Hegel, The Essential Writings (selections)

The reading begins with the section titled SOCIAL LIFE: FAMILY AND CIVIL SOCIETY on p. 273 (paragraph 513), which is a selection from Hegel's Philosophy of Mind.

1. Paragraphs 513-517: These paragraphs are pretty impenetrable, due to Hegel's technical language. The point, broadly, is that freedom is only attained in an ethical life that is both social, and recognizes the individual ethical status of those who make up the society.

2. Paragraphs 517-522: Hegel distinguishes three component parts of this ethical life: family; civil society; and political constitution. What aspects of the family does Hegel emphasize? What do you think Hegel means when he refers to the "second or spiritual birth of the children"? What is the importance of noticing the "legal regulation" introduced into the family in paragraph 522?

3. Paragraphs 523-524: In paragraph 522, the children have grown up and left home, and we find that outside the family there is civil society. In what ways is civil society different from the family? How do individuals interact with each other differently in civil society than in the family? (notice that these differences also affect the nature of family life itself).

4. Paragraphs 525-527: what are the implications of the 'division of labour' for Hegel? How does it affect the structure of civil society as a whole?

5. Paragraph 528: consider the description of the three 'estates' Hegel offers. Do these have parallels in American society today?

You'll notice the paragraph numbers change as we move to the next section: these paragraphs are actually from a different book, the Philosophy of Right.

6. Paragraphs 236-248: Hegel describes in these paragraphs what he calls the "inner dialectic of civil society." He means that there is an inner conflict in civil society that drives it forward: what is that inner conflict? How is colonialism related to this inner conflict, according to Hegel?

7. Paragraph 249: Hegel now introduces the third element of his ethical life, the political constitution, or state. What is the relationship between the state and the family and civil society?

8. Paragraphs 535: the language gets more abstract again, but again try to make sense of his understanding of the relation between the state, on the one hand, and the family and civil society, on the other.

You don't need to read beyond paragraph 535 on p. 284.

Marx, "The German Ideology, Part 1"

1. What seems to be the problem with the Germans?

2. Marx discusses several “real premises” from which any analysis of human history must start – what are they?

3. What are the “stages in the development of the division of labor”? Why is this story important to Marx? What needs must human societies fulfill and how do they go about doing so? Compare it to the "inner dialectic" of civil society in Hegel. How is Marx's story similar or different?

4. Read the central paragraph on p. 160. What does this tell you about Marx’s idea of communism?

5. What are the conditions under which the transition to communism is going to come about, according to Marx?

6. Who are the proletariat, why are they different from other classes in history, and what must they do to achieve freedom?

Nietzsche: On the Genealogy of Morals

1. Preface 5-6: Nietzsche states here a central concern of the three essays that follow, namely the "value of morality." What seems to call that value into question? What danger does Nietzsche identify? Why does he demand a "critique of moral values," and what does he seem to mean by this?

2. Each of the three essays that follow involve an aspect of this "critique." In essay one, he identifies two sets of values, the 'master' morality and the 'slave' morality: what values are associate with each morality? 

3. Consider the last sentence of section 6, p. 33, along with section 7: what light does this shed on Nietzsche's understanding of the 'value' of the slave morality?

4. Nietzsche presents the relation between the 'master' and 'slave' moralities as a conflict, one that originates in a slave revolt in morality: in what sense was it a revolt?

5. A key term in Nietzsche's critique is ressentiment, and his identification of this emotion with the slave morality. Read section 10 carefully: what does Nietzsche mean by ressentiment? Compare section 15: how do these examples illustrate Nietzsche's point?

6. Section 16: Nietzsche symbolizes this conflict of moralities as "Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome." But he also suggests that "there is no more decisive mark of a 'higher nature,' a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided in this sense, and a genuine battleground of these opposed values." What do you think Nietzsche's own stance is towards these two moralities?

7. What might he mean when he calls Napoleon 'late-born'?

8. The second essay investigates the same issues from a different angle: what we might call the 'psychic traces,' or effects on the psychology of an individual, of the imposition of slave morality. What processes does Nietzsche identify as required to transform man into a person capable of making promises?

9. How does Nietzsche distinguish between 'conscience' in section 2 and 3 from 'bad conscience' in section 4? How does 'bad conscience' come into the world? What is the role of pleasure and cruelty in this story?

10. See section 10: what is Nietzsche's understanding of 'mercy'?

11. Nietzsche now brings ressentiment back into the analysis: what is the relation between this and 'bad conscience'?

12. A crucial step in the argument concerns what Nietzsche calls the "internalization of man": what does Nietzsche mean by this? In what sense does it produce something "pregnant with a future"? Compare the first sentence of section 19.

13. Read section 24: how does Nietzsche answer the question in the first paragraph?

Mill: On Liberty 

1. In chapter 2, Mill argues against the power of government to limit liberty of thought or discussion (p. 16). What are the three scenarios he considers to establish his case that no opinion should be silenced? Is his argument convincing? Has Mill's doctrine of liberty itself become a "dead dogma" (p. 14)? 

2. Imagine J.S. Mill were a resident of a city when the Ku Klux Klan came to town. Would Mill have been most likely to: (a) join the militant "Smash the Klan" counter-demonstration; (b) participate in the "Unity rally" held elsewhere in town; or (c) attend the Klan rally? Think of parts of the argument of On Liberty that support what you think.

3. Does the manner in which Mill writes -- more specifically, the way he structures his arguments -- help illustrate or strengthen his view about how truth emerges? See pp. 17-20, among other places.

4. Consider Mill's diagnosis of the threat facing democracies ("tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling", p. 4): as citizens of a democratic society, does the diagnosis sound compelling? 

5. In chapter 4, Mill argues that the state may interfere with individuals' actions only when they threaten other people. Is his distinction between self-regarding actions and other-regarding actions valid? Think of one or two acts that may be difficult to classify.

T. H. Green: Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract

1. What is 'freedom of contract'? Why is it an obstacle, as an idea, to the kind of legislation he defends in this lecture? How does Green present arguments against 'interference' with that freedom?

2. What kind of legislation does Green seem to want to defend? Are they all of a similar kind, in your view?

3. On p. 51-2, Green defines freedom "rightly understood," or what he sometimes calls 'positive freedom.' What does he mean by freedom? Think of the authors we have read so far: Mill on the liberty of the individual; Marx on individual freedom only being realized in community with others; Nietzsche's understanding of 'power.' How does Green compare to, or differ from, these authors in his understanding of freedom?

4. How does 'freedom of contract' limit the kind of freedom Green wants to defend? On what basis does Green think we have rights to property, and the right to dispose of our own possessions?

5. The argument Green gives to his opponents is basically: leave individuals alone to make the contracts they want to make, and they will figure out for themselves how to avoid the ones with bad consequences. How does Green reply to this objection?

6. Green ends the lecture with two examples (land policy and restrictions on the sale of alcohol) and argues that the same principles apply to regulations of both kinds. Do you agree? Why or why not?

Nakae Chomin: A Discourse By Three Drunkards on Government

The discourse (published in 1887) is comprised of the arguments of two characters (The Gentleman and The Champion) with differing perspectives on how Japan should respond to the power of Europe, in terms of both ideas and arms, and the comments of Master Nankai, who acts as a kind of moderator and critic.

1. The Gentleman suggests that politicians act as 'priests' to the 'god of evolution' (or 'god of political change'): how does he use European history to illustrate this idea?

2. The Gentleman proposes a four stage account of the 'evolution of government': anarchy to absolute monarchy to constitutionalism, and finally to democracy. Compare this to other accounts of history we have read this semester: how does this differ, how is it similar?

3. How is democracy characterized by the Gentleman? How is it different from constitutionalism? How is freedom an equality related to each of these regimes?

