Analytical Articles 

International law prohibits crimes against humanity, yet it still lacks a global treaty dedicated specifically to their prevention and punishment. Genocide, war crimes, torture, and enforced disappearance are each addressed through international conventions that establish obligations for States. Crimes against humanity—despite encompassing some of the most systematic abuses committed against civilian populations—remain the major exception.

The international community is now attempting to close this gap. In December 2024, the United Nations General Assembly authorized negotiations toward a legally binding convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity. A preparatory committee held its first session in January 2026, and a second session is scheduled for April 2027. The diplomatic conference itself is expected to meet for three weeks in 2028 and again in 2029.[1] The process could produce one of the most important international criminal-law treaties since the adoption of the Rome Statute.

The central argument for a new convention is straightforward: defining crimes against humanity is not the same as creating a complete system for preventing and prosecuting them.

The Rome Statute already grants the International Criminal Court jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Under Article 7, these crimes include acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, enforced disappearance, and persecution when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.[2] The Court, however, was designed to prosecute individuals. It was not intended to replace national courts or create a universal framework governing cooperation among every State.

The ICC also operates under jurisdictional limitations. It generally depends on territorial or nationality connections to a State Party, the acceptance of jurisdiction by a nonparty State, or a referral from the United Nations Security Council. Political divisions within the Council can consequently prevent situations from reaching the Court. Even where the ICC possesses jurisdiction, it relies heavily on States to arrest suspects, obtain evidence, protect witnesses, and enforce sentences.

A crimes against humanity convention would address a different level of the accountability problem. The International Law Commission’s 2019 draft articles call upon States to criminalize crimes against humanity domestically, establish jurisdiction in specified circumstances, investigate suspected offenders, cooperate through extradition and mutual legal assistance, protect victims and witnesses, and either prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators found within their territory.[3] Instead of concentrating responsibility in a single international institution, the convention would distribute enforcement across national legal systems.

This distinction matters because most international crimes will never be prosecuted in The Hague. International courts have limited resources and can address only a small number of cases. Durable accountability therefore depends on domestic courts possessing compatible laws and reliable procedures. A convention could reduce the legal gaps that allow suspects to travel, relocate assets, or exploit differences between national criminal codes.

The treaty’s preventive function may be equally important. Crimes against humanity do not require an armed conflict and can occur through State policy, organized repression, forced displacement, detention systems, or coordinated attacks against political, ethnic, religious, or social groups. Waiting until violence reaches the threshold of war misunderstands the character of the crime. International law must be capable of responding when systematic persecution begins, rather than only after it becomes a historical catastrophe.

Nevertheless, negotiations will face serious political disputes. States are likely to disagree over definitions, universal jurisdiction, extradition requirements, dispute-settlement mechanisms, and the relationship between accountability and the immunity of government officials. Governments may also resist provisions that allow foreign courts to examine conduct connected to their territory or officials. The submitted amendment proposals will form part of the compiled negotiating text considered before the diplomatic conference, meaning that the final treaty may differ substantially from the International Law Commission’s original draft.[4]

These disagreements should not be dismissed as technical obstruction. A treaty that attracts broad participation but contains weak obligations could create the appearance of progress without materially improving accountability. Conversely, a highly ambitious convention joined by only a narrow group of States could struggle to establish the international cooperation needed to function. Negotiators must therefore balance legal strength with political legitimacy.

The proposed convention will not end crimes against humanity, nor will it eliminate selective enforcement. It could, however, close a major structural gap by connecting international prohibition with national responsibility. The ultimate value of the treaty will depend on whether States are willing to accept obligations that may one day apply not only to their adversaries, but also to their own officials and institutions. That is the real test of international criminal law: whether its rules remain binding when accountability becomes politically inconvenient.

Endnotes

[1] United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, “United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity,” last updated July 14, 2026, https://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/cah/. legal.un.org

[2] International Criminal Court, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” accessed October 8, 2026, https://www.icc-cpi.int/publications/core-legal-texts/rome-statute-international-criminal-court. International Criminal Court

[3] International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity,” 2019, arts. 4–14, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/7_7_2019.pdf. legal.un.org

[4] United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, “Proposals for Amendments: Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity,” last updated September 1, 2026, https://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/cah/proposals.shtml. legal.un.org

Bibliography

International Criminal Court. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” Accessed October 8, 2026. https://www.icc-cpi.int/publications/core-legal-texts/rome-statute-international-criminal-court.

International Law Commission. “Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity.” 2019. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/7_7_2019.pdf.

United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. “Proposals for Amendments: Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity.” Last updated September 1, 2026. https://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/cah/proposals.shtml.

United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. “United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity.” Last updated July 14, 2026. https://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/cah/.

October 8, 2026

Europe’s security institutions were designed around a comparatively clear distinction between peace and war. That distinction is becoming harder to sustain. Cyberattacks, sabotage, arson, infrastructure disruption, disinformation, and drone incursions can impose serious political and economic costs without producing the unmistakable evidence or scale normally associated with an armed attack. These operations exploit uncertainty: governments must decide not only how to respond, but also who acted, whether the incident was centrally directed, and whether retaliation could trigger escalation.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen addressed this problem in her September 2026 State of the European Union speech by proposing a European “counter-hybrid playbook.” Under the proposal, any member state confronting a serious hybrid incident could trigger an emergency consultation among EU governments. The Commission also intends to develop plans for a European Security Council that could involve non-EU partners such as the United Kingdom, Norway, Ukraine, and Canada. The concept reflects a broader recognition that Europe’s existing procedures have not kept pace with threats deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold of conventional war.

The proposal is strategically important because hybrid operations attack the political foundations of collective security. A drone near an airport, a fire at a defense facility, or a disruption to an energy network may appear limited when considered separately. Repeated incidents, however, can test national defenses, create public anxiety, raise insurance and security costs, and expose disagreements among allies. An adversary does not need to defeat European militaries directly if it can instead demonstrate that governments cannot agree on attribution or consequences.

The first challenge is attribution. Effective deterrence requires an adversary to believe that hostile action will be identified and answered. Yet cyber operations and sabotage commonly involve intermediaries, false identities, commercial technology, and cross-border networks. Governments may possess persuasive classified intelligence but hesitate to reveal it publicly because disclosure could expose sources and surveillance capabilities. Europe therefore needs a shared evidentiary framework that distinguishes legal proof, intelligence confidence, and the political standard required for collective action. Without such a framework, the state most affected may demand an immediate response while others insist on additional investigation.

The second challenge is proportionality. NATO’s Article 4 permits allies to consult whenever a member believes its territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened. The EU also possesses a mutual-assistance clause for armed aggression. Hybrid attacks occupy the space between those mechanisms. A workable European playbook should therefore establish a graduated menu of responses: coordinated attribution, diplomatic expulsions, targeted sanctions, cyber countermeasures, criminal prosecutions, infrastructure protection, and, in the most serious cases, reinforcement by NATO. Predictability would strengthen deterrence, but complete automaticity could be dangerous. European governments must retain the ability to account for the scale of the incident, confidence in attribution, and the risk of escalation.

The third challenge is institutional overlap. A new EU security mechanism could strengthen NATO if it improves civilian resilience, law-enforcement coordination, sanctions policy, cybersecurity, and the protection of critical infrastructure—areas in which the European Union has significant regulatory and economic power. It could weaken coherence if it creates a competing political forum, produces conflicting assessments, or allows governments to shift responsibility between Brussels and NATO. The division of labor should therefore be explicit: the EU should organize the civilian, economic, legal, and regulatory response, while NATO remains responsible for collective military deterrence and defense.

The proposed European Security Council raises a related question of representation. A smaller body may make decisions faster than a union of twenty-seven states, particularly if it includes militarily important partners outside the EU. However, permanent membership for the largest states could deepen concerns that European security is being directed by an informal hierarchy. Rotating participation, transparent criteria, and a clear relationship with existing EU institutions would be necessary to preserve legitimacy.

Ultimately, Europe’s problem is not the absence of institutions. It is the absence of an agreed sequence connecting detection, attribution, consultation, and consequence. A counter-hybrid playbook can reduce hesitation and prevent each crisis from beginning with procedural confusion. It cannot, by itself, deter hostile action. Deterrence will depend on intelligence sharing, resilient infrastructure, credible sanctions, defensive cyber capacity, military readiness, and the political willingness to impose costs.

The strongest version of the proposal would therefore complement NATO rather than imitate it. Europe does not need another broad declaration of solidarity. It needs an operational framework that makes ambiguous aggression less advantageous. If the EU can establish common standards of evidence, proportionate response options, and a disciplined division of labor with NATO, the playbook could close one of the most exploitable gaps in European security. If it becomes only another consultative forum, adversaries will continue to treat ambiguity as strategic protection.

Sources

1. European Commission, “State of the Union Address 2026 by Ursula von der Leyen,” September 16, 2026, https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/media/photo/P-070449.

2. Reuters, “EU’s von der Leyen Backs European Security Council and ‘Playbook’ Against Sabotage,” September 16, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/eus-von-der-leyen-backs-european-security-council-playbook-against-sabotage-2026-09-16/.

3. Associated Press, “EU Chief Calls for Security Mechanism to Respond to Drone Incidents and Sabotage,” September 16, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/4ce4fef2ba8e3866e436655075afc6d3.

4. NATO, “The Consultation Process and Article 4,” accessed September 28, 2026, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/the-consultation-process-and-article-4.

5. European Union, “Mutual Defence Clause,” EUR-Lex, accessed September 28, 2026, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legissum:mutual_defence.

Published: September 28, 2026

The renewed discussion of an expanded U.S. military presence in Greenland is often framed as a contest for strategic geography. That is incomplete. Greenland’s importance lies not only in its position between North America and Europe, its access to Arctic sea lanes, or its relevance to missile-warning systems. It also raises a central question in contemporary international relations: can states strengthen security in a rapidly militarizing region without treating sovereignty and local political agency as obstacles to be managed?

Reuters reported this week that the United States plans to re-establish a military presence at Narsarsuaq in southern Greenland and Mestersvig on the east coast under a proposed arrangement involving the United States, Denmark, and Greenland.[1] The strategic logic is apparent. Arctic competition has intensified as Russia reinforces its northern military posture, China expands its regional interests, and climate change makes the High North more accessible. Yet Greenland’s legal framework demonstrates that military access is not merely a question of operational capability. It is also a question of consent, treaty interpretation, and political legitimacy.

The starting point is the 1951 Agreement Concerning the Defense of Greenland between the United States and Denmark, subsequently amended in 2004. The amended arrangement specifically included the Greenland Home Rule Government, an important recognition that security decisions concerning Greenland cannot be understood solely through a bilateral Washington–Copenhagen framework.[2] That structure matters because Greenland is not simply a strategic space controlled from afar. It is a self-governing people within the Kingdom of Denmark, with its own parliament and government exercising authority over a wide range of domestic matters under the 2009 Self-Government Act.[3]

Legal authority and political legitimacy are not identical. Denmark retains responsibility for foreign, defense, and security policy within the Kingdom, but Greenlandic participation is essential if military arrangements are to be durable. An agreement could satisfy formal legal requirements while still generating political resistance if Greenlanders regard it as an externally imposed decision. In the Arctic, where geography makes local infrastructure, environmental conditions, and community acceptance especially consequential, legitimacy is not merely a normative concern. It is a strategic asset.

The history of U.S. defense policy in Greenland supports that conclusion. During the Cold War, Washington and Copenhagen repeatedly had to reconcile strategic necessity with Danish political sensitivities. In 1968, the two governments agreed that the United States would not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or conduct nuclear-armed overflights without Danish consent.[4] The episode revealed an enduring principle: even a close security partnership does not create unlimited freedom of action. Defense agreements require continuing political management, particularly when they implicate territory with a distinct local identity and an unresolved constitutional future.

International law supplies the broader framework for this balance. Article 2 of the UN Charter grounds the international order in sovereign equality and requires states to refrain from threats or uses of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states.[5] These principles do not prohibit consensual defense cooperation. Rather, they distinguish lawful collective-security arrangements from coercive efforts to obtain strategic advantage through pressure. A U.S. presence developed through transparent agreement with Denmark and meaningful engagement with Greenland would reinforce the idea that Arctic security can be strengthened without weakening sovereignty.

This distinction is especially important because Greenland has become a test case for the future of Arctic governance. Great powers increasingly view the Arctic through the lens of military competition, critical minerals, supply routes, and surveillance. But a rules-based approach must resist the temptation to treat territory as a commodity. Greenland’s strategic value does not reduce its people to bystanders, nor does it erase the legal obligations that structure relations among the United States, Denmark, and Greenland.

The practical question, therefore, is not whether the United States should have a role in Arctic security. It already does, and it will remain essential to the defense of North America and NATO’s northern flank. The question is whether that role is exercised through a framework that strengthens allied trust. Transparent terms, consultation with Greenlandic authorities, clear limits on military activities, and respect for local political autonomy would make any new arrangement more credible and more sustainable.

The broader lesson is that Arctic security cannot be built solely through bases, runways, and surveillance systems. It must also rest on law, consent, and institutional legitimacy. The contest over Greenland is not simply about who can establish a larger presence in the Arctic. It is about whether strategic competition can still be governed by principles that protect sovereignty while addressing genuine security concerns.

Endnotes

[1] Reuters, “U.S. to Open Two New Military Bases in Greenland, Sources Say,” September 21, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-open-two-new-military-bases-greenland-sources-say-2026-09-21/.

[2] United States Department of State, Defense: Greenland: Agreement between the United States of America and Denmark Amending and Supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951, as Amended, Concerning the Defense of Greenland, signed August 6, 2004, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/04-806-Denmark-Defense.done_.pdf.

[3] Denmark, Prime Minister’s Office, Act No. 473 of 12 June 2009: Act on Greenland Self-Government, June 12, 2009, https://english.stm.dk/media/4vgewyoh/gl-selvstyrelov-uk.pdf.

[4] United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Note from the Danish Ambassador (Rønne) to Secretary of State Rusk,” May 31, 1968, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, vol. XII, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d22.

[5] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, art. 2, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.

September 22nd, 2026

The United States and the European Union present the world’s most meaningful strategic partnership, united by decades of institutional cooperation, common democratic values, and a joint commitment to the rules-based international order. However, this relationship has seldom been so contested. The EU and the US persist as each other’s closest allies while concurrently experiencing some of their deepest strains since the end of the Cold War. The two crises / events we will be reviewing in this paper define this struggle most sharply: the ongoing war in Ukraine, which saw outstanding transatlantic solidarity under the Biden administration before receding under the Trump administration’s return to power. We will also examine the 2026 US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, which lacked EU endorsement or general support, a move that led to an open and public rupture with Washington. These cases do not simply illustrate tension within the alliance; the help expose a structural metamorphosis in the character of the relationship itself. Shifting from cooperation grounded in shared liberal norms, to one that is progressively being defined by transactional American foreign policy and European attempts to recoup through strategic / military autonomy. This paper argues that the EU-US defense relationship has remained structurally resilient due to a shared institutional foundation and commitment to rules-based order but has grown more questioned as American leadership embraces a unilateral and domestically driven position, forcing the EU to search for larger strategic autonomy. The relationship is most clearly understood not through a single theory, but through the interaction of liberal internationalism, new intergovernmentalism, and postfunctionalism, each illustrating a unique dimension of why the alliance persists and why it strains.

The origin for understanding US-EU defense cooperation is liberal internationalism. In the liberal internationalist tradition states planted in shared institutions and democratic norms are more likely to cooperate than those operating in an ungoverned international environment. NATO as an institution is the clearest expression of this reasoning: it is not exclusively a military alliance, but serves as a political community built around liberal democratic values and on the basis that aggression against one is aggression against all. For many decades, this structure provided the foundation to the transatlantic relationship. The EU and the United States shared a universal world view, which made cooperation the default and miscoordination the exception. This bedrock was essential to understanding why, even during periods of serious tension, the alliance has not collapsed entirely and has been able to regroup and recover. Liberal internationalism, nonetheless, falters at explaining divergence, precisely what the two case studies in this paper will reveal.

Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism (1998) offers a more detailed account. Rather than seeing states as unified actors driven by shared norms, Moravcsik believes that cooperation surges from the consideration of national preferences bargained out among governments. States are incentivized to cooperate when their interests align and resist when they do not. International institutions exist not to override these interests but to lock in agreements once reached. Applying this to the transatlantic relationship, this framework best explains why the EU-US coordination has long been uneven: it does not reflect a natural harmony of values, but a contingent alignment of interests that may shift when domestic politics change. The transitionary period between Biden to Trump is not as abnormal as many would consider. It is what happens when American domestic preferences elect a government less committed to multilateral burden-sharing and is more oriented toward bilateral negotiation and national self-interests, what Trump describes as the America First policy. A recent University of Warsaw study revealed that even Biden’s liberal internationalist ideals concealed significant pragmatic adjustments driven by interest-based logic, further suggesting that the gap between the two administrations is of one degree rather than kind (Jarczewska, Polish Political Science Yearbook 2025). To explain the EU side of the equation, Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter's new intergovernmentalism (2015) is equally indispensable. Even as European integration has deepened, member states have retained firm control over the most politically sensitive areas, particularly foreign and defense policy. As Puetter (2022) demonstrates, the Council of the EU operates through consensus and deliberation among national governments, a process that is slow, politically constrained, and vulnerable to individual member-state vetoes. This architecture explains why the EU's response to both Ukraine and Iran have been fragmented: it is not simply a failure of political will, but a structural feature of how EU foreign policy is made. Rounding out this theoretical framework, Hooghe and Marks's postfunctionalism (2009) captures the domestic political dimension that has increasingly destabilized both sides of the alliance. Integration and, by extension, international cooperation, is no longer shaped only by elite preferences and national interests. It is now contested terrain, shaped by identity politics, public opinion, and the rise of populist movements that challenge the very norms liberal internationalism assumes. This framework does the most analytical work in explaining Trump's posture toward Europe: not a strategic calculation so much as the expression of a domestic political coalition deeply skeptical of multilateral commitments, allied burden-sharing, and the liberal international order itself.

These theoretical lenses find their most recent and direct application in the war in Ukraine, which began with Russia’s full-blown invasion in February 2022 and initially generated one of the most sustained demonstrations of transatlantic solidarity in the post-Cold War era. Under the Biden administration, the United States pledged over $63.5 billion in military aid and relief to Ukraine. Aid that included hundreds of air defense missiles, artillery shells, and surface-to-air systems (Thai News Service 2024). Former President Biden explicitly instructed the Pentagon to continue increasing weapons deliveries, framing support for Ukraine as both strategic and moral incumbent, as it was seen as a defense of the liberal international order against authoritarian aggression. The European Union replicated this commitment on the economic and financial side, with European leaders and Zelensky reporting significant progress in coordinating a broader support plan, including a proposed €90 billion loan package (Von Der Leyen, cited in Thai News Services 2025). Most recently, Zelensky signed a law that integrated Ukrainian energy markets with the EU a stride toward deeper institutional alignment even amid the ongoing war (Thai News Service 2026). Liberal intergovernmentalism helps explain why this cooperation materialized so efficiently under Biden. A time where American and European national preferences intersected, as both saw Russian aggression as threatening to domestic security interests and to the broader rules-based order. As interests converge, institutions like NATO and EU coordination mechanisms could function as intended, locking in commitments and sustaining collective action.

The situation, however, shifted considerably with Trump’s return to the White House, introducing precisely the kind of preference divergence that Moravcsik’s ideals predicted would disrupt cooperation. Even prior to his inauguration, Trump hinted that Ukraine would be receiving drastically less support from the US under his tenure. With media reports indicating that an estimated $3.8 billion congressionally approved aid package left unspent by the Biden administration would be transferred to Trump’s control, rather than being delivered to Kyiv (RBC Ukraine 2025). Biden himself acknowledged the uncertainty of Trump’s decision, expressing hope that bipartisan congressional support would hold even if Trump moved to cut aid (New Voice of Ukraine 2025). On the European side, new intergovernmentalism helps explain the EU’s uneven response. While western member states like France and Germany moved relatively quickly to support Ukraine, the consensus requirements of EU foreign Policy coordination created persistent friction. Hungary, under the leadership of Viktor Orban, continually used its veto power to delay or weaken EU sanctions packages and financial commitments, a perfect demonstration of Puetter’s argument that consensus-based intergovernmentalism limits collective action in times of security crises. Ukraine itself recognized this struggle, with Ambassador Stefanishyna pressing the US congress to designate Russia as a state that sponsors terrorism and strengthen sanctions through the Graham-Bluementhal Act, precisely because multilateral EU procedures alone were insufficient (RBC Ukraine 2025). The Ukraine case, summarized, shows the transatlantic relationship at its most functional and at its most vulnerable. Cooperative when interests and values coincide, fragile when domestic politics push in different directions. It is this fragility that the Iran case study brings into the sharpest possible relief.

At the end of February 2026, The United States and Israel launched a joint military campaign against Iran, alleging the country was in possession of nuclear weapons, which caused regional instability. Major Iranian cities were targeted, Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed, and Iran’s Navy and Air Force were “effectively destroyed” according to Trump (Thai News Service 2026). The military campaign and following actions were launched without warning or consultation to European Allies. This led to a European response of opposition rather than passive acceptance. The EU had already begun shifting its stance towards Iran: in early 2026, EU foreign ministers agreed to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, a significant symbolic course of action. This designation was driven in large part by the IRGC’s brutal clash with civilian protestors and its role in supplying drones to Russia (Thai News Service 2026). Iran retaliated to this by designating the naval and air forces of all EU member states as terrorist organizations, a move that further escalated diplomatic tensions (Thai News Service 2026). Despite these signs of alignment with the United States, the EU has drawn a clear line, stating it will not partake in any military action against Iran. Spain was the first at this and most vocal. Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles announced that US aircraft partaking in operations against Iran, including those based in NATO countries like the United Kingdom and France, would no longer be granted access to Spanish airspace. Another powerful blow to the United States from the Spanish came by restricting all access to jointly operated Rota and Moron de la Frontera naval bases. Prime Minister Sanchez labeled the US-Israeli campaign as illegal, reckless and an unjustified act of war, with Spanish media noting this has been the most monumental public break between a major Western ally and Washington since the 2003 Iraq invasion (MENAFN 2026). Italy followed Spain, with Italian Prime Minister Meloni blocking US requests to use Sigonella air base in Sicily for operations against Iran. Citing a 1950 bilateral treaty which restricts the base to logistical and training use and prohibits its use as a transit hub for weapons during a conflict without parliamentary approval (International Business Times India 2026).

Washington reacted sharply to the actions of Spain and Italy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the lack of allied support as very disappointing and raised the prospect of reassessing the US commitment to NATO, arguing that an alliance in which Europe denies the US basing rights when needed is not a functional agreement (International Business Times India 2026). All while Iran continues to pose a threat regional stability, warning that any naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would trigger a broader regional response, and the IRGC later declared that vessels attempting to transit through the Strait would be seen as violating the ceasefire (Thai News Service 2026). Recent US-Iranian talks in Islamabad failed to reach a settlement, with Washington seemingly believing Iran might attempt to break the blockade to extract further accommodation in negotiation (Thai News Service 2026). This rupture is best explained by the growing influence of domestic political pressures on foreign policy decision-making. The Trump administration’s decision to act erratically without consulting allies, without building a coalition force, and without regard to the institutional norms that govern NATO, or the United Nations reflects exactly the domestic political logic Hooghe and Marks identify. A shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus, in which domestic audiences rather than international partners set the terms for foreign policy, applying postfunctionalism to the current state of the US and EU. A situation where domestic politics shape foreign policy and international interactions. For Trump’s political base, a decisive military strike against Iran’s capabilities is viewed as a win regardless of allied reactions. For European governments, who face scrutiny in their own domestic politics, taking offensive action in the Middle East is received with skepticism. This interference from domestic public opinion meddles with the actions and willingness of EU and US politicians to either support or reject a military campaign against Iran. Therefore, this instability of US-EU relations can also be studied as the effects of public opinion and domestic policy on the effectiveness of a transatlantic coalition, where the public consensus does not necessarily align, and the effects this has on international partnerships. The Council of Foreign Relations (CFR)captured this tension directly through its latest report on American gran strategy, arguing that the United States faces the most dangerous international environment since World War II while noting that Trumpism explicitly rejects the multilateral liberal order as naively constructed (Targeted News Service 2026). The Iran case serves as the clearest empirical demonstration of what that rejection looks like in practice, and it has forced the EU to estimate seriously with the limits of its dependence on American security guarantees.

Both of these case studies have accelerated a pre-existing reorganization in EU strategic thinking, leading to a push that would enable greater strategic autonomy. The logic is straightforward. If the European Union can no longer rely on the United States consistently and American commitments depend principally on who occupies the White House rather than on durable institutional obligations, then Europe must develop the capabilities to act independently. The EU has begun pursuing this through multiple overlapping projects, including the Common Security and Defense Policy, the Permanent Structured Cooperation bedrock through which member states can collaborate in defense technology development, as well as programs such as ReArm Europe, an initiative announced in early 2026, which will deploy €800 billion towards strengthening European Union military capabilities. Ahead of Trump’s return to the presidency, Zelensky and a coalition of European leaders including the leaders of Finland, UK (not an EU member), and Italy, along with NATO Secretary General Rutte, issued a collective statement emphasizing that the US must be a partner in building a future security architecture for Ukraine and the European continent (Thai News Service 2025). Von der Leyen similarly emphasized that any peace settlement requires unyielding security guarantees from day one (Armenpress 2025). This being said we observe how these statements are not those of a coalition content with remaining dependent on American security provisions.

The limitations of strategic autonomy are equally evident, and here new intergovernmentalism and Puetter’s ideals of the Council are most analytically relevant. EU foreign and defense policy remains a matter of intergovernmentalism at its core, it necessitates consensus among member states, is directed by national governments rather than supranational institutions, and functions without a unified / singular military command. This institutional existence has direct consequences for the transatlantic relationship between the EU-US. When EU member states respond divergently to American foreign policy, as they have done during the military campaign against Iran, the EU becomes incapable of providing a coherent unified position. The absence of unity within the alliance weakens its standing as a partner. Germany, exemplifies this, largely aligned with the United States it makes statements on the strategic necessity of dismantling the Iranian regime’s capabilities, while member states like Spain and Italy openly condemned the military intervention as a disregard for international law (Levy 2026). This internal cleavage does not merely reflect disagreement among allies; it strongly destabilizes the broader EU-US relationship by making it unclear who is the voice for Europe and on what terms. As Kassim (2022) describes, the European Commission, despite its increasing political profile, is not the most dominant actor in security affairs. The European Parliament, while bluntly elected and increasingly influential, has limited formal decision-making power over defense policy (Servant and Costa 2022). This extends to the Court of Justice of the European Union, powerful as it is enforcing Eu law, has no real jurisdiction over the kind of strict security decisions that define NATO’s role (Saurugger and Terpan 2022). The result is an institution that is powerful in regulatory and economic domains but structurally tied exactly where the Ukraine and Iran crises demand the most: swift, unified, decisive and militarily credible responses.

The EU-US defense relationship has most certainly not collapsed, but it has evolved in ways that are unlikely to reverse easily or in the near future. What was once grounded in a shared commitment to liberal internationalism and a rules-based order has become increasingly characterized by transactional friction, domestic political divergence, and European efforts to compensate through strategic autonomy that, as the Iran case demonstrated, remains more aspirational than operationally effective. The Ukraine case also showed the relationship at its most cooperative under the Biden administration and its most uncertain under Trump, a dynamic that demonstrated unity and later separation. This exemplified that transatlantic solidarity and union is highly contingent on political alignment rather than guaranteed institutional ties by themselves. The Iran case represented the most acute rupture: an America acting unilaterally without consulting its European partners, and a Europe too internally divided to respond under a single institution. The shared institutional frameworks and democratic values that helped build NATO and sustained this transatlantic partnership have not vanished, but they are under restraints that neither side has shown a clear willingness to relieve. The future of the alliance depends on whether Europe can build a sufficient strategic capacity to act as a credible and unified body, while the United States determines whether multilateral commitments still serve their purpose and interests. Both questions remain largely unanswered, and the Iran case only offered a stern reminder that the gap between European ambition and European capability is one that international adversaries and Washington alike have already started noticing.

Bibliography:

Armenpress. "EU Expresses Readiness to Continue Supporting Ukraine Peace Efforts after Trump-Zelensky Talks." Armenpress News Agency, December 29, 2025.

Bickerton, C., D. Hodson, and U. Puetter. The New Intergovernmentalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration." British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2009): 1–23.

IBT News Desk. "After Spain, Italy's Meloni Blocks US Use of Its Air Base for Iran Operations." International Business Times India, April 1, 2026.

Jarczewska, A. "Transatlantic Relations under the Biden Administration: Balancing between Liberal Internationalism and Pragmatic Realism." Polish Political Science Yearbook 54, no. 4 (2025): 5–17.

Kassim, H. "The European Commission." In The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, edited by E. Jones et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Levy, Ilai Yaron. "A Seat at the Table: Germany's Role in the War Between the US, Israel and Iran." PRIF Blog, March 19, 2026. https://blog.prif.org/2026/03/19/a-seat-at-the-table-germanys-role-in-the-war-between-the-us-israel-and-iran/.

MENAFN. "Spain Blocks Airspace to US Aircraft Involved in War on Iran." MENAFN Business and Finance News, March 31, 2026.

Moravcsik, A. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

New Voice of Ukraine. "Biden Hoping Congress Will Continue Ukraine Aid Despite Trump's Return to White House." January 11, 2025.

Puetter, U. The Council of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

RBC Ukraine. "Final Aid Package for Ukraine from Biden Administration to Total $500 Million." January 8, 2025.

RBC Ukraine. "Ukraine Expects Stronger US Action against Russia, Including Terror Sponsor Designation." December 4, 2025.

Saurugger, S., and F. Terpan. The Court of Justice of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Servent, A. R., and O. Costa. The European Parliament. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Targeted News Service. "CFR Report Proposes an Alternate American Grand Strategy." January 22, 2026.

Thai News Service. "United States/Ukraine: Biden Tasks Pentagon with Enhancing Military Aid to Ukraine." December 30, 2024.

Thai News Service. "Ukraine/European Union: Zelensky, Europeans Highlight Future Security Architecture Ahead of Trump Meeting." August 21, 2025.

Thai News Service. "European Union/Ukraine: EU Leaders, Zelensky Make Progress in Ukraine Talks." December 4, 2025.

Thai News Service. "European Union/Iran: EU Designates Iran's Revolutionary Guards a Terrorist Organisation in Policy Shift." February 3, 2026.

Thai News Service. "Iran/European Union: Iran Designates EU Naval, Air Forces as Terror Organizations." February 25, 2026.

Thai News Service. "United States/Iran: US Destroyed Iran's Navy, Air Force." April 7, 2026.

Thai News Service. "Iran/United States: Iran Warns Against US Naval Blockade." April 16, 2026.

Thai News Service. "United States/Iran: US Believes Iran May Seek to Break Blockade for Additional Concessions." April 20, 2026.

Thai News Service. "Ukraine/European Union: Zelensky Signs Law Integrating Ukraine's Energy Market with EU." April 24, 2026.

April 27th, 2026

Liberation Day, a term coined by President Trump, is the embodiment of an argument he had been making for years; that the U.S. trade deficit was not a derivation of market forces but a national emergency that needed executive intervention. Executive Order #14257 is the United States’ most recent declaration of economic independence after “decades of foreign exploitation”. This executive order reflected a stern tariff of ten percent on imports from most countries, with higher reciprocal rates for what have been historically American major trading partners: with China at 34 percent, the European Union (EU) at 20 percent, Japan at 24 percent, South Korea at 26 percent, and Taiwan at 32 percent, among others (Wilson Sonsini 2025). A week after the announcement of Liberation Day, steeper reciprocal rates were shortly activated before a 90 day pause; the median effective tariff rate on US imports had climbed to 22.5 percent, the highest since 1909 (Council on Foreign Relations 2025a). The policy was the most comprehensive tariff action taken by any American administration since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, a law best remembered for swelling the global contraction of the Great Depression (CSIS 2025). An argument growing in popularity,  and the one this paper advances, is that Liberation Day, instead of renewing American economic strength, exposed the structural confines of US influence in a world that has reconfigured around multiple authorities, while inflicting hefty costs on domestic consumers, international allies, and the rules-based trade order the United States had spent decades assembling.

To comprehend why Liberation Day came up dry as a coercive strategy, one must be clear about the domestic logic / reasoning that brought it about. Trump had long insisted that trade deficits were evidence of foreign exploitation instead of  a product of comparative advantage and consumer choice. This belief, associated closely with White House trade counselor Peter Navarro, held that deficit countries were falling economically and that tariffs were the corrective instrument (CSIS 2025). The policy originally had ample domestic appeal. American manufacturing employment had diminished sharply since the 1990s, and large portions of the working-class electorate in states like Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylvania had associated that decline to trade preassures from China and other low-wage economies. Liberation Day, in this aspect, was as much a political stab as an economic one, executing old grievances into executive action. The administration anticipated it would rake in roughly $600 billion dollars per year in tariff revenue, though independent modeling by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found the more realistic figure closer to $330 billion dollars annually (CSIS 2025). Tariff revenues did rise substantially, a seeming victory for the Trump administration, reaching $97.3 billion dollars by July 1, 2025, more than double the figure from the same period in 2024 (Council on Foreign Relations 2025b). However, what the administration did not project was who would actually pay those revenues.

The expenses of Liberation Day fell mostly on American households, not the foreign exporters Trump intended to target. A recent study by economists at the New York Federal Reserve found that Americans were bearing 94 percent of the tariff burden through August 2025, with foreign exporters engrossing only six percent in the form of lower prices (Council on Foreign Relations 2025a). By the end of 2025, tariff costs filtered through to consumers, and reached 76 percent, with rates as high as 100 percent for many consumer goods. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell voiced in March 2026 that tariffs were adding between half a percent and three quarters of a percent to the national inflation rate, contributing to the Fed's surpassing of its two percent personal consumption target (Council on Foreign Relations 2025a). Food prices rose 1.6 percent following the April announcement alone, almost equal to an entire prior year of grocery inflation (Council on Foreign Relations 2025a). These are not abstract bits of research only macroeconomic figures. Their effects were felt at checkout counters across the nation, and they weakened the domestic political case for this Executive Order over time. The administration told voters that foreign countries would pay; meanwhile, the data showed that American consumers were.

The formula used to calculate the reciprocal tariff rates deepened these problems by drawing sharp criticism from economists across the political spectrum. Rather than matching the actual tariffs set by foreign governments, the administration divided the US goods trade deficit with each country by total US imports from that country, then halved the result (Economics Observatory 2025). This method yielded rates that bore little relationship to actual foreign trade barriers. Cambodia, a small economy with limited tariffs on US goods, received a 49 percent rate because the formula picked up a large bilateral trade gap driven by clothing and footwear exports (Economics Observatory 2025). Lesotho ended up with a 50 percent tariff, a figure driven entirely by its jeans and diamond trade rather than any meaningful barrier to American exports. The same pattern played out with Germany and Japan, open economies that were penalized more heavily than countries that genuinely restrict US goods. That inconsistency told trading partners something important: this was not really about market access. It was about shrinking the deficit, and the distinction shaped how governments chose to respond.

No bilateral relationship was more central to Liberation Day than the one between the United States and China, and no response more clearly showed the limits of American coercive power. After a retaliatory cycle in which both sides escalated repeatedly, US tariffs on Chinese goods ultimately reached 145 percent, while China set 125 percent tariffs on American exports in return. These were rates approaching a functional prohibition on normal trade. U.S. soybean exports to China fell 78 percent through August 2025, and corn exports collapsed by 99 percent, collapsing the American agricultural sector who had spent years building Chinese market access (Council on Foreign Relations 2025a). Rather than forcing Beijing to modify its industrial policies or technology practices, the tariffs handed China a political narrative, one in which American unilateralism served as confirmation of what Chinese leadership had long argued: that the United States viewed economic interdependence as a tool of domination rather than mutual benefit (Backer 2026). That narrative strengthened China's standing among non-aligned states and gave Beijing added justification for the strategic insulation it had been building since the first Trump trade war in 2018. Following that earlier conflict, China had hastened domestic development in semiconductor manufacturing, electric vehicles, and artificial intelligence-powered production, while deepening Belt and Road infrastructure ties to reduce dependence on US-aligned trade routes (India Blooms 2026). Liberation Day did not reverse that trajectory. It quickened it (Council on Foreign Relations 2025b).

Chinese exports in large part also showed substantial resilience in the face of the Trump tariff regime. Goods were being rerouted through third party countries, including Vietnam, Malaysia, and Mexico, reaching American consumers through twisting channels that cut into the practical reach of the tariffs at the point of consumption (McKinsey Global Institute 2026). Beijing at the same time retaliated by targeting the most politically sensitive American export sectors, striking agricultural goods from states that had supported Trump electorally and rare earth processing, where American substitution capabilities are limited and supply chains are not easily restructured. The notion of weaponized interdependence, the strategic use of economic network dependencies as instruments of political pressure, applies heavily to both sides of this rivalry (Soufan Center 2025; Khmer Times 2026). The United States has used sanctions and export controls to restrict China's access to advanced semiconductors on a multitude of ocassions. China has relied on its dominance in rare earth minerals, battery components, and manufacturing capacity to constrain American out-sourcing options. Neither side possesses a monopoly on leverage, and Liberation Day did not change that balance. As one analysis observed, the rivalry between these hegemons brought about not submission but reorganization, with the global system not collapsing but reordering under new conditions (Pressenza 2026a). Perhaps most consequentially for long-term US interests, Liberation Day quickened / heightened China's effort to build alternate financial infrastructure, including expanded use of the renminbi in bilateral trade agreements and new partnerships across the Global South, reducing the future reach of dollar-denominated American economic pressure (Backer 2026).

The European Union showcased a different but equally telling case. The EU is a formal American ally, attached by decades of transatlantic security cooperation and economic partnership. Nonetheless, Liberation Day handled European goods with the same logic employed against adversaries. EU member states faced a starting reciprocal rate of 20 percent, alongside the 25 percent sectoral tariffs previously set on European steel, aluminum, and automobiles (Wilson Sonsini 2025; Herrera Kahn 2026). This was not a smaller adjustment. It was a strightforward blow against the industrial bedrock of the world's largest single market, set without any prior dialogue and drafted in terms that insinuated European trade policy as a form of exploitation. The symbolic break weighed as much as the economic one. For decades, the transatlantic economic relationship had laid on a shared preseumption that allies would not weaponize trade against each other. Liberation Day directly neglected that assumption. A framework agreement was eventually reached in July 2025, bringing the EU rate from 20 percent to 15 percent, but harm to the institutional logic of the alliance had already been done (Council on Foreign Relations 2026).

