Research

The idea that two scenarios that are indiscernible should be regarded as the same physical situation—and described by the same ontological account—has been extensively applied in

physics for centuries. This contribution reassesses the application of this idea—often associated with the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII)—and some of its widely accepted philosophical consequences. We argue that some notable applications of the PII fail because scenarios commonly taken to be indiscernible turn out to be discernible, once the full ontological and dynamical resources of the relevant theory are considered, including what, according to that theory, can count as detectable or measurable. We show how this type of error has led to unwarranted methodological conclusions and unfounded associations between the PII and anti-realist positions.

Non-relativistic objective collapse theories have been remarkably successful in addressing the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics. Despite substantial efforts, the project of extending them to the relativistic domain remains burdened by significant conceptual objections and technical challenges, often taken to cast doubt on the viability of the program as a whole. On the conceptual side, relativistic collapse theories have been claimed to face challenges involving tension between instantaneous collapse and relativity, frame-dependence of property values and probabilities, the possibility of superluminal signaling and the failure of narratability. On the technical side, persistent infinities, difficulties in constructing fully covariant frameworks and the apparent need for non-standard fields have hindered the development of workable models. In this paper, we offer a systematic rebuttal of the conceptual objections and provide a structured account of the remaining technical challenges. We conclude that relativistic collapse theories do provide a promising route toward a fully relativistic quantum framework that overcomes the conceptual limitations of standard quantum theory. 

As a fundamental arena for the development of his dynamics, Newton postulated the existence of absolute space, in which bodies innately possess absolute velocity. Despite this, Newton argued that, although real, absolute properties cannot be detected. Since then, the claim that absolute velocity would be undetectable in such a Newtonian universe has been generally accepted. Here, we show that standard arguments for such a claim, beginning with the one offered by Newton himself, beg the question. We conclude that there are no formal reasons to believe that absolute velocity would be undetectable in a Newtonian universe.

A theory of quantum gravity consists of a gravitational framework which, unlike general relativity, takes into account the quantum character of matter. In spite of impressive advances, no fully satisfactory, self-consistent and empirically viable theory with those characteristics has ever been constructed. A successful semiclassical gravity model, in which the classical Einstein tensor couples to the expectation value of the energy-momentum tensor of quantum matter fields, would, at the very least, constitute a useful stepping stone towards quantum gravity. However, not only no empirically viable semiclassical theory has ever been proposed, but the self-consistency of semiclassical gravity itself has been called into question repeatedly over the years. Here, we put forward a fully self-consistent, empirically viable semiclassical gravity framework, in which the expectation value of the energy-momentum tensor of a quantum field, evolving via a relativistic objective collapse dynamics, couples to a fully classical Einstein tensor. We present the general framework, a concrete example, and briefly explore possible empirical consequences of our model. 

The de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory asserts that a complete characterization of an N particle system is given by its wave function together with the (at-all-times-defined) positions of the particles, with the wave function always satisfying the Schrödinger equation and the positions evolving according to the deterministic “guiding equation”. A complete agreement with the predictive apparatus of standard quantum mechanics, including the uncertainty principle and the probabilistic Born rule, is then said to emerge from these equations, without having to confer any special status to measurements or observers. Two key elements behind the proof of this complete agreement are absolute uncertainty and the POVM theorem. The former involves an alleged “naturally emerging, irreducible limitation on the possibility of obtaining knowledge within pilot-wave theory” and the latter establishes that the outcome distributions of all measurements are described by POVMs. Here, we argue that the derivations of absolute uncertainty and the POVM theorem depend upon the questionable assumption that “information is always configurationally grounded”. We explain in detail why the offered rationale behind such an assumption is deficient and explore the consequences of having to let go of it.

Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) is an interpretation of quantum theory based on the idea of abolishing the notion of absolute states of systems, in favor of states of systems relative to other systems. Such a move is claimed to solve the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics. Moreover, RQM has been argued to account for all quantum correlations without invoking non-local effects and, in spite of embracing a fully relational stance, to successfully explain how different observers exchange information. In this work, we carry out a thorough assessment of RQM and its purported achievements. We find that it fails to address the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics—related to the lack of clarity in its ontology and the rules that govern its behavior—and that it leads to serious conceptual problems of its own. We also uncover as unwarranted the claims that RQM can correctly explain information exchange among observers, and that it accommodates all quantum correlations without invoking non-local influences. We conclude that RQM is unsuccessful in its attempt to provide a satisfactory understanding of the quantum world. 

Considering a complicated extension of a Wigner's friend scenario, Frauchiger and Renner (FR) allegedly showed that “quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself.” However, such a result has been under severe criticism, as it has been convincingly argued to crucially depend on an implicit, non-trivial assumption regarding details of the collapse mechanism. In consequence, the result is not as robust or general as intended. On top of all this, in this work we show that a much simpler arrangement—basically an EPR setting—is sufficient to derive a result fully analogous to that of FR. Moreover, we claim that all lessons learned from FR's result are essentially contained within the original EPR paper. We conclude that FR's result does not offer any novel insights into the conceptual problems of quantum theory. 

In a recent paper, Rovelli responds to our critical assessment of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). His main argument is that our assessment lacks merit, because we fail to understand, or cope with, the premises of his theory; instead, he argues, we judge his proposal, blinded by the preconceptions inherent to "our camp". Here, we explicitly show that our assessment judges RQM on its own terms, together with the basic requirements of precision, clarity, logical soundness and empirical suitability. Under those circumstances, we prove false Rovelli's claim that RQM provides a satisfactory, realistic, non-solipsistic description of the world. Moreover, his reply serves us to further exhibit the serious problems of the RQM proposal, as well as the common failures to understanding the basic conceptual difficulties of quantum theory. 

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