4. Mr. Champion, by contrast, advocates that Japan should join the Europeans in developing weapons and acquiring territory: why? Compare his argument to that of Hegel, in terms of the logic of acquiring colonies.

5. p. 103: Mr. Champion distinguishes between 'lovers of nostalgia' and 'lovers of novelty': what are the characteristics of each group? How do they shape the politics of a country like Japan? Is this distinction applicable to our own politics?

6. Although Mr. Champion identifies himself as on the side of nostalgia, he advocates removing them from the population of Japan (like a cancer): what does he mean to suggest here? Is he being serious?

7. Master Nankai offers his own appraisal of the arguments of each contender at the end of the discourse: does he seem to find one of them more persuasive than the other? What do you think the position of the discourse as a whole is on the questions under debate? Are we meant to side with one of these two positions?

8. What effect does it have on the character of the discourse that the participants are 'drunkards'? Why might Nakae have chosen this setting?

Islamic Modernism

Chiragh Ali: Islamic Revealed Law Versus Islamic Common Law

1. Ali is responding to a European Christian account of Islam: what does MacColl think about Islam? 

2. What is the distinction Ali is drawing in the title of this essay? What does Ali argue is the status and purpose of 'common law' as opposed to 'revealed law'? How have each developed? What is their relation to 'true Islam'?

3. What general picture of Islam does Ali want to convey?

Sayyid Ahmad Khan: Intellectual Pluralism and Freedom of Opinion

1. This essay is obviously a summary and application of J.S. Mill's On Liberty, at least the parts related to speech and opinion, to the context of Islam. In general it is pretty faithful to the original: what differences in emphasis do you notice, if any? How well do Mill's arguments seem to travel to Khan's context? How does Khan apply them to Muslims?

[NB: I think the first full paragraph on p.110 is corrupt from the first line through line 7, with some content missing, just read around it].

(Anonymous): Social Liberalism and Laissez-Faire Capitalism

1. Here we have another adaptation of European ideas to an Islamic context, that of nineteenth century political economy to Muslims in India. How does this anonymous author understand the poverty of Muslims in India? Compare [his] arguments to that of He Zhen on women in China.

2. The author proposes a series of reforms to economic practices and laws that [he] thinks likely to enhance Muslim wealth: what are these reforms, and why would they have the results argued for here?

3. It is obvious that the author thinks that these reforms run up against traditional Islamic economic practices, and sense of justice. How does [he] try to argue that Muslims should not simply reject his proposals as irreligious? Compare his distinction between "pure Religion" and "social and political economy--to laws and institutions" to that of Ali (between revealed law and common law). Is this distinction the same? How is it different or similar?

4. The author credits European success to their ability to sever the "union of Religion and Civil Laws" (something like establishing a separation of church and state). What do you make of this argument? To what extent do you think this difference explains economic differences between Islamic and European countries in the late nineteenth century?

Qasim Amin: The Liberation of Women

1. Again, pay attention to the way that Amin seeks to separate issues of customary practice from religious requirements, in relation to the status of women in Islam.

2. Why does Amin think Islam is particularly conducive to the equality of women (in contrast to Christianity)?

3. How is the status of women related to the condition of a country overall, according to Amin?

4. What is the status of women in the Egypt Amin is referring to, and why does he think it is a problem?

5. Amin argues for education for women, and greater access and opportunities in society for women. If you are familiar with Mary Wollstonecraft, you might compare his arguments to hers. What reasons does he give for expanding educational and social opportunities for women?

6. The question of whether Islam requires that women be 'covered' in public, or perhaps confined to the private realm entirely, is complicated. Amin tries to find an approach to this question based on a reading of the relevant passages in the Qur'an, as interpreted by several legal schools of interpretation. What is the position he is trying to defend? How successful do you think he is?

