Research
Research
“'Banerry': Origination of meaning by a nonhuman animal,” Ergo (forthcoming): I argue that nonhuman animals can intentionally originate new linguistic meaning when creating a new word. This kind of case presents a challenge to our current theories, since current theories fail to explain how someone could intentionally originate meaning with the very first word-symbols in the evolution of language. Given this gap in our theories of meaning, I suggest how a Gricean framework could be adapted to account for such cases.
“From Human child to Grey Parrot: Exploring a common model of word meaning extension across species,” with Fishkin and Xu, Cognitive Science (forthcoming)
“Modeling word overextension in a Grey Parrot,” with Fishkin and Xu, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Vol. 47 (2025).
“When is the spread of a cultural trait due to cultural group selection? The case of religious syncretism,” with Santana, Patel, and Weisberg, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 39 (2016).
Ethics, fairness, and public perception of gene editing in agricultural animals: Concerns about gene editing in farm animals are often minimized in the literature, with proponents arguing that risks are outweighed by potential benefits, and that it is not morally worse than the status quo. This paper highlights four kinds of injustices that have been largely overlooked: an unfair distribution of benefits, an unfair distribution of costs, an unjust imposition of risk onto those most vulnerable, and an unjust conversion of public resources into private benefit.
Dolphins Merge: How human and nonhuman animal language faculties are continuous: It is often thought that humans are the only animals with the capacity for language and syntax. This paper aims to show that there is even more evidence of continuity between human and nonhuman animals’ faculty for language than is commonly accepted. I consider a body of scientific research showing that dolphins are capable of sentence comprehension and syntactic processing (Herman, Richards and Wolz, 1984) and I argue that the dolphins' performance shows that they can use the operation Merge.
How do we justify interspecific inferences about cognition? This paper investigates the basis for making inferences about similar behaviours across different animal species and the cognition underlying those behaviours. I argue that Mitchell's justificatory approach should be modified to accommodate a greater breadth of factors relevant to the development of the cognitive capacity in question. I apply this modified framework to the capacity for communication.
Artificial languages in animal language studies
A model for referential communication learning
Gene editing in agricultural animals and animal ethics
Machine learning for comparative cognition
Investigating cockatoos’ concept of irreversible non-functionality
I am grateful for those who have supported my research.
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
London School of Economics and Political Science
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
Diverse Intelligences Summer Institute Fellowship, Templeton World Charity Foundation
President Gutmann Leadership Award, University of Pennsylvania
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania
Communication Within the Curriculum Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania
Program in Environmental Humanities Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania
Center for Social Impact Strategy, University of Pennsylvania
Benjamin Franklin Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania
Ontario Graduate Scholarship, Ministry of Training, Colleges & Universities (declined)
David and Helen Eisen Fellowship, University College, University of Toronto