Research

Working Papers

• How Does a Budget Rule Affect Sovereign Default Incentives and Welfare? (Job Market Paper)

This paper analyzes the role of a fiscal rule, especially a budget rule, on the likelihood of debt repudiation and the welfare of households. Following the Eaton-Gersovitz sovereign default model, I enrich fiscal features in the model by adding a budget rule. The budget rule ensures that spending cannot increase unless tax revenue increases. The rule lowers the government's incentive to borrow, reducing default risks. A budget rule can improve households' welfare if it addresses inefficiencies stemming from an agency problem when the government does not behave in the best interest of the households.

Work In Progress

• Credibility and Effectiveness of Announced Fiscal Measures: Early Evidence from Covid-19 (with Bryn Battersby and João Tovar Jalles) Slides Draft will be available soon!