I am a postdoctoral researcher at Mercatorum University and an associated researcher at CRENoS.
My research interests include organizational economics, labor economics, and the economics of education.
Contact: simone.nobili@unimercatorum.it
Previously:
Research Fellow at University of Cagliari.
Visiting Ph.D. at Pompeu Fabra University.
Visiting Ph.D. at Ca' Foscari University of Venice.
Ph.D. student in Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at University of Sassari.
"Skill-biased remote work and incentives" with Fabio Cerina and Luca Deidda.
Abstract:
We document that performance pay has become an increasingly common element of the compensation schemes, alongside remote work, especially in high-skill occupations. To explain these findings, we develop a firm-worker model with moral hazard to highlight how skill levels interact with organizational practices. Low-skilled workers face greater uncertainty due to the low chance of high performance. If risk-averse, they require large monetary premiums so firms adopt performance pay only if the worker is sufficiently skilled, and fixed pay with monitoring otherwise.
The unforeseen pandemic shock, which forced firms to implement remote work, reduces monitoring effectiveness thereby increasing reliance on performance pay. Post-pandemic, firms persist with remote work when workers are sufficiently skilled for performance pay to be cost-effective, while maintaining remote work only if remote monitoring is effective enough.
Our model predicts that reduced efficacy in remote monitoring disproportionately limits remote work opportunities for less-skilled workers. To empirically test this prediction, we exploit temporal variation in remote-monitoring legislation in New York State using a Difference-in-Differences analysis. The empirical results strongly support the model's predictions. Our findings suggest that pandemic policies and regulations have significantly influenced organizations' decisions regarding incentive structures and work arrangements.
"Market structure and international tax competition"
Abstract:
Over the past few decades, there has been a notable increase in firms' market power accompanied by a global decrease in Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rates. This paper provides a theoretical framework to shed light on these diverging trends. I develop a general equilibrium model that incorporates imperfect competition and strategic interaction among firms, allowing them to shift profits abroad towards a tax haven. I find that increasing firms' market power enhances their incentives to engage in profit shifting, via larger profits. Profits rise through (i) larger markdowns and (ii) reallocation of market share towards more productive firms. A government, competing to retain firms' profits, set low tax rates to prevent local firms from evading toward tax haven(s). International tax competition is stronger, i.e. lower tax rates, when firms' market power is higher. Besides, I find that profit shifting endogenously increases the level of market power in the economy, favouring the most productive firms, and hasten the tax "race to the bottom".
"Remote revolution: gendering job postings is the new black" with Hugues Champeaux
"The performance of incentives within the firm: onsite vs remote work"