Rather than bringing about compliance, the tariff pressure on the EU brought about strategic realignment. Trade negotiations with Mercosur, long stalled over environmental and regulatory disagreements, moved toward conclusion. EU engagement with Southeast Asian partners heightened, driven partly by the recognition that the bloc could fill diplomatic and commercial space left by an unpredictable American posture (Thai News Service 2026). The concept of European strategic autonomy, the capacity to act free of both the United States and China in economic and security matters, gained real institutional traction in the months after Liberation Day. European Commission discussions of trade defense instruments, investment screening mechanisms, and industrial subsidies all picked up speed. Canada's response showed the same pattern. After Liberation Day and the ongoing renegotiation of USMCA, Canada resumed exploratory trade talks with China after more than eight years of diplomatic estrangement (CE Noticias Financieras English 2026). That a close American neighbor and treaty partner chose to broaden its economic relationships in direct response to US tariff pressure shows the essential outcome: Liberation Day did not consolidate the American-led trade coalition. It fractured it.

For the Global South, Liberation Day arrived not as a policy debate but as an economic condition. Countries across sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America that had no meaningful role in the US-China rivalry absorbed its consequences regardless. Supply chain disruptions raised the cost of imported inputs. Commodity prices grew more unpredictable. The availability of essential goods, including food, fuel, and medicine, fluctuated in ways tied directly to tariff-driven trade dislocations (Kullane 2026). Geopolitical competition, for these populations, arrives as prices, shortages, and instability rather than as diplomatic communiques or trade framework announcements (Kullane 2026). Brazil, one of the world's largest agricultural exporters, faced a ten percent baseline tariff that added friction to its already complex relationship with American markets. The small nations hit hardest by the formula-based reciprocal rates, such as Cambodia at 49 percent and Lesotho at 50 percent, had virtually no capacity to negotiate bilateral relief and no domestic political voice in Washington capable of pushing back (Economics Observatory 2025).

The example of African nations have made the longer-term strategic consequences of this approach clear. China has built and maintained extensive economic ties across the continent through industries like mining, infrastructure financing, and development partnerships, often on terms more elastic than those offered by Western institutions (Heller 2026). The United States and previous presidential administrations had long sought to counter that through programs like the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which grants 32 Sub-Saharan African countries duty-free admission to the US market across over 1,800 product categories, with US-Africa goods and services trade reaching an estimated 104.9 billion dollars in 2024 (United States Trade Representative 2024). Despite all these efforts, Trump’s Liberation Day eroded the credibility of that partnership. When African governments saw that tariffs were applied without regard to existing relationships or political alignment, the relative advantage of the American partnership became less convincing. Kenya's decision to pursue new trade agreements with China, securing duty-free access for Kenyan exports, shows how African governments are actively using great-power competition to their own benefit rather than simply absorbing its costs (Business Insider Africa 2026). The Global South is not passive in this environment. Many developing states had already built up strategic ambiguity, maintaining economic ties with China while preserving security links with the United States. Liberation Day reinforced that hedging logic by making clear that alignment with Washington carried real and unpredictable economic risks (Backer 2026).

A prominent counterargument holds that Liberation Day was efficient as an instrument of coercive bargaining. Within weeks of the initial announcement, the administration put in place a 90-day pause on the highest reciprocal rates for most countries outside China, and dozens of states quickly entered bilateral trade negotiations with Washington. By the end of July 2025, the United States had reached general agreements with the United Kingdom, Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and the EU (Council on Foreign Relations 2026). The UK negotiation planted the reciprocal rate at ten percent. The deal reached with Japan brought its rate from 24 percent down  to 15 percent. Further talks with the EU dilluted the European rate from 20 percent to 15 percent, representing an almost insignificant shift (Council on Foreign Relations 2026). From this perspective, Liberation Day produced some results: it induced pressure, brought partners and allies to the negotiating table, and secured compromises that a more phased approach might not have achieved. Tariff revenues also rose substantially, and the administration could point to deal announcements as evidence that the scheme was working.

Yet these outcomes do not hold up well under closer examination. None of the framework agreements were legally binding, and most included commitments to continue negotiations on unresolved issues rather than concrete, enforceable changes (Council on Foreign Relations 2026). China did not modify its core industrial policies or technology practices. The trade deficit, the stated rationale for the entire policy, actually grew larger in the months following Liberation Day, reaching 650 billion dollars through May 2025 compared to 475 billion dollars over the same period in 2024, as importers rushed to bring goods in ahead of higher rates (Council on Foreign Relations 2025b). The administration's own legal authority to set the tariffs was ultimately rejected. On May 28, 2025, the US Court of International Trade ruled that Trump had exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The Federal Circuit upheld that ruling, and in February 2026, the Supreme Court affirmed it in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, finding the tariffs unconstitutional. The government estimated it had collected 166 billion dollars in tariffs the Supreme Court had ruled illegal, and US customs began processing refunds. Additionally, although tariff revenues increased, the WTO's declining authority as an arbiter of trade disputes points to a longer pattern of institutional erosion that Liberation Day only deepened. The United States suspended its contributions to the WTO budget in March 2025, and multiple countries filed WTO disputes against the tariffs, though without a functioning Appellate Body, no final rulings could be issued. Hollowing out the institution that once gave American trade policy its multilateral legitimacy yields short-term tactical gains at the cost of long-term institutional influence, a trade-off whose full consequences will take years to become clear.

Liberation Day was pushed ahead as a reiteration of American economic sovereignty over a global system the Trump administration argued had been taken advantage of by foreign competitors for decades. What it exposed instead were the structural limits of US power in a world that has reorganized around numerous centers of economic gravity. China withstood the pressure and persisted on building its strategic insulation. The EU stepped toward autonomy and alternative global partnerships. The Global South concentrated its dilatory strategies, using great-power competition for its own ends. All while the avarage American consumers paid higher prices for groceries, automobiles, and consumer goods, showing that the trade deficit the policy was intended to reduce in reality grew in the short term. The foundation of weaponized interdependence helps explain this outcome. Economic systems can be used as instruments of dominion, but only by states that control special enough nodes within them to oblige others. The United States retains substantial leverage in dollar-denominated finance, semiconductor technology, and consumer market access. But those advantages are not limitless, and they are not undying. As China, the EU, and the Global South build out alternate financial instruments, domestic technology capacity, and diversified trade relationships, the American position within the network becomes less outstanding and therefore less coercive (Soufan Center 2025; Khmer Times 2026).

This is not a simple story of American decline. It is a tale about the incompatability between the instruments / tactics Washington chose and the world in which those instruments were put to use. True structural power requires institutional expression, the ability / power to set rules, build partnerships, and maintain collaborative frameworks that make American goods the default rather than the questioned option. Liberation Day weakened rather than reinforced that capacity. The US Supreme Court's ruling that the tariffs surpassed executive authority added a constitutional breadth to what was already a strategic miscalculation. Whether the United States can reconstruct the cooperative architecture that makes its leverage effective, or whether the current pattern of unilateralism and institutional attrition deepens further, remains largely uncertain.

Bibliography

Araya, Oscar Alvarez. 2026. "Rivalry and Relations between the United States and China." UPI, January 6, 2026.

Backer, Larry Cata. 2026. "CFP: China, the United States, and the Future of the Global South: Competing Visions, Converging Interests." Law at the End of the Day (blog), Newstex Blogs, February 18, 2026.

Business Insider Africa. 2026. "Kenya Secures China Trade and Rail Deals amid Rising US-China Rivalry in Africa." Business Insider Africa, March 28, 2026.

CE Noticias Financieras English. 2026. "After More than Eight Years, Canada Resumes Talks with China amid Tariffs, Diplomatic Conflicts, and the Review of the Trade Agreement with the United States." CE Noticias Financieras English, January 8, 2026.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2025. "Liberation Day Tariffs Explained." CSIS Analysis, April 7, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/liberation-day-tariffs-explained.

Council on Foreign Relations. 2025a. "What Trump Trade Policy Has Achieved Since Liberation Day." July 7, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-trump-trade-policy-has-achieved-liberation-day.

Council on Foreign Relations. 2025b. "A Year After Liberation Day, Experts Review the Costs of Trump's Tariffs." April 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/a-year-after-liberation-day-experts-review-the-costs-of-trumps-tariffs.

Council on Foreign Relations. 2026. "Tracking Trump's Trade Deals." March 17, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/tracking-trumps-trade-deals.

Economics Observatory. 2025. "Liberation Day." April 7, 2025. https://www.economicsobservatory.com/liberation-day.

Fong, Clara. 2026. "The U.S.-China Trade Relationship: What's Behind the Competition?" Council on Foreign Relations, April 16, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship.

Heller, Kim. 2026. "Navigating Sovereignty: Africa's Role in the U.S.-China Rivalry." The African, February 13, 2026. https://theafrican.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/2026-02-13-navigating-sovereignty-africas-role-in-the-us-china-rivalry/.

Herrera Kahn, Mauricio. 2026. "Geopolitics of Global Instability, Part I." Pressenza, April 2026. https://www.pressenza.com/2026/04/geopolitics-of-global-instability-part-i/.

India Blooms. 2026. "Caught in Tech Crossfire? Economic Survey Flags Risks for India as US-China Rivalry Deepens." India Blooms, January 29, 2026.

Khmer Times. 2026. "How Small Powers Respond to Weaponisation of Economic Interdependence in Indo-Pacific." Khmer Times, February 25, 2026.

Kullane, Awale. 2026. "How the Global South Can Navigate Great Power Rivalry." The Standard (Kenya), February 4, 2026.

McKinsey Global Institute. 2026. "Geopolitics and the Geometry of Global Trade: 2026 Update." McKinsey and Company, March 19, 2026. https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/geopolitics-and-the-geometry-of-global-trade-2026-update.

Pressenza International Press Agency. 2026a. "Geopolitics of Global Instability, Part I." April 14, 2026.

Pressenza International Press Agency. 2026b. "Where Power Is Really Decided: Bangladesh, the Philippines, and the New Frontline of U.S.-China Rivalry." April 1, 2026.

Rasool, Israr, Adnan Nawaz, and Ghulam Mustafa. 2026. "Sino-U.S. Rivalry and Its Implications for Southeast Asia: An Analysis." Global Social Sciences Review XI (I): 15–22.

Soufan Center. 2025. "Weaponized Interdependence: Supply Chains Reconfigure Globally." Soufan Center IntelBrief, August 29, 2025. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-august-29/.

South China Morning Post. 2025. "Tariffs, Truces, Trump's Liberation Day: Key Developments in US-China Trade War in 2025." South China Morning Post, December 29, 2025.

Thai News Service. 2026. "European Union: Trust in EU Grows in Southeast Asia, but Challenges Remain." Thai News Service, April 13, 2026.

United States Trade Representative. 2024. "African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)." Office of the United States Trade Representative. https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa.

Wilson Sonsini. 2025. "Understanding the Liberation Day Tariffs." Wilson Sonsini Insights, April 7, 2025. https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/understanding-the-liberation-day-tariffs.html.

World Economic Forum. 2026. "Global Risks Report 2026: Geopolitical and Economic Risks Rise in New Age of Competition." January 14, 2026. https://www.weforum.org/press/2026/01/global-risks-report-2026-geopolitical-and-economic-risks-rise-in-new-age-of-competition/.

 April 22nd, 2026

A plausible answer to this question is that although Iran and Nigeria share important structural similarities—particularly oil dependence, internal divisions, and difficult state-building conditions—their diverging outcomes can be explained primarily by differences in state formation and political institutional design, as well as how each state has managed its internal cleavages over time. While both countries faced the constraints of resource dependence and social fragmentation, Iran developed a more centralized and cohesive state following the 1979 revolution, whereas Nigeria’s federal and competitive political system remained fragmented and vulnerable to patronage, corruption, and regional instability. These differences shaped each country’s ability to enforce authority, manage conflict, and maintain political order, ultimately producing different levels of state strength.

To understand this divergence, it is necessary to begin with the similarities that make comparison meaningful. Both Iran and Nigeria entered the global oil economy through processes deeply shaped by foreign involvement and colonial or quasi-colonial dynamics, which embedded petroleum at the center of their political economies from an early stage. In Iran, oil was discovered in 1908 under the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, at a time when the country was subject to significant British and Russian influence (Kinzer, 2010). This early integration into global energy markets elevated Iran’s strategic importance in the Middle East and tied its economic fortunes to external actors, while also generating nationalist backlash that culminated in the mid-twentieth-century struggle over oil nationalization. In Nigeria, oil was discovered later in 1956 in the Niger Delta under British colonial rule, just prior to independence (Saidu, Aliyu, and Zubair, 2016). As in Iran, multinational corporations dominated extraction, and oil quickly became the backbone of the national economy, transforming Nigeria into Africa’s leading oil exporter and a central player in regional economic and political affairs. In both cases, the rise of oil not only brought significant revenues but also heightened each country’s geopolitical relevance, placing them at the center of regional and global energy networks. These shared historical experiences with oil laid the foundation for similar structural challenges, even as the two states would ultimately diverge in their levels of state strength.

Both Iran and Nigeria are heavily dependent on oil, which has been instrumental in influencing their political economies. In Nigeria, oil accounts for over 80 percent of exports and roughly half of government revenue, making the state highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global markets and reinforcing patterns of rent-seeking and corruption (The Economist, 2024). Iran’s economy has similarly relied on oil revenues, which have enabled redistributive policies and state spending but have also created economic volatility and dependence on external markets (Salehi-Isfahani, 2019). In both cases, oil wealth generated expectations of rapid development but instead contributed to governance difficulties associated with the “resource curse,” including weak institutional accountability, overreliance on state-controlled revenues, and limited economic diversification. Rather than strengthening the state, oil revenues often reduced incentives to build effective bureaucratic institutions or diversify sources of economic growth.

