Using the US Supreme Court's narrow decision in Shelby v. Holder as a negative shock to Black Americans' voting rights, we explore the relationship between political voice and economic decision-making. Post-decision, Black Americans are less likely to apply for mortgages, borrow less money, and buy fewer homes. However, they increasingly purchase homes with cash and seek mortgages from lenders friendly to Black borrowers. We document that a decline in trust in government and financial institutions among Black Americans is crucial for interpreting these results. Our findings suggest disenfranchisement may lead to financial market exclusion and worsen preexisting differences by reducing trust.

Mortgage policy can affect house prices primarily through house price expectations rather than through credit conditions. After Korean authorities relaxed loan-to-value (LTV) and payment-to-income (PTI) limits, signaling a more lenient stance toward housing booms, areas previously constrained by these limits saw a rapid expansion of mortgage credit. Yet house prices rose more sharply in expectation-sensitive regions that had experienced earlier booms but whose expectations had been dampened by prior interventions. Buyers in these areas displayed renewed optimism and speculative activity, underscoring the central role of expectations in driving house prices.

When central banks loosen monetary policy, credit availability increases, generating upwards pressure on asset prices. This paper analyzes the "credit channel" of monetary policy transmission in a unique institutional setting: the Chonsei system in the Korean housing market, in which rental tenants make interest-free loans to landlords in exchange for paying no rent. We show that, as Chonsei interest rates approach zero, the size of Chonsei loans grows unboundedly, exerting strong upwards pressure on house prices. We verify the model’s predictions empirically. Calibrating the model to the data, we find that a simple policy – imposing a proportional tax on Chonsei deposits – can substantially dampen the passthrough of interest rate changes to deposit size and house prices, providing potential benefits for financial stability.

What are the aggregate effects of deposit shocks? We introduce a new fact regarding the within-bank geographic concentration of deposits – 30% of deposits are concentrated in a single county. We construct deposit shocks by combining the within-bank deposit concentration with local natural disasters. We show that large shocks to deposit concentrated areas amplify through bank internal capital markets and generate aggregate fluctuations. Deposit shocks explain 3.30% of variation in economic growth. We identify the deposit elasticity of economic growth as 0.87 and the money multiplier as 1.18. Lender and borrower-side frictions are critical for the aggregation of local shocks.

Informed landlords adjust rent more flexibly to expand their market share, fueling rent inflation. They secure a 0.5% higher annual rental income through an additional 0.3% rent adjustment, regardless of whether the market is in a downturn or recovery. In volatile periods, this advantage grows further: they achieve a 1.7% higher annual income through an additional 0.8% rent adjustment. Although frictions in rent adjustments contribute to these outcomes, they do not fully explain the pricing patterns observed among informed landlords—pricing expertise is key. These findings suggest that informed institutional landlords lead the rental market through flexible pricing strategies, and market volatility disproportionately challenges uninformed mom-and-pop landlords, who make up the majority of the rental market.