Publications & Working Papers

After being rather moderate throughout the post-Cold War period, great power rivalries are gaining steam again. Yet, in contrast to past rivalries they are characterized by complex interdependencies which prompt the rivals to engage in order-building within and across rival “blocs”. We argue that this order-building is frequently done by means of “cooptation”, i.e. the trading of institutional privileges for order support. To prepare the conceptual ground for studying cooptation in great power rivalries, we conceptualize cooptation as a specific mode of cooperation and distinguish between four types: taming opposition, securing partners, seeking patronage, and wooing leaders. We demonstrate 1) how great power rivalry shapes cooptation in institutional orders; 2) that cooptation can exacerbate great power rivalry; and 3) that cooptation can tame great power rivalry under certain conditions. We thereby show that theories of cooptation, usually used to analyze domestic politics, help explain international order(ing) in great power rivalries.

In some cases, hegemonic powers manage to turn dissatisfied (former) rivals into satisfied partners by means of cooptation. Yet, in other cases, similar cooptation attempts result in failure. Why? We argue that the generosity of the hegemon’s cooptation offer is of utmost importance for whether cooptation succeeds or fails to overcome the rivalry with coopted great powers. When hegemonic powers offer a generous cooptation deal, a virtuous circle sets in that may socialize great power rivals into the order dominated by the hegemon. When, by contrast, the cooptation offer is not generous, a vicious circle is likely to develop, which may even exacerbate the great power rivalry. To assess the empirical plausibility of this socialization-by-cooptation theory, we study the cooptation of Germany after World War II, the cooptation of Russia after the Cold War, and the contemporary cooptation of China into the international financial system.

Are the USA and China headed to hegemonic war? Will US-China conflicts over trade and monetary issues further escalate? Will the “liberal international order” and its institutions survive US-China power rivalries? Great power rivalries are pervasive in contemporary US-China relations. Yet, it is unclear whether International Relations (IR) research can offer reflexive and relevant foresight on possible future trajectories of geopolitical competition. This article reviews existing approaches to qualitative foresight on US-China power rivalries in the military, economic, and institutional realms. We find that existing grand IR theory-based predictions and applied scenario-building approaches offer important insights, but have yet to realize their full potential as both fall short of some important theoretical and/or methodological criteria for good qualitative foresight. Taking process tracing methodology to scenario-building, we introduce a novel “paths projections” approach that reinforces the strengths of existing research strands while ameliorating their respective weaknesses. “Paths projections” offer theory-based, reflexive and politically relevant scenarios that promise to advance context-sensitive and process-centered foresight on evolving US-China power rivalries. They thereby contribute to enhancing the relevance of IR with regard to a key issue of international politics. 

How will the regime complex of balance-of-payments lending evolve amidst ongoing global power shifts? Existing research in International Relations and International Political Economy suggests divergent theoretical expectations of cooperation and conflict between incumbent international financial institutions and alternative institutions based on studying the past. Yet, this body of work fails to provide robust scenarios of future inter-institutional trajectories. Drawing on theories of power-shift-driven institutional change, we reconstruct a plurality of contingent, process-centered, and more or less distant “paths projections” of inter-institutional relations between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and alternative institutions promoted by rising powers. Depending on the interest constellations between emerging and established economies and challengers’ exposure to network effects, we create pathways of no external change (leading to inertia), institutional hedging (duplication), complementary layering (differentiation), or counter-institutionalization (fragmentation). Our “paths projections” spell out their key features, specify early indications for their respective materialization, and reflect on when and how political agency could contribute to (or prevent) a shift from one pathway to another. This paper offers an innovative and policy-relevant approach to future (inter-)institutional change in international finance and beyond.

When, how and where will geoeconomic competition over critical digital infrastructures (de-)escalate? Despite growing demand for foresight on this question, existing research has been reluctant to provide theoretically informed, methodologically reflexive, and politically relevant scenarios. Our paper formulates “paths projections” on the future (de-)escalation of geoeconomic competition over critical digital infrastructures between the US, the EU, and China. Drawing on institutionalist and constructivist theories, we argue that depending on evolving network effects and the discursive geopoliticization or securitization of digital infrastructures, different more or less conflictual pathways – coexistence, cooptation, or all- out confrontation – will ensue. Focusing on information and communications technology standards and digital platforms, we project divergent short- and long-term trajectories in these fields, provide early indicators for the materialization of particular pathways, assess their likelihood, and reflect on how political agency might shape their materialization. Our analysis helps grasp and manage the future(s) of geoeconomic competition over digital infrastructures.