Indian policymakers love to divide when they have nothing new to add. Reservation has become their favourite tool, a quick way to keep influential stakeholders happy. Now the habit has reached the power sector, which is already so “electrified” with layers that it has become ELECTRIC: Environmental, Legal, Economic, Commercial, Technical, Regulatory, Infrastructure and Consumer issues, all tangled together.
Instead of untangling them, we hand out social status to power sources. Solar and wind sit in the “upper class” because they are green and their generation tariffs are low. Coal sits in the “lower class” because of its emissions. Nuclear, hydro and gas move up and down depending on who is talking. Then comes one more tag, imported versus “Made in India”, and on top of it mandates, targets and preferences that turn every tag into money.
Each tag may start with a good reason. The trouble begins when one good quality becomes a certificate of overall superiority. And while this hierarchy is being built, the one who pays for every layer, the consumer, is the one nobody asks.
If the question is emissions, coal loses; solar, wind and nuclear do well. If it is generation tariff, solar and wind often win. If it is power at 8 pm or for a factory running 24 hours, coal, nuclear and hydro matter more. If it is fast ramping up and down, reservoir hydro and suitable gas plants shine. Storage is technically not generation; it is an entirely different ball game.
Low emissions, low generation cost, firm supply and flexibility are different things. Policy goes wrong when the answer to one question is used to settle all the others. A source that is “clean” is not automatically “reliable”. A source that is “efficient” is not automatically “cheap”. No plant, coal or nuclear included, runs without breakdowns, and solar and wind depend on weather and time of day. Every source has strengths and limits. Planning should measure them, not paste permanent labels on them.
This is the biggest confusion in the debate. A generation tariff is the ex-bus price of electricity (at the plant gate) under a contract. The consumer needs power at the right time, at the right place, with steady quality. These are not the same thing.
A low solar tariff does not tell us what it costs to meet an evening peak or run a continuous industrial load. The real bill also includes transmission, losses, balancing, reserve capacity and storage. Storage needs investment, loses energy in conversion and needs power to charge it. Of course, these costs should not be mechanically added to every solar unit; solar feeding a nearby daytime load can be very valuable, while more solar behind a jammed transmission line is worth much less. But ignoring them and cheering the tariff alone gives the public half the story.
The same strictness must apply to the “lower class” too. Coal brings pollution, water use and fuel logistics. Nuclear brings heavy construction and financing risk. Hydro brings ecological and social costs. Gas brings fuel price risk. The goal is simple: meet demand reliably at the lowest total cost, within environmental limits.
Solar modules may be imported, assembled in India from imported cells, or built with more local inputs. A “domestic” label at the module stage does not mean a domestic supply chain. In March 2026 the government itself admitted heavy import dependence in ingots and wafers, and extended its approved manufacturing framework to those stages only from June 2028. Wind is different: government reporting in 2026 put indigenisation of key components at roughly 70–80%. Treating solar and wind as the same story is lazy.
Domestic manufacturing can build jobs, skills, servicing capacity and supply security. Imports can offer better price, performance or technology. The answer lies in checking real value addition, quality and lifecycle performance, not in a label.
Supporting local manufacturing may cost more in the short run. That can be justified if it builds real competitiveness or cuts risky dependence. But then say so openly: how big is the extra cost, who pays it, and how will success be judged?
Today we celebrate record-low renewable tariffs while adding sourcing conditions that may push costs up, without separating the electricity goal from the manufacturing goal. Consumers should be able to see what their money is meant to achieve.
Import risk also needs an honest comparison. An imported solar panel or turbine is mostly a one-time exposure, with spare parts and servicing as a continuing link. An imported-fuel plant needs foreign supply every day it runs. Domestic coal has a different risk profile but carries mining, transport and pollution burdens. Energy security cannot be squeezed into one “imported versus domestic” ranking.
