Peer-Reviewed Journal Article

Abstract

How do economic sanctions affect civil-military relations in targeted states? Though much research has focused on how external military threats affect civil-military relations, no study to date has offered a thorough assessment of the degree to which non-military threats, particularly sanctions, alter civil-military dynamics. We posit that sanctions alter civil-military bargaining in ways that increase the military’s role in political decision-making, ultimately lessening civilian control. However, we also posit that targeted regime leaders want to fulfill as many of the military’s demands as possible with their restricted pot of resources, ultimately leading to sanctions’ limited role in observed coup attempts. We substantiate our theoretical claims using time-series, cross-national data on economic sanctions, civilian control, and coup attempts.


Abstract

What effect do economic sanctions have on target governments’ response to citizen campaigns? We assert that sanctions as a signal of international support for campaigners alter the bargaining environment between a target state and the campaign in ways that will likely draw more support from citizens and defections from the ruling base. This will in turn incentivize target leaders to be more conciliatory toward domestic campaigns with maximalist goals, especially when such campaigns are nonviolent. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis indicate that sanctions, particularly when they are enforced by multiple senders or with high cost, are effective in increasing the success rate of nonviolent campaigns. Given the plethora of sanctions research that points to their inefficacy and adverse effects, we show that sanctions could be an effective tool to extract concessions from governments facing nonviolent campaigns.


Abstract

What effects do economic sanctions have on the volume of domestic terrorism within target states and transnational terrorism directed toward Americans by targeted nationals? In this article, we theorize that sanctions imposed by the United States increase the likelihood of domestic and transnational terrorism, but the suggested effect is conditioned by the freedom of expression in sanctioned states. When media freedom and other information freedoms are high, we posit that citizens are more likely to direct their grievances against their own government, leading to an increase in domestic terrorism as time under economic sanction increases. When freedom of expression is low, however, leaders of sanctioned states may be able to exploit sanctions to channel hostility away from the home regime via transnational terrorism exported from the sanctioned state. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis lend support to our argument on domestic terrorism in the sanctioned state while showing no statistical support for the hypothesis concerning transnational terrorism.


Abstract

There is some consensus in the literature that economic sanctions might prompt more human rights abuses in target countries. Yet, the causal mechanisms underlining the sanctions-repression nexus remain little understood. Using causal mediation analysis, we examine the processes through which sanctions might deteriorate human rights conditions. We specifically propose two indirect mechanisms driving human rights violations: increased domestic dissent and reduced government capacity. Sanctions are likely to trigger domestic dissent, and this instability would further induce the government to employ repression. Reduced government capacity caused by sanctions will harm the government’s ability to screen and oversee its security agents, which would subsequently lead to increased human rights abuses. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis indicate that sanctions-induced dissent, particularly violent dissent, plays a significant mediating role in the sanctions-repression link. Likewise, we find strong evidence that diminished fiscal capacity triggered by sanctions is likely to result in more repression. There is also some modest evidence that corruption as a proxy for poor governance mediates the sanctions-repression relationship.  

Revise and Resubmit

Abstract

How does the domestic environment affect a government’s incentives to use coercion against another country? Traditional diversionary literature indicates that governments facing internal pressures will initiate military actions overseas to improve popularity. I argue that struggling governments are more inclined to economic sanctions over military force because of lower cost and political risk. I further posit that when governments encounter nonviolent protests and strong competition in the legislature, they have more incentives to initiate sanctions. Foreign sanctions are used to project sanctioning leaders’ competence and solicit domestic support. I test the empirical implication of the argument on a sample of 137 countries from 1975 to 2005. The multinomial logit results show that diversionary use of sanctions is more likely when incumbents face maximalist nonviolent mobilization and higher levels of legislative opposition, but these domestic challenges do not prompt military actions. This study indicates that economic coercion could be a preferred diversionary option and casts doubt on the conventional predictions that beleaguered governments will resort to the use of force.


Research in Progress

Abstract

Human rights organizations regularly publicize rights abuse and shame repressive regimes. However, can such human rights messaging rally third-party countries’ public support for pressuring the abusers? This study evaluates whether and how advocacy information from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) increases citizens’ approval of sanctioning the abusive government. Using a survey experiment fielded to a national sample in the United States, I have three main findings. First, when US citizens are exposed to human rights messages from the United Nations (UN), their approval of the use of sanctions against the rights-abusing government increases. However, when similar messages are from Human Rights Watch, respondents do not increase their support. Second, information about physical integrity rights repression in a foreign country, as opposed to empowerment rights restriction, activates more popular support for sanctions. Third, human rights messaging affects attitudes toward sanctions primarily by stimulating respondents’ concerns over the US’s reputation and image. This study contributes to our understanding of transnational advocacy by showing how human rights messaging could move citizens of third-party countries in favor of punishing oppressive regimes. It also identifies the limit of advocacy by revealing that certain platforms and information may fail to strike a chord among the public.


Abstract

Human rights sanctions are meant to promote human rights values and induce policy change in target countries. How do people in target countries perceive and react to human rights sanctions? These sanctions might prompt local populations to align more with human rights norms and encourage some to protest their government’s policies. However, target governments often use nationalist narratives to counteract foreign pressure, neutralize influences on public opinion and mobilizations, and even increase government support. I fielded an online survey experiment in India to evaluate the impact of sanctions information on public attitudes. The results indicate that target citizens’ support for human rights wanes when exposed to competing narratives from the sanctioner and the target government. Information about sanctions also reduces target citizens’ sympathy for antigovernment protesters. Furthermore, I use mediation analysis to figure out the driving mechanisms. I find that sanctions increase citizens’ threat perception of the sanctioner and thus give rise to the backlash effects. This study contributes to the literature on sanctions’ counterproductive effects by offering evidence on individual-level resistance to human rights pressure. It shows that the target government’s messages gain an advantage over the sanctioner and that target citizens reject the values being promoted.


Abstract

Research suggests that economic sanctions lead to rising dissent but rarely destabilize the target dictatorships. What strategies do dictators use to maintain social order in the face of foreign sanctions? We contend that dictators will both co-opt and repress to prevent the public from threatening the regimes during sanctions. We further argue that, on the one hand, party-based autocrats are inclined to increase public spending to co-opt the citizens because the regimes suffer less economic loss from sanctions and have a larger winning coalition. On the other hand, nonparty-based autocrats can only co-opt selected groups due to the deficiency of allocable resources. In addition to co-optation, dictators will also restrict citizens’ collective action capacity to weaken the public’s incentives to mobilize against the regime. To test our hypotheses, we identify sanctioned dictatorships using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset and the Autocratic Regime Data. The sample consists of 100 authoritarian regimes from 1970 to 2005. The empirical results support our argument that dictators employ both carrots and sticks when confronted with sanctions. In short, the sticks are used to punish the potential insurgents, but those who join the club are provided with carrots. 


Abstract

This paper explores how sanctions against human rights abusers affect the sanctioning government’s popularity. I argue that the use of human rights sanctions helps create a rally effect in sender countries. Prior research also suggests that voters care about economic performance; thus, it is expected that when people are primed with the economic costs of sanctions, they will be less inclined to support sanctioning leaders. Furthermore, I hypothesize that sanctioning rival countries is more likely to incite in-group/out-group sentiment than targeting friends. Using an experiment fielded in the US, I find that sanctioning human rights abusers will boost presidential popularity even if respondents know information about the potential economic costs of sanctions. Surprisingly, targeting ally rights abusers will generate stronger rally effects than targeting non-ally rights abusers. Results from mediation analyses further show that the increased approval for the sanctioning leader is driven by increased perceptions that (1) the leader is more competent, (2) the US is more prestigious in the world, and (3) the US has more influence in the world, compared to the scenario of doing nothing in response to human rights violations overseas.


Editor-Reviewed Publications