Mechanisms of Policy Change in Lobbying Transparency

The case of Germany

Maximilian Schiffers and Sandra Plümer

Long phases of policy stability and quick phases of policy change

Beyond the specific arrangement of lobbying regulation and the policy content of lobbying registers, interest group research asks how lobbying regulation laws are introduced or reformed. This is because interest groups are also active in the policy-making process itself, as they are lobbyists seeking changes in existing norms in this field as well. This intersection between interest group research and public policy research is the focus of our paper “Identifying causal mechanisms of unexpected policy change: Accumulated punctuation in the field of lobbying transparency in Germany” published in European Policy Analysis.

A new perspective in understanding policy change and stability is provided by recent public policy research towards mechanistic approaches for explaining policy change. Using Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) from the set of most “Theories Of The Policy Process” (5th edition; Weible 2023), we analyze the causal mechanisms that lead to unexpected policy changes - in the case of lobbying regulation. As an empirical illustration, we focus on the Germany's mandatory lobbying register introduced in 2021 as a breakthrough and policy change after 16 years of debate and policy stability. In the German case, we show that three mechanisms needed to be combined for this breakthrough to happen. Previous constellations of policy reform initiatives in Germany lacked one or two of these mechanisms. Thus, the mechanisms can explain previous policy stability as well.

The introduction of the lobbying register (2021) and the latest reforms (2023) have moved Germany from a lowly regulated system with structural deficits to a mediumly regulated state in terms of transparency measures, hence being part of a new wave of stricter lobbying regulation in Europe. Examples of regulated states within this wave are Austria (2012), Ireland (2015), France (2016) and the EU interinstitutional transparency register (2021; Crepaz et al. 2019; De Francesco and Trein 2020). 

Four episodes of policy stability and policy change

In episode 1 from 2008 to the federal election of September 2017, lobbying regulation received selective public attention through a series of events. The present regulation at that time—ranking Germany as lowly regulated system dating back to 1951 included a list of registered associations (“Öffentliche Liste über die beim Bundestag registrierten Verbände”) which has been in place since 1972, and merely lists the names and addresses of associations but not of other interest groups. Despite numerous scandals, the debate remained a niche topic resulting in policy stability.

Episode 2 starts with the federal election in September 2017 and ends in March 2018 when the new coalition government signed the coalition agreement. The conservative Union parties (CDU/CSU) – the major opponents of lobbying regulation – first agreed on the introduction of a mandatory lobbying register in coalition negotiations with Liberals and the Greens. Even in a second round of coalition negotiations between CDU/CSU and Social Democrats (SPD), the register was part of the coalition agreement until a last-minute intervention of the CSU. The interim outcome at the dramatic climax of the episode is thus policy stability despite a near breakthrough in the coalition negotiations.

Episode 3 covers the start of the new coalition government in 2018 until the end of 2020. These years marked a period of limited action, although a lobbying scandal in summer 2020 surrounding member of parliament Philipp Amthor (CDU) led to more support for advocates of stronger regulation. Amthor provided a consultancy firm with privileged contacts within ministries and the Chancellery, and received stock options and lavish travel expenses in return.  As a reaction, the coalition parties launched a proposal for the introduction of a lobbying register which subsequently failed in committee. By then, even experienced political commentators did not expect any change until after the next federal elections. The interim outcome, again, is policy stability despite a near breakthrough.

Episode 4 starts at the beginning of the election year 2021 and ends with the introduction of a lobbying register in March 2021. In the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic, conflict-of-interest and corruption scandals about the procurement of face masks by MPs dominated the debate about transparency regulation reforms. Even though these scandals did not fall in the jurisdiction of a lobbying register, conflicts-of-interests of MPs and lobbying in general were blended in the debate. The final outcome is thus the introduction of the lobbying register as substantial policy change after a long time of policy stability.

Combining mechanisms to explain policy stability and policy change

In a multi-step analyzing strategy, we develop causal mechanisms regarding the relevant theoretical concepts of PET. Methodologically, the analysis is based on process tracing and qualitative content analysis to examine 100 policy documents. These mechanisms - in their combination - not only explain the adoption of the lobbying register in March 2021 as our central outcome displaying policy change, but also can account for the interim outcomes of the three other case episodes leading to policy stability. 

Mechanism 1: De-thematization of the policy issue by the opposing policy network. The mechanism illustrates how policy actors manage to dampen the salience of the policy issue directly and indirectly. Based on a shared policy image and applied in key policy venues, this mechanism is an instance of a negative feedback loop (PET) to block policy initiatives for stricter regulation. We observe this mechanism in episodes one, two, and three. However, due to the accumulated scandals, policy actors were not able to employ this mechanism in episode 4.

Mechanism 2: Growing dominance of issue network in favor of strict regulation. Build around a common policy image that scandals are the result of a structural deficit in regulation instead of individual mistakes of politicians, key policy actors from political parties and interest groups enact a positive feedback loop. Together with SPD, the Greens and the Left Party, the key policy actors are transparency NGOs (LobbyControl, Transparency International, Abgeordnetenwatch), large public and business interest groups as well as the association of lobbyists (de'ge'pol) that engaged in this issue network.

Mechanism 3: Issue validation through accumulation of scandals. The accumulation of scandals over time led to a shift in public perception that framed diverse scandals through a lobbying lens. The mechanism is positive feedback loop with focusing events which is distinct in episodes 3 and 4.

To conclude, the main argument of this paper is that policy change becomes possible when the issue network defending the status quo becomes less influential and, at the same time, a network advocating policy change emerges and becomes dominant in the policy debate. In particular, it highlights that it is the active work of policy actors that takes advantage of focusing events to create fertile ground for reform.

References

Schiffers, M., and S. Plümer. (2024). Identifying causal mechanisms of unexpected policy change: Accumulated punctuation in the field of lobbying transparency in Germany. European Policy Analysis, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1205 

Crepaz, M., Chari, R., Hogan, J. and Murphy, G. (2019) ‘International Dynamics in Lobbying Regulation’, Lobbying in the European Union. Edited by Dialer, D. and Richter, M. pp. 49–63. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98800-9_4 

De Francesco, F., and P. Trein. 2020. How does corruption affect the adoption of lobby registers? A comparative analysis. Politics and Governance 8 (2): 116–127. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2708 

Weible, C.M. (Ed.). (2023). Theories Of The Policy Process (5th ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003308201 

For a further analysis of the German Lobbying Register Law (2021) and its reform (2023) see:

Schiffers, M., and S. Plümer. (2024): Explaining the German Lobbying Register Law and its Reform: Combining Insights from the Multiple Streams Framework and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. Interest Groups & Advocacy Special Issue: New Perspectives on Lobbying Regulation and Reform. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41309-024-00214-w 

About the authors

Dr. Maximilian Schiffers is a researcher at the NRW School of Governance, Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. His research interests include lobbying, NGOs and interest groups as well as public policy change and governance in a transforming society.

Dr. Sandra Plümer is a researcher at the University of Bielefeld in Germany. Her research covers comparative public policy with a focus on explaining and understanding policy processes in different fields, such as education, transparency and environmental policy. For her doctoral thesis, she examined the coordination mechanism which helps to translate policy learning into policy change, using the example of German school and education policy.