Entrepreneurship
Publications and Working Papers
Dual-Class IPOs: A Solution to Unicorn Governance Failure, forthcoming in the Handbook on the Structure of Private Equity and Venture Capital (edited by Brian Broughman and Elisabeth De Fontenay)
Summary: The availability of dual-class IPOs mitigates the tail risk of agency costs in private firms by giving founders who wish to maintain control greater incentives to go public and subject their business model to market scrutiny
Coverage: ECGI Blog, and Columbia Blue Sky Blog
Common Venture Capital Investors and Start-up Growth, The Review of Financial Studies 37(2) (2024): 549-590 (with J. Grennan)
Summary: Despite the potential for rent-extraction, startups with common VC investors that share a common director raise more capital from VCs, are less likely to fail, and are more likely to exit through IPOs or acquisitions by another commonly-held startup
Coverage: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
The Governance of Entrepreneurship, in Christopher Bruner & Marc Moore (eds.), Research Agenda for Corporate Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023)
Summary: A research agenda discussing key avenues for further research on the governance of startups focusing on the evolving relationship between founders and venture capital firms. Topics include: fiduciary duties, independent directors, contractual rights, exit decisions, and innovation
The Rise of Dual-Class IPOs, Journal of Financial Economics 144, no. 1 (2022): 122-153 (with D. Aggarwal, Y. Hochberg & L. Litov)
Summary: The increase in founder-controlled dual-class firms over time is due to greater availability of private capital and technological shocks that have reduced firms’ needs for external financing
Coverage: Bloomberg’s Money Stuff, Financial Times, Columbia Blue Sky Blog, Oxford Business Law Blog, and JD Supra
Common Ownership and Entrepreneurship, AEA Papers and Proceedings 111 (2021): pp. 582-86 (with J. Grennan)
Summary: Common ownership of startups by venture capital firms may have the effect of disrupting dormant industries where larger firms have limited incentives to compete
The Organization of Social Enterprises: Transacting versus Giving, European Corporate Governance Institute - Finance Working Paper No. 987 (2024)
Summary: When there are information asymmetries regarding beneficiaries' abilities and needs, social entrepreneurs form for-profits that transact with their beneficiaries (e.g., employ them) rather than engage in giving through a donative organization (e.g., training programs)
Coverage: ProMarket
The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations, Columbia Business Law Review 1 (2017): 92-194
Summary: Social enterprises that transact with their beneficiaries (e.g., workers) use the information they gather on their abilities to tailor subsidies to the specific needs of individual beneficiaries. This “measurement” function makes social enterprises relatively effective vehicles for allocating subsidies as compared to donative organizations and corporate social responsibility policies
Coverage: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation