Social Impact

Publications and Working Papers

Summary: When there are information asymmetries regarding beneficiaries' abilities and needs, social entrepreneurs form for-profits that transact with their beneficiaries (e.g., employ them) rather than engage in giving through a donative organization (e.g., training programs)

Coverage:  ProMarket


Summary: Hypothesizes that there is a link between decrease in competition and the decrease in the share of stock ownership by middle and low income households, and suggests that broadening ownership may mitigate the effects of market power on product prices and wages


Summary: While governors relied on objective criteria (e.g., poverty rates) in exercising their broad discretion to designate tracts as Opportunity Zones, there is robust evidence that OZ designation is more likely when voters supported the governor and when investors with an economic interest in the tract donated to the governor's campaigns

Coverage: Bloomberg and TaxProf Blog


Summary: Contrary to common perceptions of the Opportunity Zone program, its intended purpose was to promote entrepreneurship and startup activity. Empirical analysis shows it failed to do so. Various proposals to reform the program are considered

Coverage: TaxProf Blog and Forbes


Summary: Nonprofit ownership of for-profits in the US firms is actually possible, contrary to common belief, but the lack of tax advantages as compared to European jurisdictions makes this structure unpopular 


Summary: Because it is difficult to measure social impact with precision, the design of legal hybrid forms for firms that pursue social missions should focus on firms that commit to transacting with disadvantaged groups, and thus have a stake in their development 

Coverage: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation and ProMarket


Summary: Social enterprises that transact with their beneficiaries (e.g., workers) use the information they gather on their abilities to tailor subsidies to the specific needs of individual beneficiaries. This “measurement” function makes social enterprises relatively effective vehicles for allocating subsidies as compared to donative organizations and corporate social responsibility policies  

Coverage: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation