A common argument for predictivism is that we should avoid inferring that a theory T is true on the basis of evidence E that it is built to fit because we can explain why T entails E by simply noting how T was built—but if T was not built to fit E then only the truth of T can explain the fact that T fits E. Various philosophers have noted that this reasoning is fallacious. As noted above it makes no sense to offer an explanation (for example, in terms of how the theory was built) for the fact that T entails E—for this latter fact is a logical fact for which no causal explanation can be given. Insofar as there is an explanandum in need of an explanans here it is rather the fact that the theorist managed to construct or ‘choose’ a theory (which turned out to be T) that correctly entailed E (Collins 1994; Barnes 2002)—that explanandum could be explained by noting that the theorist built a theory (which turned out to be T) to fit E, or endorsed it because it fit E.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prediction-accommodation/#AkaiAppr
Barnes (2005a, 2008) maintains that predictivism is frequently a manifestation of a phenomenon he calls ‘epistemic pluralism’. A ‘T-evaluator’ (a scientist who assigns some probability to theory T) is an epistemic pluralist insofar as she regards one form of evidence to be the probabilities posted (i.e. publicly presented) by other scientists for and against T and other relevant claims (she is an epistemic individualist if she does not do this but considers only the scientific evidence ‘on her own’). One form of pluralistic evidence is the event in which a reputable scientist endorses a theory—this takes place when a scientist posts a probability for T that is (1) no lower than the evaluator’s probability and (2) high enough that subsequent predictive confirmation of T would redound to the scientist’s credibility (2008: 2.2).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prediction-accommodation/#AkaiAppr
Focus on the system, not the situation—Maybe you can't explain it, but you could draw it.
While "who joins in ends, has a say in ends" is not a widespread, traditional proverb like "all's well that ends well," it operates as a specialized saying within the context of Cyberpunk 2077 and similar narrative structures.
It is most accurately described as a thematic mantra regarding choice and consequence:
Narrative Meaning: It refers to the idea that those who are present for the final act of a journey (the "ends") earn the right to influence its outcome.
Gameplay Context: In Cyberpunk 2077, this specifically highlights that your choice of allies for the final assault (joining in) determines which ending options you can access.
Etymological Roots: The phrasing mirrors older idioms such as "making ends meet" (originally about splicing rope ends to survive) or "tying up loose ends" (completing unfinished business).
In short, it’s a modern saying about agency—if you are part of the conclusion, you have a hand in shaping it.
"Als ik een uur had om een probleem op te lossen, zou ik 55 minuten besteden aan het definiëren van het probleem en 5 minuten aan de oplossing." — Albert Einstein
The engagement of the precuneus through the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is a critical neuroanatomical and functional pathway involved in emotion, value-based decision-making, and self-referential thought. The OFC, particularly its lateral division, acts as a "non-reward" or punishment-related area that connects to the precuneus, which is a core component of the Default Mode Network (DMN) associated with self-awareness and self-imagery.
Variable y (Infrastructure/Trust)
The Prediction
Variable x (Velocity/Competition)