Working Papers
[JMP] Gambling for Ascension: The Quest for Elite Government Jobs in India (Link) [Last Updated 14th November 2026]
Abstract: Each year, over one million graduates in India take the Civil Services Examination competing for approximately 1,000 vacancies. Why do aspirants spend years preparing for these examinations—remaining unemployed and forgoing labor-market opportunities—despite success rates as low as 0.1%? Using original survey data on 1,643 aspirants and two randomized discrete choice experiments, this paper investigates this puzzle. The first experiment estimates valuations of three non-pecuniary attributes of elite government jobs: tenure, social status, and power, with the latter two characterized using aspirants’ own perceptions elicited through structured interviews. The second experiment elicits choices between private-sector careers and lotteries over government employment. Combined with a structural lifetime-utility model, it identifies risk preferences and valuations of elite civil service positions. Under expected utility, aspirants exhibit strong risk-seeking and assign a very high value to the government job. Under probability weighting, they substantially overweight small probabilities, with extremely large decision weights but still assigning a very high value to the job. These findings suggest extreme probability insensitivity and maximax-like preferences: aspirants largely discount the odds and costs of failure, focusing instead on the prospect of obtaining an elite position. High valuations of non-wage attributes, recovered from both the job-choice experiments and the structural model, help explain why civil service employment is perceived as a jackpot.
The Long Wait: A Theory of Youth Unemployment, joint with Kaushik Basu
Abstract: We incorporate a novel feature, prestige, in a rational expectations model to explain the incidence of high youth unemployment stemming from youngsters applying for government jobs year after year. This phenomenon is prevalent across countries like India and China. Incorporating prestige-- defined as the intrinsic value of getting a government job that many covet but very few succeed in getting-- gives rise to multiple equilibria with some exhibiting staggeringly high levels of youth unemployment. A novel policy insight emerges: traditional macroeconomic interventions like increasing number of available government jobs to spur employment can instead backfire and raise youth unemployment.
Can Competition Harm Innovation? A Model of Product Market Innovation with credit-constrained firms
Abstract: How does R&D occur in product markets where innovations are non-patentable? Does competition in these markets harm innovative activity? Upto what degree of competition can incentives be offered to firms to put in high effort into the innovative activity? This paper attempts to answer these questions. I show that whether com- petition is beneficial or detrimental to innovation in the absence of patents depends on the parameters of the product market. I show that under some specific conditions, there exists a threshold N determined by the parameters of the product market such that if the number of firms in the product market was at or beyond this threshold, incentive compatibility fails and capital constrained firms cannot borrow in the credit market to fund their investment in innovation. Thus competition at or beyond this level is detrimental to innovation because the innovation equilibrium moves to one characterized by low quality innovation. I also show that there are conditions under which perfect competition is the most preferred market structure to spur investment in innovation. The main finding of this paper is that what degree of competition is most beneficial to innovation depends on the parameters that define the product market.
Work in Progress
The Price of Merit: Sunk Cost and Corruption in Competitive Selection, joint with Ashutosh Thakur , ( Draft coming soon, data collection in process)
Returns to Experience and the Child Penalty, joint with Gabrielle Penrose