I am a postdoctoral researcher at Mercatorum University and an associated researcher at CRENoS.
My research interests include organizational economics, labor economics, and the economics of education.
Contact: simone.nobili@unimercatorum.it
Previously:
Research Fellow at University of Cagliari.
Visiting Ph.D. at Pompeu Fabra University.
Visiting Ph.D. at Ca' Foscari University of Venice.
Ph.D. student in Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at University of Sassari.
"Skill-biased remote work and incentives" with Fabio Cerina and Luca Deidda.
Abstract: We document four key trends since the pandemic: a surge in remote work, an increase in performance pay, their joint occurrence, and the skill-biased nature of this complementarity. We develop a firm-worker model that explains this evidence. We show that, under risk aversion, the incentive-compatible performance pay premium falls with worker’s skills, as the likelihood of a good performance increases. Hence, the firm uses performance pay if the worker is sufficiently skilled and fixed pay with monitoring, otherwise. The unforeseen pandemic shock forces the firm to adopt remote work and reduces monitoring effectiveness. As a result, the firm relies more on performance pay. Post-pandemic, the firm always sticks to the remote work if the worker is sufficiently skilled. If the worker is too unskilled for performance pay to be cost-effective, the firm sticks to remote work only if remote monitoring is effective. Accordingly, the model predicts that a decline in remote monitoring efficacy could reduce remote work for less-skilled workers only. To test this, we exploit temporal variation in legislation in New York State, using a Difference-in-Differences approach, to estimate the impact of stricter regulations of remote monitoring on the adoption of remote work. Such a test strongly supports our model’s predictions. Our findings suggest that pandemic policies and regulations may have played a significant role in shaping the adoption and persistence of remote work and performance pay.
"Market structure and international tax competition"
Abstract: Over the past few decades, there has been a notable increase in firms' market power accompanied by a global decrease in Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rates. This paper provides a theoretical framework to shed light on these diverging trends. I develop a general equilibrium model that incorporates imperfect competition and strategic interaction among firms, allowing them to shift profits abroad towards a tax haven. I find that increasing firms' market power enhances their incentives to engage in profit shifting, via larger profits. Profits rise through (i) larger markdowns and (ii) reallocation of market share towards more productive firms. A government, competing to retain firms' profits, set low tax rates to prevent local firms from evading toward tax haven(s). International tax competition is stronger, i.e. lower tax rates, when firms' market power is higher. Besides, I find that profit shifting endogenously increases the level of market power in the economy, favouring the most productive firms, and hasten the tax "race to the bottom".
"Remote revolution: gendering job postings is the new black" with Hugues Champeaux
"The performance of incentives within the firm: onsite vs remote work"