Why        Now?

             The last general elections held in the country led to Jovenel Moïse becoming the head of state, constitutionally, on February 7, 2017. His entire term was marked by numerous political tensions, popular protests, and political scandals. After the president was assassinated at his private residence during the night of July 6th, 2021, the country’s chronic political instability took on a security dimension. The administrative vacuum across different levels of state power left behind by President Moïse who had never managed to organize elections forced the country into a clumsy transition. Even before his assassination, on the second Monday of January 2021, the Haitian Senate was reduced to a third of its members due to the expiration of terms, following the president’s own findings.

                         Thanks to the support and endorsement of the CORE GROUP, Dr. Ariel Henry assumed leadership of the Haitian government on July 20, 2021, in an unprecedented situation: Dr. Henry held the dual role of de facto Prime Minister and President. He remained in power for nearly three years. During his time in office, a crisis that initially had political and security dimensions escalated into a full-blown humanitarian crisis, particularly after violent clashes broke out between two major gangs in Port-au-Prince—the Gran Ravine gang and the Village de Dieu gang. These confrontations forced thousands of residents from the Martissant neighborhood to flee their homes and seek refuge in other communes.

There were also violent confrontations between the 400 Mawozo gang and the Chen Mechan gang, resulting in the deaths of many innocent civilians. Finally, one cannot forget the large, coordinated attacks by the “Viv Ansanm” gang coalition, which targeted the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, multiple police stations, and the Croix-des-Bouquets prison, where over 3,000 inmates escaped. It was in this chaotic context that Dr. Ariel Henry, who was abroad at the time, found himself unable to return to Haiti, and on March 11, 2024, he was forced to announce his resignation. What he left behind was a crisis that had worsened in every aspect.

CARICOM as Mediator

                                      After Ariel Henry's resignation, under the leadership of CARICOM as mediator, several political actors—already aligned around different agreements and each with their own proposal to resolve the national crisis—finally reached a broader consensus around an accord called the April 3 Agreement. This agreement gave birth to a Presidential Transitional Council (CPT) composed of nine (9) members, of which seven (7) have voting rights: six (6) representing the political class and one (1) representing the private sector. The remaining two (2) are observers: one (1) from civil society and one (1) from the interfaith religious sector.

    Although the April 3 Agreement successfully brought together a variety of actors and gained some popular support, many national observers quickly foresaw that the Presidential Council with nine heads would likely fall short of delivering the expected results. The concern was that personal political interests among council members would lead to internal tensions, which would hinder decision-making. It's important to note that a majority of five (5) members is required to pass any resolution or decree.

Observers' predictions have unfortunately proven correct. Fifteen (15) months after the council began operating, it has failed to bring about any meaningful recovery. More territories have been lost, more police stations burned, more people displaced—all under the governance of this transitional council, which remains in power to this day. In summary, the council has failed in its mission to restore security nationwide, organize a referendum, and hold general elections.

A Worrying Deadlock

                                   The April 3 Agreement, which created the Presidential Transitional Council (CPT), laid out a clear roadmap. If that roadmap had been successfully followed, Haiti would be returning to constitutional order by February 7, 2025, with newly elected leaders at various levels of government resulting from general elections. The council was given 22 months to restore security, conduct a referendum, and hold elections.

However, 15 months have already passed with no serious progress. Only about nine (9) months remain before the council's mandate ends. Both the population and political observers strongly doubt that what has not been achieved in 15 months could suddenly be accomplished in just nine.

           Ultimately, the CPT’s poor performance, the series of political scandals it has faced, and its internal conflicts have all reduced the council to a mere symbolic figurehead. Today, the Presidential Council is widely criticized and discredited, as reflected in public opinion and everyday conversations across the country.

This situation raises two critical questions:

1. How will the population view these leaders when their time-limited mandate comes to an end?

2. How does the failure of the Presidential Council (CPT)  impact CARICOM ?

We, the peasant-farmer organizations, along with various other structured groups rooted in the rural population, therefore have come together to form a common front in order to:

• Strengthen our representation and ensure our presence in all national discussions about the country, so that we can bring forward the demands of the sector;

• Take all necessary actions—in the short, medium, and long term—that contribute to changing the current state of affairs, in the interest of the sector in particular, and the nation in general;

• Make recommendations and submit petitions;

• Offer consultations where needed.