Rifa'ah Rifa al-Tahtawi: Civil Rights

1. al-Tahtawi offers an assessment of the rights guaranteed by the French constitution. He is broadly sympathetic to these rights, and finds them compatible with Islamic understandings of the role of government: what are his reasons?

2. al-Tahtawi then provides a summary, and critique, of the actions of the 1830, or 'July,' Revolution, which led to the overthrow of King Charles X. What mistakes does al-Tahtawi think Charles made? What lessons does he draw from these events?

Islamic Fundamentalism

Sayyid Qutb: Islam as the Foundation of Knowledge

1. How does Qutb characterize Islam, and what are the implications in terms of the sources of knowledge a Muslim should rely on?

2. Qutb distinguishes areas of knowledge where a Muslim might rely on non-Muslim sources of knowledge, and other areas where she should not: what are these areas? why would there be any where a non-Muslim source might be used?

3. 'Jahiliyyah' literally means 'ignorance' and traditionally referred to the period before Islam. One of Qutb's most influential arguments is to extend this state of 'jahiliyyah' to all societies that are not completely organized in submission to divine sovereignty and an Islamic way of life (which included, for Qutb, the whole of the existing Islamic world at the time he lived). Why is knowledge derived from 'jahili' sources suspect for Qutb?

4. Qutb argues that European empirical science derives from an Islamic source: what relationship does this suggest between science and Islam?

5. Compare Qutb to the Islamic modernists on the realms of life to which Islamic law pertains.

Ali Shariati: Critical Attitude Towards the West and the Idea of Western Decadence

1. Shariati argues against capitalism and communism in this essay: what are his objections to each way of life? In what ways do both reduce humans to 'economic animals'?

2. Part of the essay is a criticism of Marxism: what are Shariati's main objections?

3. Shariati offers a history of religion: what does he see as the aim of religion, and why has this been thwarted in the past? What is his explanation of the Renaissance?

4. What is 'true humanism' (p. 320), and how is it related to spiritual values? How does Islam fit into his argument?

5. How much of his critique of modern western life do you think is valid?

Murtaza Mutahhari: On the Islamic Hijab

For general background on hijab, this website is useful: http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/hijab_1.shtml

1. Throughout, consider what areas of disagreement exist between Mutahhari and Amin on this issue of 'veiling.'

2. Notice that Mutahhari begins from the concept of human dignity, and accepts that for hijab to be acceptable it would need to be consistent with recognizing the human dignity of each woman. What role does this play in his argument? Do you think he succeeds?

3. As with Amin, we are not in a position to assess the underlying question as a matter of Islamic law. Instead, try to see where they rely on the same quotes or examples: how do they treat these texts in their arguments? For example, compare p. 364, middle of the page, where Mutahhari quotes a text that Amin had also used on p. 179.

4. This is a debate among men about what is appropriate for Muslim women. Here are two modern Muslim women debating the issue: 

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/muslim-woman-veil-hijab

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political

How are their perspectives similar to, or different from, those of the men we are reading?

Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation"

Weber's topic is the nature of politics in the modern state, both its organization and the personal qualities it requires. The essay is long. The pdf linked from the syllabus is paginated. Please make sure to read at least the following: p. 1-5 (last full paragraph); p. 20-27.

1. Weber begins with a series of very influential definitions: how does he define (a) the modern state and (b) politics? Do you agree with these definitions?

2. Weber mentions three ways that political power (rule by some over others) might be thought legitimate. What are these three? What kind of legitimacy does each provide? Which of these types of legitimacy does a US President require?

3. Weber then turns to the organization of politics. Besides legitimacy, what else does a politician need in order to have people follow him or her? How are these provided in the context of the modern state?

4. Weber is very interested in the rise of the 'professional politician.' What does he mean by this term? What does it mean to live 'from' rather than 'for' politics?

