Research
MAIN PUBLICATIONS
"Cultural Transmission with Incomplete Information," Della Lena, S., Panebianco, F. (2021). Journal of Economic Theory, 198, 105373. (Preprint)
"On the Transmission of Guilt Aversion and the Evolution of Trust," Della Lena, S., Manzoni, E., & Panebianco, F. (2023). Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 765-793. (Preprint)
The Spread of Misinformation in Networks with Social and Individual Learning (2024). European Economic Review, 168, 104804. (Preprint)
WORKING PAPERS and R&R
Affective Polarization, Media Outlet, and Opinion Dynamics (2023), with Luca Merlino and Yves Zenou. (CEPR) [R&R Review of Economic Studies]
We study opinion dynamics in a social network consisting of two groups. Agents update their opinions by conforming to the opinions of agents from their group and not conforming to the opinions of people from the other group (affective polarization) and by listening a media outlet that is a possible biased source of information. We characterize the long-run opinions and provide the conditions under which affective polarization and media outlet lead to ideological polarization. We also study the effect of homophily and group size on long-run opinions when agents in the same group are homogeneous.
An Economic Model of Acculturation under Strategic Complements and Substitutes with Pietro Dindo. [Submitted]
We propose a cultural transmission model based on the co-evolution of cultural traits, behaviors, and socialization levels. Cultural traits affect agents’ behavior during their interaction in a strategic environment. In turn, behaviors affect both how much parents directly socialize their children and the traits they decide to transmit. We describe the co-evolution of cultural traits and behaviors, and their long-run outcomes, in terms of well-established acculturation processes: assimilation, integration, marginalization, and separation. We characterize how the occurrence of each process depends on the nature of the strategic environment (complements or substitutes), the cost of transmitting traits, and the size of the majority.
On the Evolution of Norms in Strategic Environments with Pietro Dindo.
This paper investigates the intergenerational dynamics of norms in a heterogeneous population divided into two cultural groups as depending on the underline strategic environments. Groups’ norms are modeled as preferences over actions. We find that in general, environments with strategic complements and substitutes produce different social outcomes: full convergence of norms with high (horizontal) socialization for complements and full divergence with low (horizontal) socialization for substitutes. However, for specific choices of material payoffs, partial convergence can arise also under complements, providing an explanation to cultural heterogeneity, and partial divergence can arise for substitutes.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
"Why Do Consumers Prefer One Brand Over Another? The Economics and Sociology of Brand Competitiveness," Della Lena, S, Timming, A (2023) . Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 74, 103416. Special issue ‘Brand Competitiveness’ [invited submission].