Working Papers


Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Law and Economics

Abstract: We examine how politicians' real estate holdings shape their economic bill proposals. Using a novel database of mandatory financial disclosures for all legislators in South Korea, we find that legislators with greater real estate holdings are less likely to propose economic bills aimed at tightening the real estate market during the run-up of housing prices. We address endogeneity concerns by employing an exogenous local earthquake shock as an instrumental variable for the local real estate market. Our results indicate that politicians' personal financial interests significantly influence the content and focus of economic bill proposals.

*KB Securities Best Paper Award, Conference on Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, 2022

*Previously circulated under the title "Politicians' Asset Allocation and Economic Bill Proposals"


Abstract: We study how climate policy uncertainty shapes strategic lobbying behavior among firms with opposing environmental stances, using a game-theoretic model and firm-level data from the U.S. The model predicts that greater policy uncertainty intensifies lobbying by polarized firms; this “tug-of-war” in lobbying is amplified by competitive interactions and leads to an increase in firms’ cost of capital. We test these predictions using U.S. data on corporate lobbying and climate policy uncertainty. Consistent with the model, we find that lobbying expenditures are U-shaped in environmental stance: both carbon-intensive (“brown”) and clean-energy (“green”) firms lobby more than others, especially when climate policy uncertainty is high. This effect is amplified in more competitive industries. Moreover, firms engaged in extensive lobbying exhibit a higher cost of capital, accompanied by lower investment. Our findings reveal a strategic channel linking policy uncertainty to firm financial outcomes.

*Media Mention : The Finreg Blog (Sponsored by Duke Financial Economics Center)

*Previously circulated under the title "Tug of War in Corporate Environmental Lobbying"


Abstract: I explore why many high-carbon-emitting Brown firms lobby for pro-environmental policies. Using U.S. federal lobbying reports and the patent assignment database, I propose that green innovation plays a key role in this behavior. In the absence of explicit environmental lobbying direction in the lobbying reports, I use lobbyists' ideological preferences to infer it. I find that while Brown firms generally lobby against pro-environmental policies, those with more and higher-quality green innovation outputs also lobby to support these policies. This relationship is stronger for Brown firms that rely more on intangible capital. Overall, the results suggest that Brown firms support green transition when they anticipate the future value of their green innovation output.