Saloni Sanjeev Vadeyar
PhD Candidate, Department of Economics
Cornell University
PhD Candidate, Department of Economics
Cornell University
Hello! My name is Saloni Vadeyar. I am a sixth year PhD candidate at the Economics Department in Cornell University.
I am on the 2026-2027 job market.
My research interests lie at the intersection of Development, Labor and Applied Microeconomics. My work focuses on understanding how individuals/households perceive risk and make decisions especially in the context of career choices and human capital investment. I also study the effect that these choices have on long-run market outcomes and institutional quality
I have a keen interest in designing surveys and survey experiments to elicit beliefs, perceptions and subjective expectations that influence career and human capital decisions.
Email: ssv29@cornell.edu
[JMP] Gambling for Ascension: The Quest for Elite Government Jobs in India (Latest Draft) [Last Updated 14th November 2026]
Abstract: Each year, over one million graduates in India take the Civil Services Examination competing for approximately 1,000 vacancies. Why do aspirants spend years preparing for these examinations—remaining unemployed and forgoing labor-market opportunities—despite success rates as low as 0.1%? Using original survey data on 1,643 aspirants and two randomized discrete choice experiments, this paper investigates this puzzle. The first experiment estimates valuations of three non-pecuniary attributes of elite government jobs: tenure, social status, and power, with the latter two characterized using aspirants’ own perceptions elicited through structured interviews. The second experiment elicits choices between private-sector careers and lotteries over government employment. Combined with a structural lifetime-utility model, it identifies risk preferences and valuations of elite civil service positions. Under expected utility, aspirants exhibit strong risk-seeking and assign a very high value to the government job. Under probability weighting, they substantially overweight small probabilities, with extremely large decision weights but still assigning a very high value to the job. These findings suggest extreme probability insensitivity and maximax-like preferences: aspirants largely discount the odds and costs of failure, focusing instead on the prospect of obtaining an elite position. High valuations of non-wage attributes, recovered from both the job-choice experiments and the structural model, help explain why civil service employment is perceived as a jackpot.
References:
Kaushik Basu (Co-Advisor) Levon Barseghyan (Co-Advisor)
Carl Marks Professor of International Studies Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Economics
Department of Economics, Cornell University Department of Economics, Cornell University
kb40@cornell.edu lb247@cornell.edu
Rohit Lamba (Committee Member)
Assistant Professor of Economics
Department of Economics, Cornell University
rohitlamba@cornell.edu