A summary of our contribution to the Handbook on Lobbying and public policy
In December 2022, “Qatargate” scandal rocked the European Parliament, exemplifying the persistent threat of corruption and illicit lobbying in political systems, whether regulations are present or not. Despite the expansion of lobbying regulation globally, from only four systems in the 1990s to 19 by the 2020s, scandals continue to arise, highlighting both the successes and limitations of existing regulations.
Lobbying regulation governs the behaviour of lobbyists and how they interact with government officials and policy makers, aiming to ensure transparency and accountability, allowing citizens to monitor these interactions (Broz, 2002). However, as our chapter along with previous literature points out, the stringency of lobbying regulations varies significantly across different political systems. For example, the UK only requires consultancies to register and report on lobbying activity, whereas the European Union (EU) covers a wide variety of actors included businesses, NGO’s, consultancies, and other interest groups seeking to influence public policy.
Measuring the Robustness of Lobbying Regulations
Researchers focused on lobbying regulation have developed various indices to measure the robustness of these laws. Early studies by Opheim (1991) focused on U.S states, while later comparative research applied these measures globally (Hollman & Luneburg, 2012; Chari et al., 2020). Holman & Luneburg (2012), for instance, examined European lobbying rules using 21 indicators, including information disclosure, registration, and enforcement capabilities. The Centre for Public Integrity (CPI) further expanded on these studies by developing an index with 48 indicators, ranking the robustness of lobbying laws across jurisdictions on a 0-100 scale (Chari et al., 2020).
The CPI index classifies regulations into low, medium, and high-robustness systems. For example, the UK scores 26 on the CPI scale, placing it in the low-robustness category, while the U.S. federal system scores 62, placing it among the most stringent (McKay & Wozniak, 2020; Chari et al., 2020). The differences reflect the varying levels of disclosure required, enforcement, the definition of who a lobbyist is, revolving door provisions, and the degree of public access to information.
Global Trends and Developments in Lobbying Regulation
Over time, lobbying regulations have generally become more robust, with countries learning from each other’s experiences. This “policy learning” is evident in countries that adopted more stringent regulations after observing weaknesses in earlier frameworks. Germany, for instance, was one of Europe’s first movers in lobbying regulation in 1951, but its rules remained weak for decades. In January 2022, Germany updated its laws to introduce a mandatory register and enforce sanctions for non-compliance, thereby strengthening transparency.
Figure 1 - CPI Scores over time: Robustness and growth in lobbying laws
The EU’s lobbying regulation, long considered robust, has recently undergone a facelift with the adoption of the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) on a Mandatory Transparency Register (2021). The agreement between the three major EU Institutions (the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament) mandates lobbyists to register before engaging with senior officials in the three institutions. This represents a significant enhancement of the EU’s transparency framework, transitioning from a voluntary registration system to a de facto mandatory one, ensuring that unregistered lobbyists cannot access high-level meetings (Chari et al., 2020).
Ireland has similarly enhanced its regulations with the 2022 Regulation of Lobbying Bill, which expands the scope of lobbying activities covered and introduces stricter penalties for non-compliance, including an unlimited fine and two years’ imprisonment for violations. Others are adopting regulations for the first time. Finland, for example, will implement its first lobbying law in 2024, becoming the first Nordic country to do so. Latvia and Belgium have also introduced new lobbying frameworks in recent years, although Belgium’s voluntary register remains classified as a low-robustness system (OECD, 2021).
Challenges and Future Directions
Despite these marked improvements, challenges remain in regulating modern lobbying activities. One such challenge is the rise of digital lobbying, particularly in age of social media mad voters, consumers, and even politicians. Existing regulations focus on direct lobbying and often fail to address indirect strategies like online campaigns (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). Only a handful of jurisdictions, such as the EU and Canada, have introduced provisions specifically addressing social media lobbying (OECD, 2021).
Foreign interference is another area where regulations fall short. The U.S has a robust Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), regulating foreign entities lobbying US policy makers, but most EU member states have no equivalent. The OECD has highlighted this gap and called for more comprehensive measures to limit foreign influence in domestic policymaking (OECD, 2021).
Scholars and policymakers have proposed reforms to address these issues. One suggestion is to consolidate regulatory oversight within jurisdictions, as fragmented responsibility often leads to inconsistent enforcement (Coen et al., 2023). Another recommendation is to improve interoperability between jurisdictions, allowing for better sharing of information on lobbying activities across borders (Coen et al., 2023).
Conclusion
Conclusion The global landscape of lobbying regulation has improved over the past few decades, with more countries adopting laws. However, the lobbying industry has evolved, particularly with the rise of digital lobbying and foreign interference. To ensure the integrity of policymaking, regulations must continually adapt. Transparent and fair lobbying regulations remain essential to sustaining evidence-based policymaking in a modern, digital world.
References
Broz, J.L., 2002. Political systems and accountability: A lobbying analysis. Public Choice, 112(3-4), pp.261–279.
Chari, R., Hogan, J., Murphy, G. and Crepaz, M., 2020. Regulating lobbying: A global comparison. 2nd ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Coen, D., Katsaitis, A. and Vannoni, M., 2023. Regulating government affairs: Integrating lobbying research and policy concerns. Regulation and Governance. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12515
De Bruycker, I. and Beyers, J., 2019. Lobbying strategies and success: Inside and outside lobbying in European Union legislative politics. European Political Science Review, 11(1), pp.57-74.
Holman, C. and Luneburg, W., 2012. Lobbying and transparency: A comparative analysis of regulatory reform. Interest Groups & Advocacy, 1(1), pp.75-104.
McKay, A. and Wozniak, A., 2020. Opaque: An empirical evaluation of lobbying transparency in the UK. Interest Groups & Advocacy, 9(1), pp.102-118.
Murphy, G., 2017. Lobbying regulation in Ireland: Fool’s errand or finest hour? Administration, 65(2), pp.127-144.
OECD, 2021. Lobbying in the 21st century: Transparency, integrity and access. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Opheim, C., 1991. Explaining the differences in state lobby regulation. Western Political Quarterly, 44(2), pp.405-421.