• Environmental Economics

• International Trade Theory: Modelling oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting with applications to international trade. 

• Microeconomics

• Game Theory

Trade Policy, Environmental Policy, and the Sustainability of International Cooperation

Link: http://drive.google.com/file/d/1D6DYQvtTuf7bAEtzvx8AIS6JC3pefgSP/view?usp=drive_link 

Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements with Many Countries

Abstract: The sustainability of international environmental agreements (IEA) with many countries is analysed in an infinitely repeated game. Countries can use a production tax/subsidy to control the output of a monopolistic industry that emits pollution that has global spillovers. Welfare in the Nash equilibrium (NE) in taxes may be negative if the relative environmental damage is sufficiently high, but welfare is always positive when countries cooperate. Cooperation can be sustained in the infinitely repeated game using Nash-reversion trigger strategies or optimal punishments. In both cases, the critical discount factor required to sustain cooperation is generally decreasing in the number of countries and the relative environmental damage. The possibility of renegotiation following a deviation can be ruled out if renegotiation is costly and/or time consuming with optimal-punishment strategies, but not with Nash reversion trigger strategies. When full cooperation cannot be sustained due to the discount factor being lower than the critical value, limited cooperation is possible using Nash-reversion trigger strategies or optimal punishments.

Link:   http://drive.google.com/file/d/1P9pTtZZa0b4pLWqiTYIb81oISQb4dxbB/view?usp=sharing 

The Sustainability of International Environmental Cooperation in a Duopoly Model

Abstract: In an infinitely repeated game, the sustainability of the international environmental agreement is analysed in a Cournot duopoly with differentiated products in an integrated market. The static model allows for global environmental spillover in terms of production pollution, and two countries use a policy instrument to deal with oligopolistic distortion and environmental externality. In a repeated version of the static policy game, it is shown that the international trade agreement is sustainable using infinite Nash reversion and using the optimal punishment strategy of Abreu (1986,1988). Under both strategies, the critical discount factor is decreasing in both the environmental spillover and relative environmental damage, hence pollution leakage and damage make it easier to sustain cooperation. The degree of product differentiation becomes problematic in sustaining cooperation when products are highly homogenous. When comparing the two strategies for sustaining the international environmental agreement, it is always much easier to sustain cooperation using optimal punishment than infinite Nash reversion.

Link: Available upon request

Incentives of Deviation in a Finitely Repeated Game