Published papers
Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game
Dokka, T., H. Moulin, I. Ray and S. SenGupta, (2023), Review of Economic Design, 27, p: 419-438.
As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCEs), using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.
Georgalos, K., I. Ray and S. SenGupta, (2020), Experimental Economics, 23, p: 1178-1204.
We run a laboratory experiment to test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial in Int J Game Theory 7:201–221, 1978), with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes (including the Nash point) with higher ex-ante expected payof than the Nash equilibrium payof. We fnd that the subjects do not accept this lottery (which is a coarse correlated equilibrium); instead, they choose to play the game and coordinate on the Nash equilibrium. However, given an individual choice between a lottery with equal probabilities of the same outcomes and the sure payof as in the Nash point, the lottery is chosen by the subjects. This result is robust against a few variations. We explain our result as selecting risk-dominance over payof dominance in equilibrium.
Improving Nash by coarse correlation
Moulin, H., I. Ray and S. SenGupta, (2014), Journal of Economic Theory, 150, p: 852 – 865.
We consider a class of symmetric two-person quadratic games where coarse correlated equilibria – CCE – (Moulin and Vial [16]) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium – CE – (Aumann [3], [4]) cannot, because these games are potential games with concave potential functions. We compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE in those games and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two pure strategy profiles. Applications include the Cournot duopoly and the game of public good provision, where the improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff can be substantial.
Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly game
Ray, I. and S. SenGupta, (2013), International Journal of Game Theory, 42, p: 541 – 562.
For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. Any small unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.
Peer-reviewed conference papers
Pricing toll roads under uncertainty
Dokka, T., F.T. Nobibon, S. SenGupta and A. B. Zemkoho, (2016), 16th Workshop of Algorithmic Approaches for Transportation Modelling, Optimization, and Systems (ATMOS’16).
Discussion papers
Efficient public good provision in a multipolar world (with Sakib Anwar, Jorge Bruno and Renaud Foucart) (submitted) [arXiv] [CRETA discussion paper] (R&R)
Previously circulated as "A group public goods game with position uncertainty".
Pricing under asymmetry and ambiguity (with Trivikram Dokka) [CRETA discussion paper] [EconStor: QBS WP] (under review)
Equilibria in budget games with dissatisfaction cost (with Trivikram Dokka , Jorge Bruno and Sakib Anwar)
Equilibria in a Japanese English auction with discrete bid level (with Konstantinos Georgalos, Ricardo Gonçalves and Indrajit Ray) [Draft coming soon]
Public good provision with a Distributor (with Sakib Anwar and Alexander Matros) [arXiv] [SSRN]