6. What role do political parties play in modern politics?

7. Weber ends the essay with a description of the 'personal qualities' a politician requires. What are they? 

8. What does Weber mean by his famous distinction between an 'ethic of responsibility' and an 'ethic of principled conviction'? In what sense are they 'complementary'? Do you agree with Weber that they can be complementary? Do you think you have a vocation for politics, as Weber describes it?

Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political

Like Weber, Schmitt seeks an account of the distinctive nature of politics in the modern world.

1. Most famously, for Schmitt politics is premised on, and entails, a distinction between friend and enemy. What does Schmitt seem to mean by this? How would you, as a citizen, know who was your friend and who enemy?

2. Conflict, antagonism, and ultimately war are all integral to Schmitt's conception of politics. Why does he emphasize this?

3. In various places, Schmitt contrasts his account of politics with that of liberalism. What does liberalism get wrong about politics? What does pluralism misunderstand about politics?

4. Schmitt insists that liberalism and democracy are in tension with each other: what does he mean by liberalism and democracy when he makes this claim? Do you agree with him?

5. Why does democracy entail the "total state" and what do you think Schmitt means by this term?

6. Schmitt is looking for an account of politics and the state that could justify the right of the state to demand that citizens be willing to kill and die on its behalf. Does he successfully demonstrate that his account of politics is sufficient to explain this? Why does he think liberalism is not able to justify this demand?

7. "Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy" (p. 46). Why? What role does this idea play in Schmitt's account of politics?

8. Schmitt worries that a war based on the idea of 'humanity' would "be driven to the most extreme inhumanity"? Why? Why is Schmitt so scornful of universal understandings of human nature associated with natural law, or human rights? Compare Weber's discussion of pacifism: what similarities or differences are there? Consider how the context of post-Versaille Germany might influence these ideas.

9. "political conceptions and ideas cannot very well start with an anthropological optimism" (p. 64). Why not?

10. Schmitt denies that liberalism contains an account of politics, or that any "specific political idea" can be derived from its premises. What does Schmitt mean by this, and what are the implications for how we should think about liberalism? Is he right?

Antonio Gramsci: The Modern Prince

The selections from "The Modern Prince" proceed as a commentary on Machiavelli's Prince. But the subject is really the nature of a communist political party, how it should be organized, what its aims should be and so on.

1. What concepts does Gramsci seem to draw most strongly from Machiavelli? How is his concept of politics shaped by Machiavelli?

2. What does Gramsci think is the purpose of Machiavelli's Prince?

3. Who were the Jacobins, historically? (if you don't know, look it up) Why do you think Gramsci takes them as his model?

4. Gramsci begins with a discussion of human nature: do you agree with him?

5. Like Schmitt, Gramsci insists that politics has "its own principles and laws distinct from those of morality and religion" (and, to some degree, economics as well). Compare Schmitt, Weber and Gramsci on this point: how are their accounts of politics, as an autonomous kind of human activity, different? Are there ways in which they are similar?

6. Compare Weber and Gramsci on the relationship between rulers and ruled. How is Gramsci's understanding similar to or different from Weber's? What role does Gramsci see for political parties in politics?

7. Gramsci compares conditions when a political party works "democratically" versus when it works "bureaucratically." What do you think he means by this? How is the distinction related to his understanding of leadership?

8. 'Economism' is a key term for Gramsci, the name for a set of approaches to understanding the relation between economics and politics that he thinks are mistaken. What do you think his central concerns are with 'economism'? (NOTE: "philosophy of praxis" is code for Marxist theory)

9. Gramsci returns to Machiavelli to discuss the "dual perspective" on politics. How is this dual perspective drawn from Machiavelli, and what does it mean? (Compare to discussion of "two levels" above)

F. A. Hayek: "Individualism: True and False"

Joseph Schumpeter: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy

1. In these chapters, Schumpeter lays out reasons why he thinks capitalism will ultimately be undermined. Some of these are 'external' (meaning not intrinsic to capitalism itself) and some 'internal' (meaning they are part of the logic of capitalism, though not economic as such). One of these factors is that he thinks that as capitalism develops the role of the entrepreneur disappears. Why does he thinks so? Do you think he is correct?