In addition to oil dependence, both countries inherited significant internal cleavages that complexed state-building efforts. Nigeria’s colonial experience under British administration created an artificially consolidated state comprised of numerous ethnic and regional groups, including the Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the west, and Igbo in the east (Sil, March 23rd,/ 17). These divisions were institutionalized through federal arrangements, which were meant to manage diversity but often reinforced regional competition. Iran, although not formally colonized, experienced internal barriers that intensified after the 1979 revolution, particularly between conservative clerical forces and reformist factions within the Islamic Republic (Bakhash, 1998). These ideological divisions have shaped political competition and constrained consensus within the system. In both countries, internal cleavages signaled serious challenges to the development of a unified and effective state.

Despite these similarities, Iran and Nigeria diverged significantly in terms of state strength. The first and most important explanation lies in their different paths of state formation and institutional design. In Nigeria, independence in 1960 was followed by political instability, including military coups, civil war, and repeated disruptions to democratic governance. The federal system adopted at independence was intended to address ethnic diversity, but in practice it often reinforced regional divisions and weakened central authority. Political competition became directly connected to access to state resources, especially oil revenues, which encouraged elites to prioritize short-term gains over long-term institutional development. Even after the transition to civilian rule in 1999, these patterns persisted, as elections remained closely linked to patronage networks and resource distribution (Ashindorbe & Danjibo, 2022).

This institutional fragility has had long-term consequences for Nigeria’s state capability. The government has stumbled upon difficulties in maintaining security in parts of the country, particularly in the northeast where Boko Haram insurgency has caused widespread terror and displacement (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). In the Niger Delta, conflict over oil resources has further demonstrated the state’s limited ability to address local resentments and enforce authority (Cayford, 1996). These challenges are not simply the result of economic conditions but reflect deeper problems of institutional fragmentation and weak central coordination. Nigeria’s political system allows for participation and competition, but it does not produce the level of institutional coherence necessary for strong state authority.

Contrastfully, Iran’s 1979 revolution produced a significantly different trajectory. As opposed to weakening the state, the revolution led to the creation of a new political system that allowed for a centralized authority and restructured institutions around religious leadership. The Islamic Republic established a bi-institutional framework in which elected bodies exist alongside powerful unelected institutions, including the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council (Bakhash, 1998). Despite elections being held, ultimate authority remains concentrated in the hands of the clerical leadership, allowing for more a more uniform enforcement of political decisions. This centralization has enabled the Iranian state to maintain / retain a higher degree of coherence and control, even in the face of internal dissent and external pressure.

The stark contrast between the two cases becomes particularly clear when considering how policy decisions are implemented. In Iran, the hierarchical structure of dominion allows decisions made at the top to be enforced across the political system. In Nigeria, by contrast, competing political interests and decentralized authority often prevent adequate implementation. Policies may be adopted at the national level but are inconsistently applied at regional or local levels. This difference emphasizes how institutional design shapes state strength: centralized systems may limit political openness, but they often provide greater capacity for coordinated action.

A second key explanation for divergence lies in how each country has managed its internal cleavages. In Nigeria, political competition is closely tied to ethnic and regional identity, which has often intensified divisions rather than reducing them. The distribution of oil revenues is a central issue, and political elites frequently mobilize support along ethnic lines to gain access to these resources. This has contributed to recurring tensions and conflict, particularly in oil-producing regions where local communities feel excluded from the benefits of resource extraction (Cayford, 1996). The inability of the state to resolve these grievances effectively reflects its limited capacity and reinforces instability.

These dynamics create a reinforcing cycle. Weak institutions make it difficult to manage internal divisions, and unresolved divisions further weaken the state. This helps explain why Nigeria continues to struggle with state authority despite its formal democratic institutions and economic resources. Political openness alone has not translated into strong governance, and in some cases it has exacerbated fragmentation.

Iran, by contrast, has managed internal divisions through a combination of ideological integration and political control. The Islamic Republic has used religion and revolutionary ideology to create a shared framework for political life, which helps to contain internal conflict. Although tensions between reformists and conservatives persist, these conflicts are largely managed within the institutional structure of the state. Elections, while constrained, provide a controlled mechanism for channeling political competition without threatening regime stability (Boroumand, 2017). This allows the state to absorb internal pressures while maintaining overall cohesion.

The contrast is therefore not simply between democracy and authoritarianism, but between fragmentation and cohesion. Nigeria’s institutions tend to amplify divisions by linking political competition to identity, while Iran’s institutions contain divisions by limiting competition and reinforcing centralized authority. This difference plays a critical part in forming state strength.

It is also equally important to consider unconventional explanations for the divergence between Iran and Nigeria. Geopolitical factors, for example, have played a large part in shaping each country’s trajectory. Iran’s position in the Middle East and its involvement in recent regional conflicts have exposed it to external pressure, including economic sanctions from hegemons. These sanctions have caused a rise on Iran’s inflation, inequality, and general economic hardship (Gharagozlou, 2025). Nigeria, by contrast, operates in a less geopolitically contested environment. Leadership decisions and oil price fluctuations may also have influenced outcomes.

However, these factors do not fully explain the divergence. Instead, they interact with domestic institutions. External pressure may weaken a fragmented state but reinforce cohesion in a centralized system. Similarly, economic shocks may produce instability in weak institutional environments but can be managed more effectively in stronger ones. This reinforces the argument that state formation and the management of internal cleavages are the primary drivers of differences in state strength.

The experience of South Korea provides a useful comparative perspective. Like Iran and Nigeria, South Korea was at the center of many significant challenges in the mid-twentieth century, including poverty, political instability, and external threats. However, it developed a strong and capable state that was able to implement long-term economic strategies, particularly export-led industrialization. A key factor in this success was the creation of a centralized and effective bureaucracy that could coordinate policy and maintain institutional coherence.

The experiences of South Korea highlights the importance of state capacity. Unlike Nigeria, it was able to conquer internal fragmentation and build significant institutions capable of implementing policy effectively. Unlike Iran, it eventually coupled strong state capacity with increasing political openness, allowing for both more stability and adaptability. This combination made it possible for South Korea to integrate into global markets while maintaining control over its development strategy.

For Nigeria, the South Korean case indicates that more powerful / regulatory institutions are essential for translating resources into development and stability. The abandonement of improvements in state capacity, oil wealth is likely to continue reinforcing fragmentation rather than substantiating growth. In the case of Iran, the lesson at hand hosts furthere complexity. While its centralized system has allowed for political “stability”, it has also restricted flexibility and economic innovation. Greater openness could potentially improve long-term outcomes, but such modifications would require significant adjustments to the existing political system.

At the same time, the relevancy of the South Korean model should not be overblown. Major differences in historical context, geopolitical conditions, and institutional legacies limit its applicability, for some cases. Nigeria’s profound ethnic divisions and unique federal structure, as well as Iran’s ideological / religious foundations, present unusual challenges. Nevertheless, the comparison reinforces the importance of state capacity and institutional coherence in shaping development outcomes.

In conclusion, the diverse experiences of Iran and Nigeria demonstrate that similar initial conditions do not neccesarily lead to similar or even outcomes. Both countries are oil-dependent and face significant internal cleavages, nevertheless, they have developed different levels of state strength. This divergence can be explained primarily by differences in state formation and how internal divisions have been managed. Nigeria’s fractured and competitive system has led to openness but weak state capacity, while Iran’s centralized and ideologically obsessive system has produced stronger state control. Ultimately, the comparison exposes that the key to understanding distinct outcomes does not stand in shared structural conditions, but in how states construct institutions and address internal challenges.

Bibliography :

-   “BP And Iran: The Forgotten History.” 2010. CBS News. June 30, 2010. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bp-and-iran-the-forgotten-history/.

-   Saidu, Ahmed S., Saidu B. Aliyu, and Umar A. Zubair. 2016. “Is The Discovery of Oil a Curse or a Blessing to Nigeria?” CBN Digital Commons. 2016. https://dc.cbn.gov.ng/bullion/vol40/iss1/3/.

 April 15th, 2026

The Arctic region, once a remote and largely inaccessible area, has become a focal point of international geopolitical interest due to climate change and the subsequent melting of polar ice. This environmental transformation has unveiled new opportunities for resource extraction and the development of strategic maritime routes, notably the Northern Sea Route. Among the areas attracting significant attention is the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, situated strategically in the Arctic Ocean. Svalbard's unique geopolitical status and abundant natural resources have drawn the interest of major global powers, particularly Russia and China, leading to a complex interplay of international relations and strategic interests.

Svalbard's Geopolitical Significance

Svalbard occupies a unique position in international law and geopolitics. The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 grants Norway sovereignty over the archipelago but allows citizens of signatory countries equal rights to engage in commercial activities, including mining and fishing. This arrangement has facilitated a multinational presence on the islands, with Russia maintaining a continuous presence through settlements like Barentsburg. China, a signatory to the treaty since 1925, has also established a foothold by setting up the Yellow River Research Station in Ny-Ålesund in 2004, marking its first scientific outpost in the Arctic. 

Radio Free Asia

Russia's Strategic Interests

For Russia, the Arctic is a region of paramount strategic importance. The Northern Sea Route, which runs along Russia's Arctic coast, offers a shorter maritime path between Europe and Asia, potentially revolutionizing global shipping. Russia has invested heavily in developing this route, viewing it as a means to enhance its economic and strategic standing. Additionally, the Arctic is rich in untapped natural resources, including oil and gas reserves, which Russia aims to exploit to bolster its energy sector. The presence of Russian settlements in Svalbard, such as Barentsburg, underscores Moscow's intent to maintain and expand its influence in the region. 

CSIS

China's Expanding Role

China's interest in the Arctic has grown markedly over the past two decades. Beijing has declared itself a "near-Arctic state" and has articulated ambitions to integrate the Arctic into its Belt and Road Initiative, referring to this extension as the "Polar Silk Road." China's activities in Svalbard, particularly through scientific research, are part of a broader strategy to establish a presence in the Arctic. While these research endeavors are officially civilian, concerns have been raised about their potential dual-use applications, including military and strategic purposes. 

Newsweek

Norway's Response and NATO's Involvement

Norway, as the sovereign authority over Svalbard, faces the challenge of balancing its obligations under the Svalbard Treaty with national security concerns. The increasing activities of Russia and China have prompted Oslo to enhance its surveillance and defense capabilities in the region. Norway is also working closely with NATO allies to monitor and respond to these developments, recognizing that the Arctic's strategic importance has implications for the entire alliance. The concept of "Arctic exceptionalism," which once kept the region insulated from global geopolitical tensions, is eroding as great-power competition intensifies. 

CSIS

International Relations Theories and Concepts

The situation in Svalbard can be analyzed through various international relations theories and concepts:

• Geopolitics: This refers to the influence of geographic factors on international politics. Svalbard's location makes it a strategic asset for controlling Arctic sea routes and accessing natural resources.

• Realism: This theory posits that states act primarily in their self-interest, seeking power and security. Russia and China's actions in the Arctic can be seen as efforts to enhance their strategic positions and secure resources.

• Sovereignty: Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard is recognized, but the stipulations of the Svalbard Treaty create a complex dynamic where multiple states have vested interests, leading to potential conflicts over jurisdiction and control.

• Security Dilemma: Norway's bolstering of defenses in response to Russian and Chinese activities could lead to an arms race in the region, as other states feel compelled to enhance their own military capabilities.

Current Political Context

The geopolitical dynamics in the Arctic are influenced by broader international developments. The war in Ukraine has strained Russia's relations with Western nations, leading Moscow to seek stronger ties with Beijing. This partnership extends into the Arctic, where both nations find common cause in countering Western influence. Concurrently, the United States and NATO are recalibrating their Arctic strategies to address the challenges posed by this emerging alliance. The potential re-election of U.S. President Donald Trump, who has previously expressed interest in Arctic territories like Greenland, adds another layer of complexity to the region's geopolitical landscape. 

New York Magazine

Conclusion

The evolving situation in Svalbard exemplifies the shifting dynamics of Arctic geopolitics. As environmental changes open new avenues for economic and strategic endeavors, the actions of Russia and China in the region reflect broader trends in international relations, including the pursuit of strategic advantage and resource security. Norway's responses, in coordination with NATO, highlight the challenges smaller states face in safeguarding sovereignty amid great-power competition. The Arctic is transitioning from a zone of low tension to a theater of strategic rivalry, necessitating careful navigation of international laws and norms to prevent conflict and ensure sustainable development.

The confluence of state sovereignty with human rights concepts in the complex field of international law frequently ignites intense discussions and piques the interest of both individuals and officials. This complex tapestry, which is weaved with the strands of interventionism and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), reveals a precarious equilibrium between national sovereignty and the global obligation to preserve human dignity [1]. 

Interventionism poses a moral dilemma since it is defined as when outside forces meddle in a country's internal affairs to rectify abuses of human rights [2]. Supporters promote it as a ray of hope, a way to stop crimes and spare suffering from disadvantaged groups. However, detractors proceed with caution, concerned about the possible infringement of sovereign rights and unexpected outcomes. A clear example of this is the 1999 NATO involvement in Kosovo, in which bombings were carried out in response to ethnic unrest without UN approval [3]. Although no lives were lost, doubts persisted over the legality of circumventing the UN Security Council and the precedent established for unilateral action [4].

Humanitarian intervention is ingrained in interventionism; it is the personification of kindness in the face of conflict [5]. Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a UN-sanctified guiding principle, affirms that it is the responsibility of the international community to stop crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. However, putting R2P into practice is a maze of intricate details. A NATO coalition's 2011 involvement in Libya was supposed to protect citizens from repression by the government, but it turned into a campaign to overthrow the current administration, creating instability throughout the area [6]. This story highlights the necessity for careful consideration in interventionist attempts by encapsulating the complex dance between humanitarian ambitions and geopolitical realities [7].

The intervention has many unintended consequences that permanently alter the field of international relations. Interventions can have long-lasting effects, such as lengthy hostilities, humanitarian disasters, and regional instability, even while they may provide momentary relief from misery. An important reminder is the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq [8]. Notwithstanding the well-meaning attempts to advance democracy, the intervention caused instability, shattering social cohesion, and escalating violations of human rights. The wounds inflicted by conflict provide witness to the complex network of repercussions that results from tipping the scales between interventionism and sovereignty.

A careful hand—a combination of legal knowledge and moral strength—is required to negotiate the complex web of state sovereignty and human rights. The legality of interventionism as a safeguard against injustice is contingent upon compliance with established legal frameworks and multinational collaboration. The knowledge gained from previous initiatives emphasizes the necessity of openness, responsibility, and diplomatic outreach. Maintaining human rights without sacrificing sovereignty is crucial as the world community faces new and changing problems. As a result of this endeavor, international cooperation and communication become rays of hope that point mankind in the direction of a future devoid of injustice and filled with dignity and peace.

The conversation over R2P and interventionism ultimately speaks to the core of our common humanity and goes beyond legalese. It calls us to face moral conundrums, to stand up for justice, and to defend the intrinsic worth of every person, regardless of their location or allegiance. Let us answer the call to action to create a society in which human rights are not only idealistic concepts but actual, practical realities for everyone, as we negotiate the complexity of international law and government.

Further investigation into historical settings, case studies, and academic assessments is necessary to fully comprehend the complexities of interventionism and R2P [9]. We may learn a great deal about the achievements, failures, and moral conundrums that come with prior interventions, such as those in Rwanda, Darfur, and Syria [10][11]. Furthermore, studying the changing international norms and legal frameworks related to interventionism and the responsibility to protect provides a more nuanced understanding of the potential and difficulties associated with advancing human rights while upholding state sovereignty. In addition, having multidisciplinary conversations with professionals in disciplines like sociology, political science, and ethics broadens our horizons and encourages the development of comprehensive strategies for dealing with difficult international problems.

It is also impossible to overestimate the influence that non-state actors—such as grassroots movements, civil society organizations, and humanitarian organizations—have had on the language and actions surrounding interventionism and responsibility to protect [12]. These individuals frequently work as change agents by promoting the defense of human rights and demanding accountability from national and international authorities. Their advocacy campaigns, grassroots projects, and humanitarian endeavors support the promotion of human rights standards and the practical application of R2P.

Let us not waver in our dedication to protecting human dignity, advancing justice, and cultivating peace as we negotiate the complex terrain of international law and governance. By working together, having educated conversations, and exhibiting moral leadership, we may work toward a future in which everyone's rights and liberties are upheld and safeguarded, overcoming boundaries and obstacles. By doing this, we uphold the values of interventionism and R2P as guiding principles that point the way toward a more equitable and compassionate international system rather than as theoretical ideas.

[1] "What Is R2P? - Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect." 2023. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. June 24, 2023. https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/.

[2] Sibii, Razvan. 2014. "Interventionism | International Relations & Global Impact." Encyclopedia Britannica. June 27, 2014. https://www.britannica.com/topic/interventionism.

[3] Nato. n.d. "NATO's Role in Kosovo." NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48818.htm.

[4] Greenwood, Christopher. "International Law and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2000): 926–34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/761769.

[5] Bell, Duncan. 2013. "Humanitarian Intervention | International Law & Human Rights." Encyclopedia Britannica. May 20, 2013. https://www.britannica.com/topic/humanitarian-intervention.

[6] Nato. n.d. "NATO and Libya (Archived)." NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm.

[7] Apavia. 2022. "The EU, NATO and the Libya Crisis: Scaling Ambitions Down?" Atlantic Council. November 18, 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-eu-nato-and-the-libya-crisis-scaling-ambitions-down/.

[8] "Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements Through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund." n.d. https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/60857.htm.

[9] "The Rise and Fall of the Responsibility to Protect." 2023. World101 From the Council on Foreign Relations. April 20, 2023. https://world101.cfr.org/understanding-international-system/building-blocks/rise-and-fall-responsibility-protect.

[10] "The Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention Since Rwanda." n.d. Council of Councils. https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/challenge-humanitarian-intervention-rwanda.

[11] Pradhan, Ramakrushna, and Anantagopal Sing. 2024. "Humanitarian Intervention in Syria: A Critical Analysis." International Studies, March. https://doi.org/10.1177/00208817241228385.

[12] "Human Rights Activism and the Role of NGOs - Manual for Human Rights Education With Young People - www.coe.int." n.d. Manual for Human Rights Education With Young People. https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/human-rights-activism-and-the-role-of-ngos.

April 11th, 2024 

By: Javier Quinones-Casanova 

Over recent years, China's military actions in contested maritime areas have alarmed neighboring countries and international observers. Referred to as "realistic combat-oriented confrontational exercises," these actions carry significant international law ramifications [1]. The purpose of this article is to examine the legal framework for military maneuvers in disputed seas, with a special emphasis on China's actions and their compliance with international standards. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has garnered international attention for its strong actions, particularly in the South China Sea. In a series of military drills known as "realistic combat-oriented confrontational exercises," the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been testing its military prowess in these disputed waterways. These exercises are supposed to be training exercises, but they also function as displays of military and political might.

Based on established international legal rules on the use of force, military operations, and maritime dispute settlement, China's military drills in disputed waters are considered legitimate [2]. In these situations, states act according to fundamental agreements and principles. The main body of international law governing marine operations and disputes is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) [3]. It describes the responsibilities and rights of governments in relation to the use of the ocean. UNCLOS requires governments to respect the rights of other nations and forbids actions that might heighten tensions or endanger peace and security, even if it allows states to conduct military drills inside their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) [4]. Enshrined in international law, the basic concept of freedom of navigation permits military vessels to travel unhindered throughout the world's waters.

States have control over their territorial seas, but they cannot stop other states from exercising their right to legal navigation. Military drills should not interfere with commercial maritime lanes or impede civilian navigation. States are required under the Duty to Avoid Conflict to abstain from acts that might escalate tensions in disputed areas or spark an armed conflict [5]. It is important to use caution when conducting military exercises, especially in disputed seas, to avoid any miscommunication or calculation errors that might lead to hostilities. An example is what occurred on October 2023 when a Chinese J-11 military jet came dangerously close to a United States Air Force B-22 bomber, performing dangerous close proximity maneauvers. Pentagon officials are categorizacing this as reckless, highlighting the potential danger of such a close encounter [6].To avoid misunderstandings, intentions must be communicated clearly and openly. The UNCLOS's emphasis on negotiation and dispute resolution highlights the significance of settling maritime conflicts amicably through processes like arbitration, mediation, or negotiation. States having conflicting maritime rights ought to have earnest discussions to reach settlements that satisfy both parties [7].

Unilateral acts need not jeopardize current discussions or infringe upon the rights of other claimants, nor should they involve military drills. China's military drills may or may not comply with international law based on how well they follow these guidelines. China has faced criticism from neighboring governments and international scrutiny for its exercises, even though it claims they are legitimate and necessary for national security. This criticism comes from recent exercises like Chinese aerial military training which involves daily incursions into Taiwanese airspace, conducting “combat readiness patrols” [8]. Considering that China is a signatory, compliance with the UNCLOS is essential. Although governments are allowed to carry out military operations within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), compliance with the UNCLOS's tenets is essential to protect other coastal states' rights and guarantee freedom of navigation. Freedom of Navigation has been called into question because of China's military actions in disputed waters. A recent incident involving a Chinese Coast Guard vessel which targetted a Phillipine supply boat using water cannons, causing injuries amongst the sailors onboard, this is just one of the actions the Chinese Navy has taken that have lead to dispute [9]

The freedom enjoyed by neighboring countries is threatened by Chinese military actions in disputed areas, targetting commercial freedom and global commerce. China must respect other nations' navigation rights and trade. Intense drills simulate conflict, raising the risk of tensions and potential conflict with neighboring countries. Recent exercises in the region include the live firing of missiles, illegal aerial incursions over neighboring countries and hostility towards commercial vessels in the region [10]. These actions affect countries such as: Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Phillipines, who all share a stake of the South China Sea. To avoid taking any moves that might spark an armed conflict or instability, China must be cautious and restrained. China should give priority to diplomatic efforts and dispute resolution in addition to its military drills [11]. The pursuit of mutually agreeable solutions is hampered by unilateral measures that assert territorial claims without respect for the rights of other claimants. To resolve maritime issues in accordance with international law, communication and discussion with adjacent nations should be given priority.

To sum up, there are significant legal ramifications for China's military drills in disputed areas under international law. These include provisions of the UNCLOS, freedom of navigation, averting conflicts, and resolving disputes. Maintaining regional peace requires adherence to international legal principles and consideration for the rights of other coastal governments. China should help resolve maritime conflicts amicably and reduce the likelihood of military tensions in tdhe area by being open, communicative, and diplomatic.

[1] Staff, Al Jazeera. 2023. “Chinese Navy Holds ‘Confrontational Drills’ in South China Sea.” Al Jazeera, January 16, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/16/chinese-navy-holds-confrontational-drills-in-south-china-sea.

[2] Agence France-Presse. n.d. “China, US Hold Rival Drills in Disputed South China Sea.” Courthouse News Service. https://www.courthousenews.com/china-us-hold-rival-drills-in-disputed-south-china-sea/.

[3] United Nations. n.d. “Oceans and the Law of the Sea | United Nations.” https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/oceans-and-the-law-of-the-sea.

[4] “Chapter 4: Military Activities in an EEZ – Law of the Sea.” n.d. https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-4/.

[5] Fravel, M. Taylor. “Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes.” International Security 32, no. 3 (2007): 44–83. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30130518.

[6] Online, Et. 2023. “US Military Expresses Concerns Over China’s Reckless Aerial Maneuvers Over South China Sea.” The Economic Times, October 27, 2023. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-b-52-bomber-and-chinese-fighter-jet-came-within-10-feet-of-each-other-over-south-china-sea/articleshow/104743729.cms?from=mdr.

[7] Fearon, James D. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903.

[8] “China Trying to ‘normalise’ Military Drills Near Taiwan: Island’s Top Security Official.” 2024. Reuters. March 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-trying-normalise-military-drills-near-taiwan-islands-top-security-official-2024-03-11/.

[9] Gomez, Jim. 2024. “Chinese Coast Guard Blasts Philippine Boat With Water Cannon in Disputed Sea | AP News.” AP News, March 23, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-philippines-thomas-shoal-water-cannons-c9f35182db64c098cd47ecbf10f7966e.

[10] NEWS WIRES. 2024. “China and US Hold Rival Military Drills in Disputed South China Sea.” France 24, January 4, 2024. https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20240104-china-and-us-hold-rival-military-drills-in-disputed-south-china-sea.

[11] Unbound, Guest Blogger for Asia. 2021. “Winning the Public Diplomacy Battle in the South China Sea.” Council on Foreign Relations, July 1, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/blog/winning-public-diplomacy-battle-south-china-sea.

March 27th, 2024 

By: Javier Quinones-Casanova 

John F. Kennedy once wisely stated, "Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us." Today, this quote resonates more than ever. Ongoing geopolitical tensions have become the new norm and possibly a defining aspect of our future. With this backdrop, one question looms large: Could China emerge as the next global military and economic powerhouse? The answer to this question remains uncertain, but in this research paper, we will delve into the historical context of China's rise and its challenge to the United States of America.

What fuels China's ambition? To understand this, we must first explore the Cold War, a prolonged political rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies that persisted after World War II, mainly fought on political, economic, and propaganda fronts and concluded in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union (USSR). With this historical framework in mind, we can explore the origins of the current conflict and how we reached this point.

It all began when Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party assumed control of China, replacing the existing leadership and establishing a Communist nation. The United States recognized the emergence of this new threat, but without provocation, no action was taken. In 1964, the Chinese Communist Party conducted its first atomic bomb test, marking a significant development. In February 1972, President Nixon's visit to Mainland China aimed to address diplomatic issues and negotiate with Mao Zedong regarding Taiwan's sovereignty. Despite these efforts, the China-U.S. relationship remained unchanged until 1989 when the Tiananmen Square Massacre unfolded. This tragic event, where university students in Beijing protested and faced military suppression, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protesters. In response, the U.S. suspended all military sales to China and froze most relations.

Following the Tiananmen Square incident, Taiwan elected its first president in March 1996, despite China's perceived threat to Taiwanese sovereignty. This decision signaled Taiwan's pro-independence stance. Since then, China has sought to expand its territory, challenging U.S. dominance in the Indo-Pacific region and on the global stage.