Renewable Purchase Obligations and the Renewable Consumption Obligation (RCO) reserve a fixed share of procurement or consumption for eligible resources. There are good reasons: decarbonisation, market building, diversification. But mandatory shares also tie the hands of buyers, and they must be judged by what they deliver.In 2025-26, renewables (including large hydro) supplied 26.2% of India’s electricity generation against an RCO target of 33.01%, a shortfall of nearly 7 percentage points, yet the obligation is being enforced as if the target had already been met.
In effect, this works like reservation: a minimum share is set aside for a category. Technology-specific sub-targets create a reservation within a reservation. (The comparison is only about the allocation method; social and political reservation have their own constitutional purpose.) The September 2025 central RCO notification, for example, sets separate categories for wind, hydro, distributed renewable energy and other renewable energy. Add domestic sourcing rules on top, and every layer narrows choice further.
Meeting an annual renewable target does not prove a distribution company can serve the evening peak. Green compliance, industrial growth and reliable supply need separate scorecards.
More solar and wind need more flexibility: dispatchable plants, storage, strong networks and demand response. The IEA calls these central to integrating variable renewables. A conventional plant may sell fewer units yet remain essential during shortages and for reserves. If its earnings depend only on units sold, and the system does not pay for availability, we starve the support that renewables rely on.
The reverse is equally true. Old plants should not get lifelong protection just because they delivered in the past. Keep or retire them based on dependable capacity, delivery dates, location and system need.
These choices are made on the supply side. Governments pick favoured technologies, set procurement shares, promote manufacturing and design support. Generators, manufacturers and buyers lobby and negotiate. The consumer, who funds the whole system through bills and taxes, watches.
Bills recover procurement, network and operating costs, including the cost of keeping supply dependable. Subsidies just move the burden to taxpayers; they do not erase it. Yet nobody shows consumers the combined effect. What does a technology-specific mandate cost? What premium comes with domestic sourcing? How much extra network is needed? Who pays for surplus or badly timed purchases?
Each rule may be defensible alone. Together they pile up into a burden no one properly examines. Households, farmers and small businesses cannot switch supplier or negotiate contracts. They get the portfolio chosen for them, and the bill that follows. If a cost serves a wider national goal, such as jobs or strategic independence, then tariffs should not be the automatic piggy bank. Budget support deserves a fair look.
Public consultation is welcome, but commenting on a tariff after the procurement is locked in is like reviewing a meal after it has been eaten.
• Start with the service, not the technology. Define what is needed: power at specific times and places, a reliability standard, environmental limits and clear costs. Let solar, storage, hydro, gas, nuclear, coal and demand response compete, alone or together, on full system cost.
• Be neutral, but not blind. Count emissions, value firm capacity and flexibility, price in transmission, and judge supply-chain risk through open criteria.
• Make special support earn its place. Where support is needed for innovation or a strategic gap, state the goal, the cost, the time limit and the review test. Preferential treatment must come with proof of results.
• Bring consumers in before the money is committed. Regulators should demand plain-language comparisons of options showing bill impact, reliability, environmental performance and fuel or equipment risk. Fund independent consumer advocates with technical backing, and offer real choices such as time-of-day tariffs and demand response.
• What exactly does it cost? In rupees per unit, and in total, for the consumer and the taxpayer.
• Who pays, and who benefits? If the benefit is national, the bill should not carry all of it.
• How will we know it worked? Every preference needs a target, a deadline and an honest review.
If a policy cannot answer these three questions in plain words, it is not ready to be imposed on 1.4 billion people who will pay for it.
India needs cleaner electricity that is also affordable, dependable and secure. Renewable status does not prove reliability. A domestic label does not prove value for money. A low tariff does not prove a low bill. Past dependability does not earn permanent protection.
The question that should govern every decision is this: which combination best serves consumers, at what full cost and with what risks, and did consumers have a real voice in that choice?
The people who finance the power system deserve a real role in shaping it.