Research

Working Papers

Land expropriation is widely used by governments in developing countries to boost economic growth, but it also comes at the cost of creating discontent among the population if people do not feel adequately compensated. Using staggered changes in county-level land compensation mandated by provincial governments in China, I test how increased compensation affects land conflicts using difference-in-differences method. Perhaps counterintuitively, I find that an increase in compensation leads to a 10% increase in land conflicts. Subsequent investigation uncovers that the increase in land conflicts is primarily driven by the unequal increase in compensation across regions, though the overall increase in compensation mitigates grievances to some extent. The results do not seem to be explained by the economic incentives of governments, individuals, and companies to minimize costs in seeking to obtain land. The results highlight the need for progressive changes in compensation to reduce conflict around land-transfer programs.

[2] Decollectivization and Child Adoption in China, with Pinghan Liang, Revision Requested at Journal of Population Economics.

Many children are trafficked in developing countries to meet the household demand for children as most trafficked children are finally adopted by households. We exploit the county-by-county rollout of land reform in rural China since 1978 to explore the causal impact of decollectivization on child adoption. The difference-in-differences estimation demonstrates an increase in child adoption by sterile households after the reform, coinciding with a surge in child trafficking. Besides, the reform led to a lower adoption probability in urban areas and less children were abandoned after the reform, suggesting that our estimate is not driven by the One-Child policy. Further analysis seems to support that decollectivization raises the value of children by increasing labor demand for old age support and for agricultural production, as well as receiving favorable redistribution of land. This indicates the importance of economic incentives in child adoption in developing countries. Our study offers insights into the rising occurrence of child trafficking after decollectivization reform in 1978 in China.

Cultural behaviors can be shaped and preserved by economic institutions. To investigate this, we examine the causal impact of the rural decollectivization reform in China that took place after 1978 on the supply of one cultural public goods-the construction of religious sites. A staggered difference-in-differences model that analyzes the timing of reform implementation in 1,114 counties finds that the reform resulted in a surge in the number of newly constructed religious sites. Further evidence suggests that counties with a more severe exposure to the Great Famine (1959-1961) and a larger income growth experienced a greater impact of the reform. Moreover, kinship organizations, serving as a critical tool in mobilizing individuals, could enhance the impact of the reform. We argue that in the commune system before the reform, the demand for religions was suppressed and the reform increased people's power and resources for building religious sites. These findings demonstrate that economic institutions may shape cultural behaviors in the short term.

Publications

[1]  Pray, Vote, and Money: The Double-edged Sword Effect of Religions on Rural Political Participation in China. With Pinghan Liang. China Economic Review. (2022)

[2] The Effect of Adult’s Migration on the Health of Parents Left Behind (in Chinese).  With Xingxiang Wen and Xue Wen . Population & Economics. (2016)

Work in progress

[1] Growth, redistribution and civil unrest in China

[2] Land acquisition rights and extractive behaviors of government

[3] The social cost of developemnt projects: the cases of High-Speed Railway and Special Economic Zones in China