China's naval modernization, particularly its activities in the South China Sea, is a significant factor in its quest for dominance. Since 1978, China has transformed its military, focusing on high-technology, joint operations, maritime capabilities, and information domains. This transformation has made the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) a formidable force, conducting various exercises in the Indo-Pacific region. Notably, in 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, Africa, marking a major strategic shift.

China's economic expansion is another crucial facet of its global influence. As the world's second-largest economy, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a massive platform for investment and infrastructure development across Asia, Europe, and Africa. The BRI's extensive network of projects, including ports, railways, and highways, spans more than 70 countries, with investments exceeding $3 trillion.

However, China's economic expansion carries both benefits and concerns. It stimulates economic growth in developing countries and creates trade and investment opportunities, but it also raises questions about China's intentions, potential debt traps, and dependency on Chinese investments. Environmental concerns, corruption, and transparency issues in bidding processes have also been raised by some nations.

China's military and economic expansion significantly affect global power dynamics, challenging the United States and its allies. China's increasing military capabilities and assertiveness raise concerns about potential conflicts, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States and its allies responded by bolstering their military presence in the region and strengthening alliances. One example of this response is the U.S.'s substantial investments in Southeast Asian nations, aiming to build alliances and counter Chinese influence.

Conclusively, China's military and economic expansion has profound implications for global power dynamics. As it rises as a global superpower, China challenges the dominance of the United States and its allies. While China's economic expansion has opened doors for trade and investment, it also poses concerns about influence and debt traps. China's military expansion raises concerns about potential conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. The international community must collaborate to address these challenges and promote peaceful coexistence. Potential solutions may be found through organizations like the United Nations, and time will ultimately reveal whether China can achieve dominance, but the odds are not entirely in its favor.

October 19, 2023 

By: Javier Quinones-Casanova 

English?

THE IMPACT THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE IS HAVING IN THE AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY. The war between Russia and Ukraine has already had many negative effects, nonetheless one of the most significant for the international community has been the shortage of wheat. Statistics show that around 30% of the worlds wheat is exported from Russia and Ukraine. The fertile grounds around the Black Sea allow for the wheat industry to be a major in the area. Around two (2) weeks ago Ukraine decided to stop the export of wheat to other countries, most likely in an attempt to feed their own population during these times of war. Due to this decision made by the Ukrainian government the world is expected to experience a shortage of wheat. It’s something that will cause a global crisis but will likely cause wheat prices to rise due to unavailability. What are your thoughts? 

Spanish:

EL IMPACTO QUE ESTÁ TENIENDO LA GUERRA ENTRE RUSIA Y UCRANIA EN LA INDUSTRIA AGRÍCOLA.  La guerra entre Rusia y Ucrania ya ha tenido muchos efectos negativos, sin embargo uno de los más significativos para la comunidad internacional ha sido la escasez de trigo.  Las estadísticas muestran que alrededor del 30% del trigo mundial se exporta desde Rusia y Ucrania.  Los terrenos fértiles alrededor del Mar Negro permiten que la industria del trigo sea importante en el área.  Hace alrededor de dos (2) semanas, Ucrania decidió detener la exportación de trigo a otros países, probablemente en un intento de alimentar a su propia población durante estos tiempos de guerra.  Debido a esta decisión tomada por el gobierno ucraniano, se espera que el mundo experimente una escasez de trigo.  Es algo que provocará una crisis global, pero probablemente hará que los precios del trigo suban debido a la falta de disponibilidad. ¿Cuáles son tus pensamientos?

March 31, 2022

Today we will be talking about Food Shortages in Puerto Rico and the United States. Have you recently been to the Supermarket and noticed the empty shelves or aisles? Well in our case we have noticed it and see that it’s becoming a growing trend across the states. Today we will try to find the Why and How to this problem. Perhaps agree on how we can fix this food shortage and refill all those empty shelves.

Let's define what is a Food Shortage and what are some of the most common causes. Food Shortage: a widespread scarcity of food, caused by several factors including war, inflation, crop failure, population imbalance, or government policies. Now that we possess the definition let’s see what is the most probable cause for the food shortages in the US and Puerto Rico. In our opinion, the reason why we’re currently facing food shortages is government policies and labor shortages.

We have concluded that labor shortages and government policies in the US and Puerto Rico are the main causes for this “famine”. The first and main reason would be food shortages and by this, we don’t mean the unavailability of food or crops but the shortage of truck drivers. While this may sound like a simple reason but it’s a true problem that’s occurring. If there are no truck drivers, there is no other way to transport goods from one part of the country to the other, or from the docks to the cities. Truck Drivers play an essential role in our economy and nation since they are the moving gears in our machine of capitalism. Most definitely I am not complaining about capitalism because it’s been proven to be the most efficient socio-economic system over time but I am suggesting we find another way to ship items or food across our nation that is cheaper and more effective.

These types of advancements do come with a caveat because if we implement autonomous driving trucks or other autonomous modes of transportation the industry would evolve and adopt these technologies. When the industry evolves it would result in the absolute elimination of the “truck driver role“ and create huge rates of unemployment. 

What would you choose? Sticking to the current system or evolution that would cause a large demographic of the US and PR population to become unemployed? 

Send us your thoughts.

Greetings! Today we will be talking to you about the young voters and recent trends occurring in the US political system. I will do my best in explaining the trends in voting and political views for our younger generations and why they tend to vote that way.

If you had some sort of social media during the 2020 US electoral period, you would remember seeing videos, tweets, social media posts, and online articles talking about politics and usually promoting “Biden Harris”. Most of the people or users who posted this type of information were the younger generations and normally liberal college students. During this period I set myself the task of finding out for myself why most of the younger voters planned on becoming a part of the “blue wave”.

After some time asking questions and recollecting my data I concluded that most of these people weren’t voting for Biden because of his policies or political ideals. If not I found out most of these young voters just wanted President Trump out of office. Their case was so extreme they didn’t pay attention to Biden’s proposals or anything, they just cast their “Biden Ballot”. Of course, I don’t blame them completely because I could agree Trump did some incorrect things but I would disagree with the fact they didn’t do any research before their vote was cast. 

Nonetheless, Joe Biden’s campaign was heavily based on equality and on “Building back Better”. These words of building back better would be enough to motivate a regular person to cast their vote in your favor but what else did Biden promise to bring to the table, and why did younger generations appeal to these proposals?

Lets mention some of them:

-Beating COVID-19

-Jobs and Economic Recovery

-Affordable Health Care

-Reward Hard Work

-Support Education and Students

-Support Veterans

-Protect Immigrants

-Tackle Climate Change

-Improve Racial Economic equality

-End Gun violence

-…

After mentioning some of these proposals it sounds like an amazing idea to vote for Biden, the only unknown thing is how exactly is he going to execute and make these proposals a reality? That’s the only part Joe Biden fails to explain. One thing is a plan and another is the action.

Finally, I believe that the reason most of our youth vote for liberal and democratic values is college and media. During the time I’ve spent at college, I’ve seen how most professors tend to push and try to insert liberal values into your mind. I’m not saying this is a negative thing but it’s what I have seen the most. The other important factor is the media that surrounds them. For example, during the 4 years, Trump was president CNN had the highest streams in its history. It is most likely that the spike in their views was due to their political segments in which they critiqued Trump.

I don’t condemn their criticism because we live in a country in which it’s ok to express your beliefs and opinions but I do believe the leftist media had something to do with the outcomes of the 2020 election. That’s the main reason why I try not to listen to any news source belonging specifically to Left or Right. It is to not confuse myself or become biased. I hope the article was of help and allowed you to understand at a further level the decisions of our new generations when it comes to politics and government. Again thanks for your attention and remember that learning never stops.

Recently in the news, a hot topic has been about Abortion. Rather, this isn't necessarily a new heated debate, it's one that has been going on for many years, but has once again come into spotlight. 

Recently, the State of Texas introduced a new law that was signed by Governor Abbott that would prohibit women going through the procedure of an abortion as early as the 6-week mark. A controversial piece in this whole situation is the fact that by the 6-week mark, many women aren't even aware of their pregnancy, and by the time they actually learn they are pregnant, it is legally too late to do something about it, and hence women may face legal consequences if this law is broken. 

This is one of the most controversial laws ever passed since Roe v. Wade, many years ago...

Furthermore, this law has been so controversial, to the point where The US Justice Department recently filed a lawsuit, and sued the state of Texas. 

Now lets see what the typical-Republican viewpoint:

Let’s compare both the conservative side of the spectrum as well as the liberal areas in order to obtain a better perspective and arrive at a conclusion.

Republicans believe that:

-life begins at conception

-the law protects the right for human life

-every human has a different generating composition, therefore no one is genetically the same, so the claim that it’s a part of the woman’s body is false. It’s a different person.

-22 weeks after conception the child’s heart begins to circulate blood 

-10 weeks after conception the child will make bodily movements

-At 6 weeks the child has eyes, eyelids ,nose, mouth, tongue and more, which prove it’s a different person from the mother, she doesn’t have 2 tongues.

-only 13 percent of the US population believes that abortion should be legal in last weeks before birth

-the organization Feminists United claimed that we should protect women even if they are still inside their mothers womb (hinting it’s a different woman inside the womb. 

Nonetheless, personally I try to stay away in personal involvement with such topics, as they prove to be very controversial, and sometimes quite sensitive, depending on the type of audience. It's hard to really get involved, and be an active-voice in these types of topics, without in some ways saying something that isn't going to be conveyed in a offensive way. 

Hello! Today we will be talking a little about the 2nd Amendment Right in the US and if it should be abolished or should be left in effect. The question of the day is: Are guns necessary in civilian hands and if so what’s their purpose?

As always I will start off by defining some key concepts for this article to help you further understand the legal, historical and social aspects behind the Second Amendment in our constitution. So what is the Constitution?  The Constitution of the United States established America's national government and fundamental laws, and guaranteed certain basic rights for its citizens.  It was signed on September 17, 1787, by delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. As we know, during the 1700‘s Colonial America was fighting a Monarchy and to a certain extent “running away” from strict rules and laws. The “Founding Fathers” had the goal to create a nation in which there would be equality and freedom for all. At the time they were making some incredible advances but the only part where they lacked was the freedom for all because they still had slave labor, let’s talk about that in another blog.

The thing is that in 1700’s Americans had to fight for their liberty and combat the “redcoat“ British soldiers. Since the “New Nation” hadn’t been born they did not have a well established military. The US government wanted citizens to possess firearms in case the British attempted an invasion. This history shows us worked for them. During the Revolutionary War Americans were armed and allowed them to create militias to fend off the British invaders. This victory led them to the creation of the second amendment and the right for Americans to “bear arms”.

Today we find ourselves in the twenty first century and we ask ourselves if the right to own arms should be abolished? In my opinion I believe we should keep this amendment since it has worked out for us in the 20th century. An example would be World War two. This war comes to mind because our second amendment right was what kept us from being invaded by the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy. Japanese Admiral Yamamoto is claimed by some to have said, "You cannot invade the mainland United States.There would be a rifle behind every blade of grass." If our 2nd amendment right would have been abolished at the time what would’ve happened to our nation and what would have the world looked like?

Some might say were no longer in WW2, all I have to counter argue that is: “We’re in a New Cold War and we must defend ourselves”.

Apart from the military aspect of the second amendment I’ve seen gun violence in the US erupting. This is not because of gun control laws, in most cases the guns found in the streets and used for crime are unregistere. This means they enter illegally into the US and are obviously sold illegally. Since the case we are facing is due to illegal weapons we should not ban nor abolish the second amendment and punish those who have their weapons in a legal and safe manner.

Thank you for your attention and have a great day! Remember to follow us on social media and leave a like. If you have any questions or would like to further discuss this topic leave us a message.

Sunday October 24,2021

Welcome to another blog about Puerto Rican Politics. If you have reas any other articles from our page you have noticed that we try to be as unbiased as possible, in order to bring you the facts. No matter how hard we try there will always be some sort of bias but let’s talk about Puerto Rico’s independence and if it’s something posible and something that could benefit the island.

As always let’s start off by defining some keywords that will allow us to further understand the topic of this blog and some of the history behind this political situation. What is a colony? A colony is a country or area under the full or partial political control of another country, typically a distant one, and occupied by settlers from that country. In my opinion I wouldn’t call Puerto Rico a colony just by one reason, we are not geographically distant from our “Colonizers”. A colony by definition requires the colonized land to be far away from the colonizers mainland and Puerto Rico does not mean this criteria since we’re at 2678 miles from Continental US. Nonetheless if we eliminate this criteria, Puerto Rico 🇵🇷 would qualify as a Colony. The modern term for colony is territory and as an American territory we share federal laws, same type of government, similar taxes and more. The only aspects we don’t share that come to mind right now are:

-voting on presidential election

-no representation in American Congress

These two aspects determine why many Puerto Ricans are rooting for independence. It’s as if history represas itself, one of the reasons why Americans in the 1700‘s hated the British is because they had no fair representation in the House of Commons. Since Americans did not have a say in the laws and taxes that were put upon them, they decided to fight for their liberty.