2. Schumpeter thinks the dominant class under capitalism, the bourgeoisie, is incapable of generating the kind of allegiance necessary for political rule: he thinks capitalism has been living on borrowed time, in a sense, relying on features inherited from the pre-capitalist past. What role have the landed aristocracy played in the development of capitalism, in his view? Why is that role coming to an end?

3. On pp. 139-142, Schumpeter makes a curious claim: that capitalism undermined private property and freedom of contract. What does he mean by this? Compare T.H. Green and Hayek on freedom of contract.

4. p. 144: why does Schumpeter think capitalism generates hostility among "people at large."

5. What role in undermining capitalism do 'intellectuals' play, according to Schumpeter?

6. In chapter XIV Schumpeter turns to the 'internal' factors. Why does capitalism undermine bourgeois motivation to defend capitalism? Why does it undermine the bourgeois family? How are these two processes connected?

Leo Strauss: 

Hannah Arendt:

Foucault: Discourse and Truth

1. The first lecture defines the Greek term 'parrhesia,' and distinguishes a 'negative' and 'positive' connotation of the word: what are these senses of parrhesia? how is parrhesia distinguished from rhetoric? You might contrast this description of truthful speech with Arendt's account of the relation between speech and action in politics.

2. Parrhesia, Foucault argues, was an activity (or, as we'll see, a set of activities): what are the characteristics of the 'truth-teller' or 'parrhesiastes,' and in what circumstances can 'parrhesia' be practiced?

3. Foucault briefly mentions a distinction he will return to, parrhesia as a democratic practice and as a monarchical one: how are they different? How are they related to and distinct from from the philosophical practice of parrhesia?

4. Lecture three elaborates further on the relation between parrhesia (in both its negative and positive senses) and democracy in Athens: what problems do Athenian critics of democracy identify with the practice of parrhesia in a democracy? Do you see these problems in our own democracy?

5. Lecture four returns to philosophic parrhesia, beginning with that exemplified by Socrates: what model of education does philosophic parrhesia require? What kind of harmony is it designed to produce? how is it different from the political use of parrhesia? Again, compare the relation between 'words and deeds' in Arendt.

6. This Socratic practice is developed in different directions by three philosophic traditions: Epicureans, Cynics, and Stoics. How does each tradition develop and modify parrhesia as a practice?

7. Lecture five identifies a specific set of Greco-Roman techniques to train oneself to be "courageous enough to disclose the truth about oneself." He compares this Greco-Roman (largely Stoic) practice to Christian asceticism: how are they different?

8. What are the specific techniques Foucault describes? Would a life in which you adopt these practices be attractive to you?

9. Compare the last paragraph of lecture five to Arendt's account of action: how does Foucault's 'aesthetics of the self' compare?

John Rawls: Justice as Fairness

This book is a restatement of John Rawls' political philosophy, written relatively late in his life. One aim of his project is to provide "an acceptable philosophical and moral basis for democratic institutions" by which we can both evaluate our own institutions and understand what it means to be a free and equal participant in a democratic society.

1. Part I provides an account of the basic building blocks of Rawls' theory. How does Rawls understand the role of political philosophy in a democratic society? Do our previous authors fit this account of political philosophy? Do you agree with Rawls?

2. Rawls proposes that we start by thinking of an ideal society as a "fair system of cooperation over time from one generation to the next" (the question for the rest of the book is really, what account of justice would help us know what "fair" means). For now: what does Rawls seem to mean by this? What other ideas does Rawls think are required by the idea that society is a fair system of cooperation?

3. Rawls doesn't want to think about justice in all circumstances. Rather he focuses his attention on the "basic structure," which he describes as the "domestic" level of justice. What does he mean by a "basic structure"? Do you think Rawls is correct to separate concerns of "local justice" from those of "domestic justice"? Compare Althusser and Foucault, for example.

