Working Papers


Conditionally Accepted, Journal of Corporate Finance

Abstract: We examine how climate policy uncertainty influences strategic lobbying behaviors between firms with opposing environmental positions, employing a game-theoretic model and firm-level lobbying data in the U.S. The model demonstrates that uncertainty about policy implementation amplifies lobbying expenditures by both “brown” and “green” firms, particularly in competitive industries, and elevates firms’ cost of capital. Empirical analysis supports these theoretical predictions. Firms that engage in more extensive lobbying activities experience higher capital costs and reduce investment levels. These findings reveal a strategic mechanism through which climate policy uncertainty influences corporate financial behavior, establishing connections between climate policy uncertainty, firms’ strategic lobbying decisions, and capital market outcomes.

*Media Mention : The Finreg Blog (Sponsored by Duke Financial Economics Center)

*Previously circulated under the title "Tug of War in Corporate Environmental Lobbying"


Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Law and Economics

Abstract: We examine how politicians' real estate holdings shape their economic bill proposals. Using a novel database of mandatory financial disclosures for all legislators in South Korea, we find that legislators with greater real estate holdings are less likely to propose economic bills aimed at tightening the real estate market during the run-up of housing prices. We address endogeneity concerns by employing an exogenous local earthquake shock as an instrumental variable for the local real estate market. Our results indicate that politicians' personal financial interests significantly influence the content and focus of economic bill proposals.

*KB Securities Best Paper Award, Conference on Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, 2022

*Previously circulated under the title "Politicians' Asset Allocation and Economic Bill Proposals"


Abstract: I explore why many high-carbon-emitting Brown firms lobby for pro-environmental policies. Using U.S. federal lobbying reports and the patent assignment database, I propose that green innovation plays a key role in this behavior. In the absence of explicit environmental lobbying direction in the lobbying reports, I use lobbyists' ideological preferences to infer it. I find that while Brown firms generally lobby against pro-environmental policies, those with more and higher-quality green innovation outputs also lobby to support these policies. This relationship is stronger for Brown firms that rely more on intangible capital. Overall, the results suggest that Brown firms support green transition when they anticipate the future value of their green innovation output.