• "Cultural Transmission with Incomplete Information," Della Lena, S., Panebianco, F. (2021).  Journal of Economic Theory, 198, 105373. (Preprint, SSRN)

• "On the Transmission of Guilt Aversion and the Evolution of Trust," Della Lena, S., Manzoni, E., & Panebianco, F.  (2023). Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 765-793. (Preprint, SSRN) 

•  "The Spread of Misinformation in Networks with Social and Individual Learning" (2024).  European Economic Review, 168, 104804.  (Preprint, SSRN)

WORKING PAPERS and R&R

• Affective Polarization, Media Outlet, and Opinion Dynamics  (2023),  with Luca Merlino and Yves Zenou. (CEPR) [R&R Review of Economic Studies, 2nd round]

We study opinion dynamics in a social network consisting of two groups. Agents update their opinions by conforming to the opinions of agents from their group and not conforming to the opinions of people from the other group (affective polarization) and by listening a media outlet that is a possible biased source of information. We characterize the long-run opinions and provide the conditions under which affective polarization and media outlet lead to ideological polarization. We also study the effect of homophily and group size on long-run opinions when agents in the same group are homogeneous.

• How do you know you won’t like it if you’ve never tried it? Preferences discovery and strategic bundling (2024), with Alessio Muscillo and Paolo Pin.  

We model the interaction between a provider of composite bundles and a consumer who learns about her preferences or product quality through consumption. We show how the provider can strategically manipulate bundles to bias the consumer’s learning, favoring or disfavoring certain goods, delaying learning, and boosting profits by leveraging temporary biases. Using concepts from OLS estimation, decision theory, and network theory, we provide new insights about possible obfuscation strategies, and we show the role of the first and the last eigenvectors in designing policies under uncertainty. A toy empirical example from the movie industry illustrates the model’s key mechanisms.

• An Economic Model of Acculturation under Strategic Complements and Substitutes (2024), with Pietro Dindo.  

We propose a cultural transmission model based on the co-evolution of cultural traits, behaviors, and socialization levels. Cultural traits affect agents’ behavior during their interaction in a strategic environment. In turn, behaviors affect both how much parents directly socialize their children and the traits they decide to transmit. We describe the co-evolution of cultural traits and behaviors, and their long-run outcomes, in terms of well-established acculturation processes:  assimilation, integration, marginalization, and separation. We characterize how the occurrence of each process depends on the nature of the strategic environment (complements or substitutes), the cost of transmitting traits, and the size of the majority.

• God, Guilt, and Giving: Public Good Contribution among Catholics and Protestants (2025). with Francesco Cinnirella, Elena Manzoni, and Fabrizio Panebianco

We study how religious ethics shape contributions to public goods by developing a theoretical model that characterizes Protestants and Catholics as representing, respectively, an individualistic and a collectivistic ethic. Both are motivated by a fixed contribution target and by the desire not to disappoint others, but Protestants place more weight on the individual target while Catholics place more weight on social expectations. The model predicts no differences at low incomes, but diverging patterns at middle and upper incomes, with Catholics’ contributions shaped by community composition. Using German panel data, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and flatter income responses among Catholics. 

• How Parents and Firms’ Hiring Policies Affect Labor Outcomes (2024), with Shahir Safi and Yves Zenou (CEPR)

This paper examines the interplay between social networks, firm hiring policies, and the transmission of work ethics across generations. Specifically, we analyze how firms’ preferences for weak-tie referrals versus traditional screening methods influence long-term labor market outcomes, including wages and employment. We also explore the role of parents in shaping their children’s work ethics and how these cultural traits affect labor market integration. The findings reveal that while weak-tie referrals may provide short-term employment benefits, they also contribute to long-run inequalities in wages and work ethics between different social groups. Furthermore, differentiated hiring policies, while effective in the short term, can perpetuate social disparities if not properly addressed through integrative policies.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

• "Why Do Consumers Prefer One Brand Over Another? The Economics and Sociology of Brand Competitiveness," Della Lena, S, Timming, A (2023) .  Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 74, 103416. Special issue ‘Brand Competitiveness’ [invited submission].

WORK IN PROGRESS