I am interested in how institutions can be structured to achieve better outcomes for agents (decision-makers) and/or planners. I believe that the design of institutions and the incentives embedded within them are crucial in shaping individual behaviour and influencing the way they understand, formulate and solve the underlying economic problems. By focusing solely on individual behaviour without considering the institutional framework, we overlook how individuals perceive and address economic issues. Additionally, this can result in missing aspects that are critical to understanding the broader dynamics at play.
Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains (with Mihir Bhattacharya)- the International Journal of Game Theory (journal link, last draft)
Abstract- We consider a social choice model where voters have single-peaked preferences over a finite and ordered set of alternatives that are aggregated to produce contiguous sets or intervals of a fixed cardinality. This is applicable in situations where the alternatives can be arranged in a line (e.g. plots of land) and a contiguous subset of these is required (e.g. a hospital or a school). We define interval-social choice correspondences (I-SCCs) on profiles of single-peaked preferences which select intervals. We extend single-peaked preferences to intervals using responsiveness. We show that generalized median-interval (GMI) rules are the only strategy-proof, anonymous and interval efficient I-SCCs. These rules are interval versions of generalized median voter rules which consist of the median, min and max rules. We show that responsiveness over intervals is necessary for the strategy-proofness of the GMI rule if preferences over alternatives are single-peaked.
Fair allocation with semi-single-peaked preferences over location and quantity (with Mihir Bhattacharya) (working draft)
Abstract- We study the fair division of a heterogeneous good between two agents in a domain where contiguous bundles are defined by their starting location and quantity. We formulate a general class of monotonic spatial preferences using ordinal indifference curves. We prove that all Pareto efficient and Envy-free allocations must lie within a specific “balanced region,” implying that a strict equal split is only fair if it intersects this space. Crucially, we demonstrate that while Pareto efficient and Strategy-proof rules exist, no allocation rule can simultaneously satisfy Pareto efficiency, Envy-freeness, and Strategy-proofness.
Old Draft with semi-single peaked preferences (Link)
Matching using choice data (with Varun Bansal and Mihir Bhattacharya) (arxiv link) (working draft)
Abstract- We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of Chambers and Yenmez (2017) by weakening the Path Independence assumption. For many-to-many markets, we show that stable matchings exist when choice correspondences satisfy Substitutability and a new General Acyclicity condition. We provide a constructive proof using a Grow or Discard Algorithm that iteratively expands or eliminates contracts until a strongly maximal Individually Rational set is reached. We provide an algorithm to obtain stable matchings in which rejected contracts are not permanently discarded, distinguishing our approach significantly from standard DAA-type algorithms. For one-to-one markets, we show that Path Independence alone does not guarantee stability. We introduce a replacement-based notion of stability and provide an algorithm that constructs stable matchings when choice correspondences satisfy Binary Acyclicity.
Choosing a pair of complementary goods (with Varun Bansal) (working draft)
Abstract- We consider a decision maker (DM) who has to choose a pair of ‘complementary’ goods, one from each of two sets, A and B. We propose a heuristic in which the DM chooses as if for each alternative in A she has a (complementarity) order over alternatives of B and vice-versa. The choices made by the DM are represented by joint choice functions. The proposed heuristic encapsulates a minimal notion of complementarity. We call a joint choice function satisfying this heuristic a weak-complements choice function (weak-CCF). We characterize the family of weak-CCFs using three testable axioms. Further, we look at a stronger notion of complementarity, represented by a sub-class of weak-CCFs called strong-complements choice functions (strong-CCFs). A strong-CCF may not exist in the universal domain of (complementarity) orders. We show that the ‘single-crossing’ property on the (complementarity) orders is sufficient for the existence of strong-CCFs.
Getting better: Redesigning Normal form games to achieve better outcomes (with Varun Bansal)
Achieving fair tournament designs
Computational work and pedagogical tools (link)
Conferences, Workshops ...
Computational Microeconomics Workshop - IISER, Bhopal (19-20 Feb 2026) (invited)
ACM IndiCS School and Seminar on Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD), Coimbatore (08-12 December 2025)
Fair allocation with (semi-single-peaked) preferences over location and quantity
Asian School in Economic Theory, NYU Abu Dhabi (06-10 January, 2025)
Conference on Mechanism and Institution design, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary (08-12 July 2024)
Social Influence within clusters and stochastic Choices
DSE Winter School (15-18 Dec 2021)
The intertwining strands in Physics and Maths: Fourier Analysis for undergraduate Physics and Mathematics teachers, IISER Pune (Jan 2018)
XVII Annual GPSC Conference – Co-creating a Safer School Environment (February 2019)