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Abstract
Abstract
With declining costs of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) and Renewable Energy (RE) sources such as Photovoltaics (PV) and Wind Turbines (WT), their integration into Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCS) has become more viable. However, without optimal power distribution, unnecessary energy purchases from the grid can occur, reducing EVCS owner profits and increasing EV charging costs. This paper proposes a framework that integrates Stackelberg and non-cooperative game theory for a comprehensive EVCS with BESS and RE, including PV and small WT, to maximize EVCS owner profits while accommodating EV preferences to minimize charging costs. The proposed method is compared with a conventional approach from existing research in terms of profitability, achieving nearly 7260 cents compared to around 829 cents for the conventional method, highlighting its superior performance. Additionally, the impact of different average unit profit settings is analyzed, offering insights into optimal profit margins based on EVCS owner objectives. The study further demonstrates the advantages of non-cooperative game theory as a decentralized approach, achieving better outcomes for both EVCS owners and EVs, with the EVs charging cost reduced by nearly 2000 cents and the profit for EVCS owners increased by approximately 1400 cents compared to the centralized approach. Finally, the economic benefits of integrating BESS into EVCS are assessed, revealing notable advantages compared to scenarios without BESS. For instance, with 50 EVs, the profit of an EVCS with BESS is approximately 600 cents lower than the scenario without BESS. However, as the number of EVs increases to 60, the profit of the EVCS with BESS surpasses the other scenario by nearly 1000 cents, highlighting the value of BESS installation under high EV energy demand conditions.
This figure shows the power-flow configuration of the proposed EV charging station, drawn as three linked blocks: the utility grid, the EVCS containing renewable sources (PV arrays and small wind turbines) together with a battery energy storage system, and the connected EVs. Colour-coded arrows separate the power absorbed by the BESS, by the EVs, and by the grid, and label every exchange between them. It makes clear that renewable output first serves the EV demand, that any surplus is stored in the BESS before being injected into the grid, and that grid power acts as the backup supply when RE and BESS are insufficient.
This figure presents the leader-follower structure of the Stackelberg game played between the charging station and the vehicles. The EVCS owner acts as the leader and broadcasts the optimal pricing parameters α* and β* to the EVs, while the EVs act as followers and return their aggregate optimal charging power. The two dashed arrows represent the iterative exchange that repeats until neither side can improve its objective by unilaterally changing strategy, which is the Stackelberg equilibrium.
This figure illustrates the non-cooperative game played among the EVs charging at the station. Each vehicle is an independent player that sends only its own optimal charging rate to the EVCS and receives back the aggregated schedule of all the other vehicles, so no information is shared directly between EVs. The layout shows how the vehicles' strategies remain coupled through the limited RE and BESS power available at each time step, even though every EV minimizes only its own charging cost.
Video Presentation
Video Presentation
Reproducing the Results
Reproducing the Results
Citation
Citation
If you want to use the dataset or scripts in this page, please cite the following paper:
P. L. Nguyen, C. Le-The, H. Ta Xuan, K. Dao Quoc, D. C. Do, L. El Ghaoui, and T. Nguyen Duc, "Strategic EV charging optimization using Stackelberg and non-cooperative game models for cost efficiency and profit maximization with renewable energy and battery storage," Smart Grids and Sustainable Energy, vol. 10, no. 1, art. no. 26, Mar. 2025, doi: 10.1007/s40866-025-00255-3.
@article{Long2025Strategic,
author = {Nguyen, Phi Long and Le-The, Cuong and Ta Xuan, Hung and Dao Quoc, Khanh and Do, Danh Cuong and El Ghaoui, Laurent and Nguyen Duc, Tuyen},
title = {Strategic EV Charging Optimization Using Stackelberg and Non-Cooperative Game Models for Cost Efficiency and Profit Maximization with Renewable Energy and Battery Storage},
journal = {Smart Grids and Sustainable Energy},
volume = {10},
number = {1},
pages = {26},
year = {2025},
month = {Mar},
doi = {10.1007/s40866-025-00255-3},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s40866-025-00255-3}
}
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