Peer-Reviewed Journal Article

Abstract

Human rights organizations regularly publicize abuses and shame repressive regimes. But can such human rights messaging effectively mobilize public support for sanctions against these regimes? This study examines whether and under what conditions international advocacy influences citizens’ willingness to support sanctions. I hypothesize that advocacy effectiveness depends on who delivers the message, what type of violation is reported, and how the response is framed. I fielded a pre-registered survey experiment with a sample of 2,204 Americans, varying the type of rights violation (physical integrity vs. empowerment rights), the advocacy messenger (UN Special Rapporteur vs. Human Rights Watch), and the sanctions framing (unilateral vs. multilateral). Results show that advocacy messages can increase public support for sanctions, but effects vary significantly across conditions. First, UN messaging produces positive and robust effects, while Human Rights Watch messaging shows weaker and less consistent impacts. Second, messages describing physical integrity abuses generate strong support, while empowerment rights violations fail to mobilize public opinion. Contrary to expectations, multilateral framing does not significantly increase support. These findings advance our understanding of transnational advocacy by identifying the conditions under which international actors can effectively mobilize public backing for human rights enforcement and when advocacy efforts may fall short.


Abstract

How do economic sanctions affect civil-military relations in targeted states? Though much research has focused on how external military threats affect civil-military relations, no study to date has offered a thorough assessment of the degree to which non-military threats, particularly sanctions, alter civil-military dynamics. We posit that sanctions alter civil-military bargaining in ways that increase the military’s role in political decision-making, ultimately lessening civilian control. However, we also posit that targeted regime leaders want to fulfill as many of the military’s demands as possible with their restricted pot of resources, ultimately leading to sanctions’ limited role in observed coup attempts. We substantiate our theoretical claims using time-series, cross-national data on economic sanctions, civilian control, and coup attempts.


Abstract

How does the domestic environment affect a government’s incentives to use coercion against another country? Traditional diversionary literature indicates that governments facing internal pressures will initiate military actions overseas to improve popularity. I argue that struggling governments are more inclined to economic sanctions over military force because of lower cost and political risk. I further posit that when governments encounter nonviolent protests and strong competition in the legislature, they have more incentives to initiate sanctions. Foreign sanctions are used to project sanctioning leaders’ competence and solicit domestic support. I test the empirical implication of the argument on a sample of 137 countries from 1975 to 2005. The multinomial logit results show that diversionary use of sanctions is more likely when incumbents face maximalist nonviolent mobilization and higher levels of legislative opposition, but these domestic challenges do not prompt military actions. This study indicates that economic coercion could be a preferred diversionary option and casts doubt on the conventional predictions that beleaguered governments will resort to the use of force.


Abstract

What effect do economic sanctions have on target governments’ response to citizen campaigns? We assert that sanctions as a signal of international support for campaigners alter the bargaining environment between a target state and the campaign in ways that will likely draw more support from citizens and defections from the ruling base. This will in turn incentivize target leaders to be more conciliatory toward domestic campaigns with maximalist goals, especially when such campaigns are nonviolent. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis indicate that sanctions, particularly when they are enforced by multiple senders or with high cost, are effective in increasing the success rate of nonviolent campaigns. Given the plethora of sanctions research that points to their inefficacy and adverse effects, we show that sanctions could be an effective tool to extract concessions from governments facing nonviolent campaigns.


Abstract

What effects do economic sanctions have on the volume of domestic terrorism within target states and transnational terrorism directed toward Americans by targeted nationals? In this article, we theorize that sanctions imposed by the United States increase the likelihood of domestic and transnational terrorism, but the suggested effect is conditioned by the freedom of expression in sanctioned states. When media freedom and other information freedoms are high, we posit that citizens are more likely to direct their grievances against their own government, leading to an increase in domestic terrorism as time under economic sanction increases. When freedom of expression is low, however, leaders of sanctioned states may be able to exploit sanctions to channel hostility away from the home regime via transnational terrorism exported from the sanctioned state. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis lend support to our argument on domestic terrorism in the sanctioned state while showing no statistical support for the hypothesis concerning transnational terrorism.


Abstract

There is some consensus in the literature that economic sanctions might prompt more human rights abuses in target countries. Yet, the causal mechanisms underlining the sanctions-repression nexus remain little understood. Using causal mediation analysis, we examine the processes through which sanctions might deteriorate human rights conditions. We specifically propose two indirect mechanisms driving human rights violations: increased domestic dissent and reduced government capacity. Sanctions are likely to trigger domestic dissent, and this instability would further induce the government to employ repression. Reduced government capacity caused by sanctions will harm the government’s ability to screen and oversee its security agents, which would subsequently lead to increased human rights abuses. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis indicate that sanctions-induced dissent, particularly violent dissent, plays a significant mediating role in the sanctions-repression link. Likewise, we find strong evidence that diminished fiscal capacity triggered by sanctions is likely to result in more repression. There is also some modest evidence that corruption as a proxy for poor governance mediates the sanctions-repression relationship.