4. The most famous aspect of Rawls theory is his "thought-experiment" that he calls the "original position." Here we are to imagine a group of free and equal representatives who are to consider what a fair system of social cooperation would be for their society. What principles, Rawls asks, would such representatives adopt? Read this section carefully: what characteristics do these representatives have? What do they know, or not know, about the society they are proposing a system for? Why does Rawls think they are likely to come up with a fair system, rather than a system that suits their own interests or ideas?

5. Rawls is generating principles for a society of free and equal persons? What does he mean by each of these terms?

6. Whether we would (or should) accept the principles generated by the original position is an open question or Rawls, so he also needs to describe the conditions under which we might evaluate those principles. Put differently, he needs to say how such principles might be justified within the context of a democratic society. Here Rawls develops the idea of public justification, and with it the idea of a "reflective equilibrium" and an "overlapping consenus." What does he mean by these terms?

7. Rawls repeats very often that a fundamental fact about modern democratic societies is that they are characterized by "reasonable pluralism." What do you think Rawls means by this term? What other facts does Rawls think are inescapable features of any modern democratic society?

Part II develops Rawls' principles of justice:

1. Rawls reiterates some of the features of the kind of society he wants to develop a conception of justice for, then presents his two principles of justice. What are these two principles? How do they relate to each other? What are the two parts of the *second* principle, and how do they relate to each other, and to the first principle?

2. There are some key terms and phrases you should identify and make sure you understand: "fair equality of opportunity"; "equal basic liberties"; "fair value of political liberties"; "the difference principle."

3. Rawls distinguishes his "background procedural justice" from "allocative justice." What is the difference between these two ideas about justice?

4. The main focus of justice, for Rawls, is what he calls the "basic structure." He gives two reasons why this is the correct focus: what are they?

5. Who are the least advantaged?

6. Understanding how Rawls means to apply the difference principle is not easy: try your best to make sense of figure 1 on p. 62.

7. Rawls thinks that a counterargument based on the example at the top of p. 69 (Indians and British) applies his argument in the wrong way. What is the mistake?

8. Rawls does not dismiss the idea of moral desert, he argues, but specifies a political conception of desert: a) why does he need to do this? b) in a system that meets Rawls' principles, in what sense might it be said that I *deserve* the level of income I have?

9. What does Rawls mean to say when he suggests that the distribution of our native endowments should be regarded as a "common asset"?

Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other

Chapter 9

Habermas contrasts his own "procedural" model of democracy with two others.

1. What is the "liberal" view of democratic politics? Which liberals in our course would be closest to understanding democracy in this way?

2. What is the "republican" or "communitarian" understanding of democratic politics? Again, compare this to other authors who might be considered 'republican.'

3. What are the different conceptions of citizenship Habermas attributes to each model?

4. Habermas introduces his own model through a contrast with the 'communitarian' or 'republican' model: what is the key feature of this model that he thinks is mistaken?

5. With his three models in place, Habermas turns to the understanding each model contains of: (a) the relation between state and society; (b) the relation between "democratic will-formation" and governmental power; and (c) the understanding of popular sovereignty. For each dimension, try to identify how the 'discourse theory' or 'procedural' model is different from the other two.

Chapter 10

Here Habermas wants to argue that constitutionalism and democracy are internally related, or in other words that each requires the other in order to be fully realized. He specifies this contrast in a number of ways: rule of law v democracy; human rights v popular sovereignty; private v public autonomy. As you read, consider whether these are equivalent contrasts in the way that Habermas seems to assume (or, consider why he thinks these formulations capture something similar). 

1. Habermas returns us to a question we have considered before: what makes law legitimate? He rejects both positivism (the command theory of law) and natural law as sources of legitimacy. Why? Compare Strauss here.

2. pp. 257-8. The argument here is a bit technical, but Habermas argues that, to be legitimate, law must secure freedom, which he understands in Kantian terms, as autonomy. What he wants to show is that for law to do this, it must treat citizens as autonomous in a double sense: as autonomous both in the private realm of work, college, and family, and in the public realm of politics. Under what condition is this double autonomy possible?

3. Habermas also returns us to a topic we have been considering since we read Hegel: what is the proper relationship between the "freedom of the ancients" and the "freedom of the moderns." What does Habermas mean by these phrases? How are they related to what he calls 'republicanism' and 'liberalism' in the paragraphs that follow?

4. On p. 259, Habermas states the "desired internal relation" between human (or individual) rights and popular sovereignty, which he thinks both Rousseau and Kant failed to state accurately. What do you think he means when he says that "human rights ... make the exercise of popular sovereignty legally possible"?

5. The first full paragraph on p. 261 is an important statement of Habermas's main point in this chapter: try to restate this in your own words.

6. Towards the end of section 4, Habermas introduces a competition between two legal paradigms: which we may identify in this course with Hayek and T.H. Green respectively. Why do the shortcomings of Hayek's model give rise to that of T.H. Green, in Habermas's telling of the story? Do you think he captures this dispute accurately?

7. Habermas thinks that both legal paradigms (both Hayek and Green) are limited: what do they miss?

8. Habermas wants to show, in the final section, how a certain kind of feminist project is limited by its adherence to the goals of the two legal paradigms mentioned above. He suggests instead that feminists should adopt a "proceduralist conception of law." What does he seem to mean by this? In evaluating the argument here, return to chapter 9 and his "procedural" or "discourse theoritic" account of democracy.

Aimé Césaire: Discourse on Colonialism

1. In what sense is Europe "morally, spiritually indefensible"?

2. Why does Césaire reject the idea that colonialism has "placed civilizations in contact"?

3. Césaire argues that colonialism "works to decivilize" the colonizer. What does he mean by this?

4. A core argument of the Discourse is that Nazism has roots in European humanism: how does he make this argument?

5. A striking formulation of the effect of colonialism on the colonized is on p. 42: "colonization = 'thingification.'" What does Césaire mean to convey with this formulation?

6. How does Césaire portray pre-colonial African societies? How have European intellectuals distorted the image we have of these societies?

7. pp. 51-2: Césaire makes clear that he does not advocate a return to a pre-colonial past. Why not? What is he arguing for?

8. pp. 76: "The hour of the barbarian is at hand. The modern barbarian. The American hour." We aren't used to this perspective on the 'American century.' What does Césaire mean to evoke?

9. The introduction by Robin D. G. Kelley argues that we should read Césaire's essay in the context of Surrealism. Look up the term. How might the essay be an example of, or influenced by, Surrealism?

Gayle Rubin: "The Traffic in Women"

This article seeks to combine the theoretical frameworks of Freud (the psychoanalyst) and Lévi-Strauss (a structural anthropologist) to provide an analytical account of the oppression of women, and identify what it would take to end it.

1. What does Rubin mean by the 'sex-gender system'?

2. Why does Rubin not use Marx/Marxism as her starting point for an analysis of women's oppression?

3. According to Rubin, what are the main parts of Lévi-Strauss's understanding of kinship? What role does each play in the production of a 'sex-gender system'?

4. Rubin next turns to Freud as an account of the psychic effects, and psychic costs, of the 'sex-gender system' that emerges through the kinship networks Lévi-Strauss describes. What is the 'Oedipal stage,' and what role does it play in gender identity formation for boys and girls? What is the 'phallus'? How does Rubin use the concept of the 'phallus' to redescribe the Lévi-Strauss's kinship exchanges?

5. What are the effects of the current 'sex-gender system' on women's sexuality?

6. "In short, feminism must call for a revolution in kinship" (p. 199). Why? What would this revolution need to alter?

7. Compare to Foucault: might Rubin's project give new impetus to the "undefined work of freedom"?