Research

Publications

1. Dato P., Durmaz T., Pommeret A. (2020). Smart grids and renewable electricity generation by households. Energy Economics, 86, 104511. link

Abstract:

This paper analyzes investments in solar panels and energy storage at a household (HH) level and studies the consequences of demand-side management for a HH by accounting for three levels of equipment in smart grids. The first level refers to the possibility of feeding electricity to the grid, which can be achieved relatively simply by net metering. The second level concerns the installation of smart meters. The third level relates to energy storage. Additionally, we look at the welfare impact of a policy imposing the installation of smart meters and the implications of curtailment measures to avoid congestion. Our analysis conveys core messages for the policymakers by showing that smart meter deployment can be welfare worsening and lead to higher grid electricity purchase depending on the tariffs. In turn, greenhouse gas emissions can be higher if fossil fuels hold a significant share in grid electricity production. This calls for regulation of tariff rates.

Keywords: Renewable energy. Intermittency. Distributed generation. Smart solutions. Energy storage. Demand response. Regulation.

JEL Classification: D24. D61. D81. Q41.Q42.

2. Dato P., Durmaz T., Pommeret A. (2019) Renewables, Energy Storage, and Smart Grids. In: Hefele P., Palocz-Andresen M., Rech M., Kohler JH. (eds) Climate and Energy Protection in the EU and China. Springer, Cham. link

Abstract: This chapter analyzes what constitutes an efficient mix of investment in renewable energy, energy storage, and central grid electricity provision and the consequences of demand-side management. The authors derive the optimal microgrid capacity in terms of solar panels and energy-storage devices depending on whether there are smart meters or not. The chapter studies the consequences for peak-period electricity consumption and explores the conditions for which access to smart meters leads to adverse outcomes by causing more purchases from the grid, and in turn, more electricity provision from power companies. The work also determines the conditions that favor the installation of smart meters and shows that it is not worth installing a smart meter unless it allows users to take advantage of sufficiently low electricity prices.

3. Dato, P. (2018). Investment in Energy Efficiency, Adoption of Renewable Energy, and Household Behavior: Evidence from OECD countries. The Energy Journal, 39(3). link

Abstract:

There are possible synergies between the decision to invest in energy efficiency measures and to adopt renewable energy, in the sense that the former reduces energy demand so that the latter can further cut future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and which has great potential in the residential sector. Much work has been done in the residential sector on demand for clean energy and on investment in energy efficiency, but to our knowledge there is no specific study that investigates the relationship between the two. This paper fills a gap in the literature, and first shows theoretically that there are relationships of substitution or complementarity between the two decisions depending on the threshold of the cross effect related to the environmental motivation of the consumer. Second, the paper empirically shows that the two decisions are positively interrelated due to unobserved characteristics that determine both decisions. Third, the paper provides differential impact of energy poverty, split incentive problem, dwelling characteristics, commitment and trust on the two decisions. Finally, the paper investigates household characteristics that significantly affect the joint adoption of energy efficient and renewable energy technologies. This contribution can serve to define incentive policies to advance the energy transition.

Keywords: Energy efficiency. renewable energy. bivariate probit. household behavior.

JEL Classification: Q42. Q21. C35. D11.


4. Dato, P. (2018). Inducing sorting investment and implementation of an alternative e-waste market under imperfect information. Economics Bulletin, 38(1), 629-637. link

Abstract: In this paper, we apply the theory of incentives to the e-waste market. We want to show how to induce firms in the North to undertake sorting investment to help implement an alternative e-waste market of a joint trade in reusable and non-reusable e-waste. Results show that, if the sorting cost is low, the optimal contract to induce sorting investment and to implement the alternative e-waste market for a joint trade in reusable and non-reusable e-waste is the Baron-Myerson contract. One of the direct implication of the results is that, if the cost is not too high to deter the sorting investment, the firm in the South should give incentives to the firm in the North to invest in sorting so that the alternative e-waste market can easily be implemented.


5. Dato, P. (2017). Energy transition under irreversibility: a two-sector approach. Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(3), 797-820. link

Abstract: This paper analyses the optimal energy transition of a two-sector economy (energy and final goods) under irreversible environmental catastrophe. First, it proposes a general appraisal of optimal switching problems related to energy transition showing: (1) the possibility of a catastrophe due to accumulation of pollution; and (2) technological regimes with the adoption of renewable energy. Second, it numerically shows that for given baseline parameter values, the most profitable energy transition path may correspond to the one in which the economy starts using both resources, crosses the pollution threshold by losing a part of its capital, and never adopts only clean energy. Third, it extends the model to allow for additional investment in energy saving technologies. We then find that this additional investment favours full transition to the sole use of renewable energy. It is then profitable to take advantage of these synergies by jointly promoting deployment of clean energy and providing incentives for investment in energy saving technologies.

Keywords: Energy . Irreversibility . Pollution . Switch

JEL Classification: Q30 . Q53 . C61

6. Dato, P. (2017). Economic analysis of e-waste market. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 17(6), 815-837. link

Abstract:

Despite international regulations that prohibit the trans-boundary movement of electronic and electric waste (e-waste), non-reusable e-waste is often illegally mixed with reusable e-waste and results in being sent to developing countries. As developing countries are not well prepared to properly manage e-waste, this illegal trade has important negative externalities, and creates ‘environmental injustice’. The two main information problems on the e-waste market are imperfect monitoring and imperfect information on the so-called ‘degree of purity’ of the e-waste. In this paper, we use a simple bilateral North-South trade model and show that there exists an alternative e-waste market that is better than the standard e-waste market for developing countries. This alternative e-waste market is a joint trade in reusable and non-reusable e-waste. In both cases, we consider demand and supply sides, plus the equilibrium of the e-waste market to show that the alternative market that we propose is better for developing countries.

JEL classification: Q53. L51. D82. F18.

Key words: E-waste. market. imperfect information. international trade.

Working Papers

  • Energy transition under a risk of environmental catastrophe: a two-sector approach (with A. Pommeret) link

  • Feed-in tariff policy in Hong Kong: is it efficient? (with A. Pommeret and T. Durmaz)

  • Quick Methods for Distributional Analysis of Electricity Subsidies Reform under Data Limitations Constraints

  • Green Technology Transitions with an Endogenous Market Structure. (with A. Bondarev and F. Krysiak)

  • Optimal policy instruments for Green Technology Transitions with an Endogenous Market Structure. (with F. Krysiak)

  • Contract Design for Energy Markets with Intermittent Technologies. (with F. Krysiak and S. Schäfers)