness and highlight how strategic incompetence can perpetuate gender disparities.

We investigate the channels through which honesty oaths shape behavior and communication in settings with asymmetric information. We manipulate whether oath-taking is public and investigate three non-pecuniary costs of oath-breaking. Our results highlight the importance for oath-takers of image costs related to self-image, and image costs stemming from how other players perceive them, while suggesting a lesser concern for passive observation. Despite the significant impact of oaths on oath-takers, the mere knowledge that an oath has been signed is neither sufficient nor necessary to generate trust in oath-takers: instead, less informed players rely on their experience.

Is dishonestly earned money treated more as a windfall gain or as the result of costly effort? We found that in the context of risk taking, individuals treat dishonestly earned money more like a windfall gain from luck than as an effort-based gain. The effect is especially prevalent among risk averse liars. However, increasing the moral cost of lying ex post eliminates the difference between risk taking with dishonest money and with money earned from costly effort. This cannot result from a selection effect in our settings but it suggests that moral costs induce an entitlement effect.