Abstracts

CONOR CUNNINGHAM

University of Nottingham

True Reduction, Real Emergence, and the Failure of Naturalness

There is growing recognition among physicists that the foundations of their discipline are in crisis. Many trace the problem to the failure of ‘naturalness’, the dogmatic requirement that a good theory predicts experimental results without ‘fine-tuning’. As empirical evidence against this dogma mounts, it is becoming increasingly evident that ‘the reductionist paradigm is hardwired into the naturalness problems’ (Arkani-Hamed 2021). Deepening this analysis, I bring Plato into dialogue with cutting-edge science to show how the empirical failure of naturalness results directly from its ideological reduction of reality to particles and science to particle physics, which renders disciplines silos, both presuming and pursuing a form of isolationism. The demise of this ideology under the pressure of scientific evidence, and theoretical reasoning, presents an opportunity to dismantle the imperialist myth that only particle physics delivers real knowledge. A major consequence of which is the exposure that the typical understanding of both reduction and emergence is wrongheaded and ill formed, and therefore so are the many faux problems this misunderstanding generates. If the above succeeds, the idea of a Master Discourse in pursuit of a Theory of Everything is nonsensical. Thereby one can retrieve the interconnectedness of the physical world and the disciplines that study it, restoring a more creative university-universe relations.

LORENZ MOISES FESTIN

De La Salle University Manila

Technological Structures and Strictures: Christianity’s Journey across Shifting Philosophical Landscapes

Given the prevalence of materialist philosophies and postmodernity, how could Christianity navigate through the current shifting philosophical landscape? Through ages past, the Christian faith has encountered various philosophical worldviews. And yet, not only did it endure all these but also came out stronger with the emergence of its own philosophy. Elaborated in categories of the Ancient Greek tradition, Christian Philosophy in its rise attests to the possibility of its being enriched by such encounters. This was the case especially in its germinal state, with the early Christians living out their faith within a pagan world. Initially indifferent towards its philosophies, they could not but come up with apologetic defenses, employing the categories of their opponents’ philosophical critiques. In the end there emerged a philosophy that is distinctly Christian, grafted within the Greek philosophical traditions. Couldn’t Christianity do the same in the present context? In this paper, I argue that the Christian faith need not be shielded from current philosophical perspectives. By identifying the salient features of postmodernity, I will consider how these may be taken within the framework of the Christian worldview. More specifically, I will take into account the conduct in which Christianity engages itself in interreligious dialogues, and from there extrapolate the prospects of engaging in a similar dialogue with the philosophies underpinning the highly secularized worldview. Indeed, as Pope Francis points out in Fratelli tutti, religious perspectives are often marginalized in public debate. It is thus expedient for Christianity to engage in a dialogue not only with other religious traditions but also with those that take a purely secular stance. This requires not only finding common ground with them but also openness toward the prospect of acknowledging their contributions within the political world, without compromising the tenets of the Christian faith.

JOÃO GOUVEIA

Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, Coimbra

Reason and Christianity in Schelling’s Late Lectures

The debate between Furhmans (1940) and Schulz (1975) must be read in light of the experience of an infinitely striving will, which acquires significant weight in Schelling’s late lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation (1858). In trying to prove the existence of a singular God, Schelling reverses his primary rational analysis and works on empirical-historical arguments, claiming a superior authority for the history of religion based on our inability to rationally reach the true God. However, in the context of Schelling’s lectures, the God of history is also presented as the confirmation that the rationally found triune God required. Schelling could argue that the will – as the desire to find God – links the rationally attained God and the truly existent God, as the negative philosophy shows that only an infinite striving survives the reciprocal self-suppression of the three negative potencies. Now, such an infinite striving might have, in itself, a potential state of rest, only attainable with the dissolution of such a will in a superior Being, but the potentially compelling nature of this reasoning is due to the fact that it is produced within the limits of reason, not because it operates the way out of reason. Besides, an appeal to find Christ within ourselves can also hardly be seen as a viable option in the context of Schelling's thought, as the internal reproduction of Christ’s life experience would take us back to the infinite striving of the negative philosophy. Even if we could achieve some kind of experience of an incessant will other than our own, we could recognise such a will as the one that truly leads to God only if we rely on the conclusions reached through rational analysis. The rationally found inability of reason to reach God is, in fact, the crucial step in Schelling’s reading of the history of religion – in particular, of Christianity – as the true divine way.

JACEK GRZYBOWSKI

Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie

Artificial Intelligence and the University. In What Way Will AI Change Our Approach to Education - Methodological and Ethical Perspective

The extremely dynamic development of artificial intelligence (AI) raises the unavoidable question about the future and direction of education, especially at the higher education levels. The current expansion of AI is leading to situations where we will not be able to verify whether a given work of literature or a piece of art are the result of human effort (i.e. whether they have come into being as a result of human creativity) or whether they have been generated by computer programming algorithms. We are already aware of the impact the artificial intelligence is having on our everyday lives, so we cannot disregard its influence on educational tasks appertaining to schools and universities. Observers of technological changes may rightly ask, whether AI development and its takeover of various human competences will not inevitably disavow all work based on reading, acquiring knowledge, inferring, discovering, writing and producing scientific or literary works? Does the development of AI bring us closer to the controversial but probable statement that at some point the will and efficiency of human agents will become unnecessary or even superfluous? Will it not come to the point where the very source of literature or art will be of no importance to us? We will no longer ask who – a human being or a machine – created a certain work, the only evaluation criterion being its reception and the impression it makes on the recipient’s mind. The above considerations lead me to suggest that widening the range of possibilities for using AI will most likely force schools and universities to reform their current teaching methods. I would like to point out what I consider to be the four most significant challenges that we will be facing in school and university environments in the nearest future. The first is the problem of failing to distinguish between real and fake master’s and doctoral theses, the second is the loss of critical thinking in the era of fake news and hallucinations created by artificial intelligence, the third is the active help AI gives to lecturers, and the fourth is a systematic disappearance of importance of compiling the historical achievements of predecessors in newly created scientific works. In my speech I would like ask: how the model of a university that would be able to meet the challenges described above.

MARK HARRIS

University of Oxford, Harris Manchester College

Christ Fundamentalism and Quantum Fundamentalism

In light of recent scholarly dissatisfaction with the identity and scope of ‘science and religion’ as the preferred terminology for an international research discipline, I explore the potential of ‘theology of science’ as a promising alternative. Indeed, it turns out that the great Polish philosopher and physicist, Michał Heller, had made a similar suggestion a long time ago (1996), but this appears to have been largely overlooked by wider scholarly circles in science and religion, and was only recently brought to my own attention by Tadeusz Sierotowicz. ‘Theology of science’ presents a number of advantages over ‘science and religion’ as a disciplinary identifier, not least that it makes clear that research takes place in parallel with (and closely informed by) the much better established disciplines of philosophy of science and history of science. It is possible, for instance, that by adopting 'theology of science' as our disciplinary title and identity, scholars of science and religion may be able, finally, to put to rest the troublesome methodological problems presented by the myth of conflict between science and religion. However, there is more, and in this talk I suggest that theology of science can also be taken as an, in effect, self-consciously Christian philosophy of science. Another way of making this point is that theology of science explores what it means to hold Christ the Logos as fundamental to natural philosophy. I will discuss these thoughts with reference to my current research interests in ‘quantum fundamentalism’, asking ‘What was God thinking when he created the quantum world?’

PHILIP HØJME

Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard’s Leap of Faith

In this talk, I want to examine the relationship between faith and reason in Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy. The examination will begin by exploring Kierkegaard’s idea of the Leap of Faith and its implications for Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity, faith and reason. Kierkegaard’s writings contributed to challenging traditional notions of the relationship between faith and reason. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s philo-theological writings have had a wide-ranging impact far beyond the confines of the Philosophy of Christianity, e.g. Existentialism and Critical Theory. According to Kierkegaard personal examinations of faith were not only Philo-theological abstractions, they were also profound existential acts going beyond the rationality of modern philosophy. Through an examination of Kierkegaard’s criticism of dogmatic religion as well as Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the paradox of Christian faith, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s perspective challenged not only the idea of Reason and rationality but also the idea of dogmatic Christianity. By doing this Kierkegaard sought to reconsider the often perceived dichotomy between faith and reason. Key parts of my argument rely on Kierkegaard’s usage of the Danish folk-tale about the Molbos. Stories that, Kierkegaard uses to criticise institutionalised and dogmatic Christianity. Together with the idea of the Leap of Faith these stories emphasise the tension between demands for rationality and the paradoxes of belief (that we cannot know God’s existence), and this, according to Kierkegaard, must lead us to understand faith as something that transforms the individual undertaking such a journey. This talk aims to show how Kierkegaard’s philosophy can help us redevelop our understanding of the relationship between faith and reason, thereby contributing to ongoing discussions of the potential of Christian philosophy in a world increasingly dominated by rationality and Science.

PIOTR KARPIŃSKI

Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie

Apofaza dyskursu miłosnego. O roli teologii negatywnej w filozofii

Teologia negatywna, tak jak została sformułowana w dziełach Pseudo-Dionizego Areopagity, może być rozumiana jako taki sposób użycia języka (a nawet pewnej „gry językowej”), który próbuje wyrazić to, co niewyrażalne, i jednocześnie zapewnić, że tego, co niewyrażalne można doświadczyć. Zbyt szybko jednak uznaje się owo użycie języka za nieprzydatne w filozofii, bo często niepraktyczne lub sprzeczne, idąc za wskazówkami Kanta (granice rozumu) i Wittgensteina („7. O czym nie można mówić, o tym trzeba milczeć”). Tymczasem samych momentów rozumienia negatywnego w filozofii jest bardzo dużo. Nader wymownym przykładem jest idea nieskończoności u Kartezjusza, który w Odpowiedziach na Zarzuty V pisze: „idea bowiem tego, co nieskończone, aby była prawdziwa, w żaden sposób nie powinna dać się pojąć, ponieważ sama niepojmowalność zawiera się w istocie formalnej nieskończonego”. Poznanie negatywne, albo elementy metody teologii negatywnej, pojawiają się także u Heideggera (odejście od metafizyki obecności na rzecz dania – Geben), u Wittgensteina (6.522 Jest zaiste coś niewyrażalnego. To się uwidacznia, jest tym, co mistyczne), czy u Derridy (Comment ne pas parler. Dénégations), by wymienić tylko niektóre przykłady. Z całą pewnością tzw. teologia negatywna nie ogranicza się tylko do domeny teologicznej.W referacie jako uprzywilejowany moment dyskursu apofatycznego zostanie przeanalizowany fenomen erotyczny, a ściślej mówiąc towarzysząca mu wypowiedź: „kocham cię”. Za pomocą teorii aktów mowy J. L. Austina, J. Searla oraz S. Cavella wykażemy, że wyznanie miłości nie jest aktem lokucyjnym, ani illokucyjnym, lecz aktem perlokucyjnym – nie chodzi w nim o poinformowanie kogoś, lecz o wywołanie pewnego efektu w odbiorcy (podobny pogląd żywił także R. Barthes). Perlokucja ogniskuje się wokół „ty”, jest pragmatycznym użyciem języka, a przede wszystkim da się w nim zaobserwować doniosłą pracę negatywności, charakterystyczną dla trzech etapów teologii negatywnej: katafazy, apofazy i uwznioślenia. Wyznanie miłości nie mówi tego, co mówi, nie daje żadnej pewności, a ostatecznie zamienia się w pytanie: „czy mnie kochasz?”. Jako przykład takiego dyskursu przeanalizujemy epizod ewangeliczny (J 21, 15-19), w którym Jezus zadał to pytanie Piotrowi. We wnioskach wykażemy zbieżność teologii negatywnej i dyskursu miłosnego. Być może to właśnie miłość, przy wszystkich różnicach między Bogiem i światem, jest tym, co łączy teologię z filozofią, Boga z człowiekiem?

ANDRZEJ KOBYLIŃSKI

Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie

Kim są „pobożni ateiści”? Stanowiska bioetyczne wybranych przedstawicieli „ateizmu chrześcijańskiego” we Włoszech

W Italii bardzo ważne środowisko intelektualne stanowią „pobożni ateiści”, którzy są także nazywani „ateistami chrześcijańskimi”, zwolennikami „ateizmu chrześcijańskiego” lub wyznawcami „świeckiego chrześcijaństwa”. Tego rodzaju przekonania oznaczają pewien specyficzny rodzaj światopoglądu, w sensie filozoficznym zbliżony do agnostycyzmu, który jest wyznawany przez dość wpływową grupę myślicieli, dziennikarzy, polityków i artystów, dostrzegających pilną potrzebę ochrony tradycji chrześcijańskiej jako fundamentu wolności i demokracji w świecie zachodnim. W ich przekonaniu ewentualny rozpad wartości ukształtowanych przez tę religię prowadziłby nieuchronnie do kryzysu i stopniowego zaniku zachodniego modelu kulturowego, który opiera się na godności jednostki ludzkiej, wolności i demokracji. Gdy chodzi o osobiste podejście do wiary i religii, reprezentanci tego prądu światopoglądowego są ateistami, agnostykami lub osobami zachowującymi pewną formę wrażliwości religijnej, deklarując jednocześnie brak przynależności do jakiegokolwiek kościoła czy związku wyznaniowego. Zwolennicy „ateizmu chrześcijańskiego” prezentują krytyczne podejście do wielu przejawów współczesnej rewolucji biotechnologicznej. Wraz z przedstawicielami wielu innych środowisk intelektualnych dostrzegają oni potrzebę nowego humanizmu, który powinien stanowić dzisiaj formę obrony wartości i godności życia ludzkiego w kontekście zagrożeń związanych z rozwojem nauki i techniki.Głównym celem prezentacji jest analiza poglądów bioetycznych trojga przedstawicieli „świeckiego chrześcijaństwa” we Włoszech: Oriany Fallaci (1929–2006), Giuliana Ferrary (1952–) i Marcella Pery (1943–).

ROBERT A. LARMER

University of New Brunswick 

Two Unsuccessful Objections to the Apologetic Worth of Miracles

In the presentation I examine two common objections to the apologetic worth of miracles. These are: (1) the objection that it would take an inordinate amount of evidence to establish the occurrence of certain events such as the Resurrection of Jesus, and (2) the objection that even if such events could justifiably be held to have occurred, it would be more rational to attribute them to unknown natural causes rather than supernatural intervention. I argue that both objections are mistaken. Two points emerge from my considerations. First, given that miracles should not be defined as violating any laws of nature, and that the common objection that the occurrence of a miracle is inconsistent with the truth of the principle of the conservation of energy is mistaken, no balance of probabilities argument based on a conflict between the evidence for the laws of nature and the evidence for a miracle is possible. This means that Hume’s argument of part one of his Of Miracles based as it is on a presumed conflict between these two bodies of evidence, can find no purchase as regards the task of assessing the rationality of belief in a reported miracle. Second, the claim that the progress of science provides a strong inductive argument against ever believing an event to be a miracle is mistaken. Rather, the progress of science provides a strong inductive argument that the occurrence of certain event types would best be understood as instances of supernatural intervention. If as time goes on our increased scientific knowledge makes it ever more difficult to provide an explanation of an event in terms of natural causes, and if the event can be seen as furthering what we reasonably take to be God’s purposes, then this provides even stronger warrant for believing the event to be the result of supernatural intervention, i.e., a miracle. The claim that the progress of science undermines the rationality of belief in miracles appears, therefore, mistaken. Given good reason to believe that certain events have in fact happened, for example the resurrection of Jesus, the progress of science has strengthened rather than weakened the claim that these events are in fact miracles. The argument from miracle, therefore, deserves, as it has in the past, to play an ongoing central role in Christian apologetics.

MICHAŁ LATAWIEC

Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie

Praktyczna filozofia przyrody a chrześcijaństwo

Przedmiotem praktycznej filozofii przyrody jest przyroda wraz z aktywnie obecnym w niej człowiekiem. Owa obecność człowieka w przyrodzie oceniana jest w świetle tworzonych norm regulujących stosunek człowieka do przyrody (A. Latawiec). Stosunek człowieka do przyrody wyrażać się może w ochronie przyrody. Od drugiej połowy XX wieku, podnoszony jest globalny głos w sprawie konieczności ochrony przyrody. Wynika to zarówno z faktu, iż środowisko przyrodnicze jest coraz bardziej zdegradowane jak również ujawniają się coraz trudniejsze warunki dla egzystencji człowieka na naszej planecie. Powstaje pytanie o istotę i potrzebę takich działań. Poszukujemy skutecznych narzędzi dla realizacji naszych postulatów. Zmieniający się świat wraz z rozwojem wiedzy naukowej o zjawiskach biologicznych skutkuje ciągłymi ich zmianami. Wynika z tego, że ciągle poszukujemy adekwatnego uzasadnienia potrzeby ochrony przyrody. Dyskusja toczy się także w ramach kościoła katolickiego. Aspekty szeroko rozumianej ekologii dostrzegamy również w kolejnych encyklikach papieskich, a szczególnie Laudato Si. Choć aspekt ochrony środowiska naturalnego nie jest najważniejszym tematem współczesnego chrześcijaństwa, to coraz częściej tematyka ta jest poruszana. Przykładem może być działalność Ruchu Ekologicznego św. Franciszka z Asyżu.Celem referatu, jest wskazanie możliwej roli chrześcijaństwa w poszukiwaniu sposobu obecności człowieka w środowisku naturalnym. Zatem chodzi o wskazanie założeń na których, proponowana ochrona przyrody może być uzasadniona. Wskazane zostaną również współczesne argumenty na rzecz ochrony przyrody, a także krytyka takich propozycji.

TYMOTEUSZ MIETELSKI

Akademia Katolicka w Warszawie

Włoska filozofia chrześcijańska wobec fenomenologii

W proponowanym referacie chciałbym przedstawić reakcję włoskich filozofów chrześcijańskich wobec fenomenologii.Myśl Husserla rozprzestrzenia się we Włoszech z opóźnieniem w porównaniu do innych krajów. Wynikało to z silnego rozwoju kierunków filozoficznych związanych z neoidealizmem uwarunkowanego między innymi sytuacją polityczną. W konsekwencji inne prądy intelektualne były niejako blokowane. Pierwsze prace włoskich filozofów dotyczące poglądów Husserla pojawiają się dopiero w latach dwudziestych i trzydziestych. Następnie zainteresowanie to zanika na rzecz analiz myśli egzystencjalistów. W latach pięćdziesiątych rozpoczyna się tzw. druga fala włoskiej fenomenologii, mająca dwa centra: pierwsze to Enzo Paci i jego uczniowie, drugie to środowisko filozofii chrześcijańskiej. Reakcja filozofów chrześcijańskich, zrzeszonych i sympatyzujących z Movimento di Gallarate, przebiegała w czterech kierunkach. Pierwszy z nich określić można jako przyjęcie fenomenologii i określenie jej jako zorientowanej na realizm, a w konsekwencji prowadzącej do ufundowania metafizyki.Przedstawiciele drugiego kierunku utrzymywali, że podstawowym zadaniem fenomenologii jest opis i zrozumienie danych. Jako taka fenomenologia nie jest nurtem filozoficznym, ale ametafizycznym podejściem metodologicznym. Było to stanowisko relatywnie najbardziej płodne. Metodę fenomenologiczną wykorzystywano do badań nad doświadczeniem moralnym oraz w obszarze antropologii filozoficznej.Trzeci kierunek polegał na odrzuceniu zarówno tezy o możliwości ufundowania metafizyki na fenomenologii, jak i tezy o jej amatefizycznym charakterze. Fenomenologia ma tutaj wyznaczone skromniejsze zadanie bycia pre-metafizyką.W ramach czwartego kierunku zwracano uwagę na uwikłanie fenomenologii w liczne aporie, które uznawano za nieprzezwyciężalne.Proponowany referat ma zatem wymiar historyczny. Ukazanie reakcji włoskich filozofów chrześcijańskich na jeden z ważniejszych nurtów myśli XX wieku ujawnia płodność i siłę heurystyczną filozofii chrześcijańskiej.

MARC PAULY

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen

Saying “You” to Nature: Greening Christianity via Dialogical Philosophy

The ecological crisis has led to different attempts to “green” various religions, i.e., to find resources in and interpretations of these religious traditions that are more in line with ecological thinking and nature preservation (Taylor). More specifically, there have also been various attempts to green Christianity (Conradie). This is particularly important not just due to the prominence of Christianity, but also because from the very beginning of the critical reflection of the ecological crisis, Christianity has been seen as co-responsible for environmental degradation (White). In this paper, I utilize the tradition of dialogical philosophy of the early 20th century in order to uncover a dialogical approach to nature within Christianity.The work of Ferdinand Ebner, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Martin Buber has primarily been used to develop our thinking about dialogue between human persons. In fact, some of the writings in this tradition suggest that the dialogical perspective is only appropriate in the human realm. I will show, however, that other passages in the works of these authors also allow us to develop a philosophical framework for saying “you” to nature, i.e., to enter into dialogue not just with human persons but also with other natural entities like animals and plants. In fact, it turns out that this approach is also consonant with certain passages of both the Old and the New Testament. If we see the ecological crisis not just as a technical problem to be solved but more fundamentally as a problem with our relationship to nature, this combination of dialogical philosophy and Christianity can offer us a fruitful alternative approach to the relationship we have with nature.

MAREK PEPLIŃSKI

Uniwersytet Gdański

An Academic and Non-academic Conception of Philosophy as a Tool for Understanding the Controversies Surrounding the Notion of Christian Philosophy

The issue of the coherence of the concept of Christian philosophy and the possibility of an original Christian philosophy became a subject of controversy in the first half of the 20th century, involving figures such as Émile Bréhier, Étienne Gilson, Maurice Blondel, and Fernand Van Steenberghen. The fact that this issue remains relevant is evidenced, on the one hand, by ongoing discussions among philosophers, particularly in Anglophone philosophy since the 1990s, and on the other hand, by John Paul II’s philosophically inspiring encyclical Fides et Ratio.The controversy over the concept of Christian philosophy is primarily related to the perception of philosophy as a theoretical endeavor concerned with pursuing a specifically defined truth about reality. From this perspective, Christianity is a matter of faith, and its corresponding cognitive enterprise is theology, which relies on Revelation and divine authority. On the other hand, philosophy is a matter of reason, a search for truth conducted through natural means, emphasizing that justification and proof cannot appeal to premises of faith as they are—or should be—inter-subjective. Thus, the very concept of Christian philosophy seems to be an oxymoron or simply impossible.On the other hand, it is a historical fact that early Christians identified themselves as philosophers and understood Christianity as a philosophy. This identification is linked to the ancient conception of philosophy as comprising two closely related aspects: a theoretical one, associated with the pursuit of knowledge, and a practical one, as a way of life and a pursuit of happiness. Another historical fact is Christianity’s undeniable and multifaceted influence on philosophical thought.The presentation proposes a broader understanding of philosophy than a particular academic conception of philosophical inquiry as solely oriented toward knowledge and understanding. In simplified terms, this academic conception views philosophy primarily as a cognitive practice concerned with producing philosophical texts and statements that objectify subjective cognitive results in a form that is, in some way, considered scientific. The methodological approach proposed, named the macro-method of philosophizing, consists of five elements: the philosopher and his intellectual construction, the threefold activity of philosophizing, the aims of philosophizing, the results of philosophizing, and the object of philosophizing. The paper then demonstrates how different solutions to the question of Christian philosophy can be analyzed using this framework.To this end, this paper refers to the ancient conception of philosophy, drawing on the reflections of Pierre Hadot, Juliusz Domański, and George Karamanolis; to John Wippel’s Thomistic approach to the relationship between philosophy and Christianity; and to the work of contemporary analytic philosophers who have addressed the issue of Christian philosophy, such as Alvin Plantinga and Marilyn McCord Adams. It argues that considering various perspectives allows for a fuller understanding of philosophy, making it a more attractive endeavor than it would be if reduced solely to academic philosophy. The paper concludes with reflections on the possibility of an authentic, original Christian philosophy within the modern university.

ONDREJ SIKORA

Palacky University Olomouc, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy

Jan Patočka and Karl Jaspers: Heretics Near and Far

The purpose of my talk is to present Patočka’s and Jaspers’ attitude to Christianity and the specific character of their philosophical heresy. What is the root of their heresy, what does this word mean with relation to their philosophical project and how exactly do they understand the relation of philosophy and religion?Both thinkers share the following: A starting point in the uniqueness of human existence, with a high sensitivity to the wide register of its modalities; inspiration from German classical philosophy, especially the thorough training in Kant; the vital, even fatal, influence of Heidegger (from whom, of course, Jaspers broke away “in time”); a permanent interest in the history of philosophy and its crucial importance in thinking through the questions of the present; an understanding of own work as an integral part of the European tradition of thought, rather than abandoning and discarding it. Last but not least, the unifying motif for both is philosophical heresy – this motif will perhaps be the most interesting outcome of this confrontation. Patočka’s heresy has not remained undiscussed. At its core we can find a purely secular reading of human history, which is supposed to begin with a “problematic” stepping out of what is simply given, over which there is no longer any instance that would somehow reflect, punish or reward human inner-worldly struggles. At the heart of Jaspers’ heresy is a rejection of the “deadly claim to exclusivity” raised by traditional monotheistic religions (Jaspers aims at protestant Christianity) and in which their tendencies to intolerance, violence and domination are rooted. In this context, he states that intolerance is only justified “against intolerance“.This heresy, however, cannot be identified with rejection of these denominations. “The Bible and biblical religion are the basis of our philosophizing,” Jaspers writes. Jesus of Nazareth is one of the ciphers of transcendence; by contrast, Jesus as Christ, as the living God is a philosophically unacceptable concept. If it is true for both that a philosopher cannot be a Christian, the title “Christian” is to be applied to denominational identity, not to the spirit of thought. Here, however, it is also necessary to emphasize the differentiation: Jaspers, unlike Patočka, is an explicitly and consistently theistic thinker, which leaves many of Patočka’s dilemmas and hesitations behind; both authors, however, share the ethos carried by the Christian tradition and the conviction that human existence in this world has an absolute yet hidden meaning, which can be discovered only through an autonomous act of an existential conversion. In this, Patočka seems even “more Christian than Christians” – recall his motif of the “enormous”, “unheard metanoein,” an authentic conversion realizing that which almost disappears in the ornamentation, self-deification, and incessant polemics of traditional confessions. However, this first view must be replaced by a critical one: what would allow one to speak of a secularized Christianity? Heresy, in order to be heresy, always makes sense only on the shared ground of a given confession. Where that ground is absent, the possibility of being a heretic falls away. The question of what that shared ground is for Patočka is not an easy one, and that is why his heresy, unlike Jaspers's, is problematic.

ANNA SZKLARSKA

Uniwersytet Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie

Problem klauzuli sumienia w bioetyce chrześcijańskiej i świeckiej

W wystąpieniu przeanalizowane zostanie zagadnienie klauzuli sumienia w bioetyce chrześcijańskiej i świeckiej ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem argumentacji (wraz z kontrargumentacją) na rzecz i przeciw tego rozwiązania. Przedmiotem namysłu jest szczególna regulacja prawna, zgodnie z którą lekarz może powstrzymać się od wykonania świadczeń zdrowotnych, które uznaje za niezgodne ze swoim sumieniem. Porządek prawny wprowadzany przez państwo i społeczeństwo może stać w sprzeczności z etyczną oceną danych praktyk dokonywaną przez pojedynczych lekarzy. Klauzula sumienia wyraża dbałość o wewnętrzną równowagę a zatem komfort pracy, moralną integralność i suwerenną wolność samych lekarzy, jednak za cenę wolności i komfortu pacjentów, narażonych na odmowę wykonania świadczenia i bezradność w obliczu trudności systemowych. Zawody medyczne są niezwykle obciążające psychicznie, osoby je wykonujące są szczególnie narażone na wypalenie zawodowe i moralne zobojętnienie. Wydaje się, że klauzula sumienia stanowi ważne narzędzie, które pomaga lekarzom zachować wewnętrzny spokój, moralną wrażliwość i autonomię. Nadrzędna metoda służąca powziętemu celowi badawczemu, którym jest analiza problemu klauzuli sumienia na gruncie bioetyki chrześcijańskiej i zsekularyzowanej opiera się na rekonstrukcji najważniejszych stanowisk i linii argumentacyjnych je uzasadniających, systematyzacji poszczególnych wątków, ich pogłębieniu i rozwinięciu oraz krytycznej interpretacji.Ramowy plan referatu:1. Klauzula sumienia i regulacje prawne z nią związane– definicja, istota i zastosowanie w porządkach prawnych wybranych państw w kontekście świadczeń budzących moralne kontrowersje.2. Klauzula sumienia w świetle najważniejszych stanowisk bioetycznych, zarówno chrześcijańskich, jak i sekularystycznych – przegląd argumentów za i przeciw (tu m.in. klauzula sumienia a zasada całościowości, klauzula sumienia a moralny relatywizm, utylitaryzm w opiece zdrowotnej i jego konsekwencje, prawo naturalne a prawo stanowione przez państwo).3. Etyka zawodowa a etyka osobista.4. Klauzula sumienia w kontekście etyki lekarskiej i celów medycyny.5. Próby osiągnięcia kompromisu i trudności, które generuje konsensus. 6. Postulat przeniesienia klauzuli sumienia na inne sfery życia społecznego i profesje.7. Podsumowanie i konkluzje. Aksjologiczne i funkcjonalne znaczenie klauzuli sumienia.

MALWINA TKACZ

Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie

Philosophy and Christianity: Kierkegaard and Weil on Hope as a Response to Crisis

The paper examines the intersection of philosophy and Christianity through the lens of crisis, focusing on the distinct yet complementary perspectives of Søren Kierkegaard and Simone Weil. It contributes to the conference’s aim by analyzing how Christian faith informs Kierkegaard’s and Weil’s philosophical engagement with the human experience of crisis. Specifically, it investigates how their reflections on suffering, despair, and hope offer valuable insights into navigating both personal and societal upheavals.The paper explores the challenges posed by crises—both existential and societal—and examines how Kierkegaard and Weil, individually, offer responses rooted in their Christian worldview. It discusses Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the individual’s confrontation with despair and the necessity of a “leap of faith” in the face of existential crisis. Weil focuses on compassion, the acceptance of affliction, and the transformative potential of divine grace in navigating suffering and social injustice. The paper analyzes how their distinct philosophical approaches are united by a shared understanding of hope as a resilient faith that transcends despair—not through a denial of suffering but through a deeper engagement with it.By juxtaposing Kierkegaard and Weil, the paper illuminates the multifaceted nature of hope within a Christian context. It demonstrates how their respective philosophies, though distinct in emphasis, converge on the idea that true hope is not a naïve optimism but a profound trust in God’s presence even in the midst of crisis. This study contributes to the conference’s broader discussion of “Christian philosophy” by showcasing how theological convictions can inspire diverse philosophical reflections on fundamental human experiences. It also aligns with the conference’s interest in identifying common ground between philosophy and Christianity by highlighting the shared foundation of faith that underpins both Kierkegaard’s and Weil’s unique philosophical contributions to understanding and responding to crisis.

WILLIAM TULLIUS

American Public University System; Department of Religion, Art, Music, and Philosophy

Towards a Marian Icon of Philosophy - A Steinian and Voegelinian Approach

Much of the modern effort to explore the relation of Christian philosophy and modern, secular philosophy has been focused on the question of what makes a Christian philosophy Christian while retaining its properly philosophical character. Such questions are often approached in conversation with or been focused around the examination of certain exemplary personalities in the history of Christian philosophy, chief among them especially Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. However fruitful their results, this effort might be further deepened by seeking to clarify in a more radical way the manner by which the existential experience of the person of Christ revolutionizes philosophical experience itself. This is precisely the sort of project that John Paul II’s encyclical Fides et Ratio aimed to promote in concluding with a brief exhortation for philosophers to look to Mary, Seat of Wisdom, as a “lucid image of philosophy” (Fides et Ratio, § 108), urging philosophers today to philosophize ‘in Mary’ (philosophari in Maria). For this, what is particularly needed is to compare the image of Mary with some of the classic ‘images’, or ‘icons’ in the Platonic sense, for the philosophical life, and it requires that we reflect upon the implications that those traditional icons had symbolically captured for understanding the work of philosophy. Drawing on Edith Stein as well as the works of Eric Voegelin, one can see that the symbols to which philosophy appeals, and which it employs in clarifying its range of problem, also condition the methods by which it addresses those problems. They also condition how more or less open philosophy is to fulfilling the ideal goal towards which it is always in tension. What I wish to argue here is that, in contemplating the icon of Mary, we have the potential for developing new philosophical symbolisms prepared to set a particular range of problems and methods for philosophical work as it endeavors to produce its ‘account of the whole’.