The things going on in Puerto Rico are quite similar as you can see. On contrary with the 13 colonies Puerto Rico has a commissioner resident in Washington. This is an elect official that is Puerto Rican, that is given the job of “representing Puerto Rico” to a certain extent. They do not have a vote nor say but can express their opinions and the desires of the Puerto Rican population. If you think about it, this isn’t much of representation therefore we would basically be in the same mindset as the founding fathers and residents of the 13 colonies. This alone would give Puerto Ricans the “reason” to fight for their independence and perhaps achieve it.

In my opinion I am against Puerto Rico’s independence, because of some economic and social factors that would be implemented if we were to become independent. Some of these factors include:

-socialism

-economic imbalance

-shortage of labor

-government corruption

-and more…

If you wish I can further explain why I disagree with Puerto Rico’s independence in the future but let’s stick to the current topic for this blog.

So lets see some information about Puerto Rico’s fight for independence:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_movement_in_Puerto_Rico

I know this is a Wikipedia article but I have read through it and believe it to be an exact timeline of Puerto Rico’s fight for independence. If I were to explain all those aspects and details here, this blog would become too long and monotone.

-Younger Generations and Their Effects

As I have mentioned in previous articles, the young voters have a great impact in a countries politics and the overall outcome of a nation. Puerto Rico has been heavily influenced by independence and liberty and mostly due to protests and other manifestations by college students. Colleges tend to be liberal places in which students are instilled the values of liberty and liberalism which of course isn’t bad. 

In my opinion I believe that what is currently preventing Puerto Rico from obtaining it’s liberty are the older generations. Since they mostly search for stability and the younger generations seek new things. As I mentioned before I hope Puerto Rico can continue being an American Territory and that we can all economically grow as a nation.

Thank you for your attention and have a great day! Remember to like our posts and leave any questions or doubts in the message Ivón of our website.

Sunday October 24, 2021

Illegal Immigration, what is it? What are the laws that make immigration Illegal? Should the US border be secured? These are the questions that Americans are asking themselves, it’s a very controversial topic and very sensitive in the eyes of immigrants and left wing citizens. Lets discuss and see the facts behind illegal immigration and determine if the border should be left open or if the US should have stricter border control.

Illegal immigration refers to the migration of people into a country in violation of the immigration laws of that country, or the continued residence without the legal right to live in that country. Illegal immigration tends to be financially upward, from poorer to richer countries. So what “problem” does the US face when it comes to immigration and from where do most immigrants come? Turns out it’s not an actual problem, since most likely this is rooted in racism. In most occasions immigrants that travel to the North American border come from South America and Central America. Especially in the South of the US also known as the “Sun Belt” where racism and slavery had a huge role on the society. Happens to be the area where most illegal immigrants enter the nation. 

Nonetheless, not everyone who supports legal immigration is racist. This may sound contradictory to what was mentioned in the paragraph above, but the important part is to give both sides of the story and explain the reasons. I believe that not all supporters of legal immigration are racist because they also have their valid point to share. I’ll list some of them done below: 

1. Humanitarian parole: Waive entry restrictions for Central Americans in the backlogged green card lines and with family legally in the United States.

2. Private refugee sponsorship: Allow U.S. residents and organizations to sponsor refugees from abroad as the State Department had planned in 2016.

3. Guest worker expansion: Expand the H-2A and H-2B seasonal worker programs to year‐​round jobs for Central Americans and waive the H-2B cap.

4. Legalization: Legalize illegal immigrants who have no serious criminal convictions and let them reunite with their spouses and children, eliminating the network for future illegal immigration.

5. Processing at ports: Remove the cap on asylum seekers at ports of entry, process 100 percent of their claims there, and release them with an employment authorization document contingent on them appearing in court.

https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/legal-immigration-will-resolve-americas-real-border-problems

6. Better Security inside the US: To prevent further immigration of Drug Cartel memebers and other people who are involved in other illegal activities, we should strengthen our border because these people are a threat to the American population. 

8. Better Benefits for Immigrants: When immigrants enter the nation legally they most likely will qualify for government help and other stipends that will make their transition easier. 

Most definitely there exist more arguments and better explained than those above but these are some of the most commonly used by “Strong Border” supporters As seen before we will also examine the more “liberal” side of the debate and mention some of their reasons why they believe we should have an open border. 

I. The Humanistic Argument: One Race, One World 

II. The Responsibility Argument: Why Punish the Migrant? 

III. The Historical Argument: Borders Are Past Violence Congealed 

IV. The Internationalist Argument: Borders Promote Nationalism and Warfare 

V. The Inequality Argument: Borders Reinforce Inequalities on a Global Scale 

VI. The Race Argument: Borders Keep People of Color Out of White Peoples’ Countries

VII. The Feminization of Poverty Argument: Borders Contribute to the Increasing Poverty of Women 

VIII. The State versus Society Argument: To Defend the Border You Must Expand the Power of the State 

IX. The Economic Power Argument: Open Borders Build International Solidarity 

X. The Workers of the World Argument

Having mentioned arguments from both sides of this debate, I will try to explain my opinion about the matter and I hope you can send me your opinions through the @novanews76. 

Finally, my opinion is that we should have a “Safe Border”, what I mean by this is that we should defend our Border and prohibit the access of people with serious criminal records into the country. This is because we should have in mind the safety of our citizens but at the same time having sympathy for those who are in times of struggle. I do believe in the legal immigration process and I also am of the opinion that some “updates” should be made to the law and whole immigration process in America. We should work towards having a faster immigration process because if a process takes too long to complete, people in a desperate situation will not hesitate to “jump the border”. We should optimize our Border services and be humane with the people who seek asylum. We should treat every human with the respect the deserve but also by applying the law. 

In some cases when people become too sensitive things fall apart and this should not be our case. We must have countrol over our border but in a fair and even way, not deporting everyone just because of race. It’s all about being fair and just. I’m not certain if I explained properly because my views are mainly “Safe Border” but I do believe in equality. Overall it’s about having a safer nation and giving the opportunity of citizenship to those who really need it.

Thursday October 28, 2021

Is housing a human right? How are current home prices affecting the middle and lower class in the US? In this article we will analyze the housing crisis in America and attempt to find a solution to this issue. To kick off lets define some key concepts so we can immerse ourselves fully in this topic. 

What is a Real-Estate Bubble? A real-estate bubble or property bubble is a type of economic bubble that occurs periodically in local or global real-estate markets, and typically follow a land boom. So what is a land boom? A land boom is the rapid increase in the market price of real property such as housing until they reach unsustainable levels and then decline. If we take a look into our current housing situation we can see a land boom and a real-estate bubble “about to burst”. 

Let’s use as an example to housing crisis in the state of California. Statistics show that around 161,000 Californians were homeless in the year of 2017. Most likely this number has seen a drastic increase because of the pandemic and because the state government has taken 0 action to combat this crisis. The estimated current number is 554,000 homeless Americans in the streets of California. Does the government have any effect on the current housing crisis? The simple answer is yes, we can see this because especially in this state the lack of public housing is evident. This seems strange since California has been a historically liberal state. This is the party we see that “Fights for Equality” and social Justice. Nonetheless their governor has done nothing regarding this issue. 

By examining the 2020 Democratic Party Platform we can see the exact standards that should be held for a Democrat candidate apart from their visions for an ideal America. Throughout it’s content we can find the word housing more than 100 times, which by itself means the importance of housing in the Democratic Party in California. They saw verbatim: “Housing in America should be stable, accesible, safe, healthy, energy efficient and above all, affordable”. This statement most certainly should be a goal for all political parties but the reality is that they are not implementing their plan nor or the citizens. 

Recently in California i saw an issue that caught my eye, it was a protest by an affluent community in which they were fighting for equal housing opportunity for every American citizen and every person who lives in California. The city council responded to their protest by recommending the construction of a public housing building in their wealth community in hopes of providing the homeless a cheap option for housing. Turns out the residents in that wealthy neighborhood rejected the proposal for the Public Housing building in their town. These residents in California (who were democrat by the way) showed how selfish one can be regardless of political affiliation. They denied an opportunity for affordable housing just so their property prices wouldn’t see a decrease. From a certain view point I don’t understand their decision but it’s cruel to a certain extent to deny affordable housing just because of your properties value. 

Another issue regarding the state of California is the unavailability of plots of land near urban areas. Like in every other state, most people like to reside near urban areas due to the fact most employments are situated in that área. As we know California is one of the largest states in the nation, nonetheless most citizens prefer to live near LA, San Francisco, San Diego, Santa Bárbara, etc. One other reason to why there is a housing crisis in for example California is due to the lack of Duplexes and apartment complexes. According to statistics, two thirds of homes in California are single family houses. Most homes single family houses can accommodate 4 people which is an extremely low number. I consider that in the plots of land where a single family home can be built the government or other housing companies should be constructing duplexes or small apartment complexes in order to accommodate a larger number of families and citizens and prevent them from ending up in the streets. 

The third factor that causes homelessness is steep costs of homes. According to Zillow the famous online real-estate company, a average Home in California is valued at $717,854. With these prices it would be almost impossible for an average family to afford a home, with the average $50,641. In a future article we will discuss the wages in America and if they are considered fair, nonetheless let’s stick to the topic. 

The solution for the issue is found in the law and is up to California’s Legislative branch. Members from the upper house and lower house can come to an agreement in which they sign an proposal suggesting or prioritizing the construction of duplexes or apartments near the surroundings of urban areas. This can be public housing with the purpose of lowering the cost of housing in the state and attempt to lower the homelessness trend in California. I know this is not an easy task but I’m certain that it is possible, most definitely it will require money and the disposition of the legislature in California but at the end of the day, it’s in order to benefit their citizens. As elect officials, their top priority should be the well being of their states population. Certainly there are many other ways to solve this housing crisis but I believe that government and citizens have the power to fix and find a good solution for their crisis. As Abraham Lincoln once said: “Union is Strength”. 

Friday November 12, 2021

Greetings! Today I brought the topic of Conventional Plastics and if they should be banned immediately. As always my goal is to help you further understand different topics ranging from politics to economics.

As always we are going to start today’s article by defining some key concepts so we can immerse ourselves deeper into this topic without doubts nor misunderstandings. So what is Conventional Plastic? Conventional Plastics are typically organic polymers of high molecular mass, but they often contain other substances. ... They are usually synthetic, most commonly derived from petrochemicals, but many are partially natural. Now let’s define what petrochemicals: Petrochemicals are the chemical products obtained from petroleum by refining. Some chemical compounds made from petroleum are also obtained from other fossil fuels, such as coal or natural gas. 

Now that we have defined these concepts let’s move on to why these conventional plastics are dangerous for our planet Earth. As we have already seen by the definitions above,  petrochemicals and plastics are quite harmful for our environment. The main use for petrochemicals in the world is the creation of plastics and for automotive use. When these petrochemicals are “burned” they slowly damage the Earths Ozone and the oxygen we breath on a daily. About 1.446 billion vehicles roam the Earth. A large percent of these vehicles are actually functional and emit these dangerous gases everyday. By meriting these gases we could say that we‘re shortening the Life of Mother Earth. In my opinion this needs to be changed as soon as possible, because the gases vehicles emit could be the cause for the mass extinction of the human race. I know this sounds dramatic but it’s the real situation we are currently going through.

Some might say that the use of petroleum and other petrochemicals should be banned immediately. Sincerely I couldn’t agree more, after all it’s because of some rich and powerful people who rely on the “gas“ business. If the petrochemical industry becomes obsolete and has no demand they would fall from their economic status and power.

We should not allow these things to stop our innovation and aspirations for a cleaner and safer planet Earth.

Let’s move on to Conventional Plastics and the harm they cause to our environment. As per usual I will start with stats and some basic info about plastic pollution. To kick it off let’s mention that there are 5.25 trillion pieces of plastic wasteestimated to be in our oceans. 269,000 tons float, 4 billion microfibers per km² dwell below the surface. 70% of our debris sinks into the ocean's ecosystem, 15% floats, and 15% lands on our beaches. In terms of plastic, 8.3 million tons are discarded in the sea yearly. 

All this plastic ends up in our oceans or rivers. Sometimes these plastics end up in the side of the road and when wild animals walk by, they might confuse the plastic for food and by eating the plastics they will likely die. We should be more considerate of how we dispose of our garbage in order to prevent the deaths of innocent animals.

By banning the use of conventional we wouldn’t not eliminate the problem instantanously because we’re already too deep in this mess but it will prevent further contamination of our Planet. 

-How can you take action?

Action in this situation starts with innovation, one great example of how you can innovate is creating your own bioplastics or other substitutes for conventional plastics. For example, last year I decided to participate in my schools science fair. With this task I decided to do something innovative and creative, I arrived at the conclusion that creating a new bioplastic would be the way to go. Therefore I decided to create a new material or bioplastic from plantain peels. Since plantain peels are a 100% organic material, their decomposition is rather quick and does not produce a negative effect on our environment. With this bioplastic I created spoons which would allow me to eliminate the use of conventional plastic spoons.

In the future I hope to continue innovating and creating new materials in order to help our planet and I hope this article has inspired you to take a step forward and innovate, in order to create a better world.

As always Thank You for your attention! Remember to like our posts and if you have a comment or question send it to us with the links provided in our website.

Sunday October 24, 2021

Taiwan and its independence. Why hasn’t Taiwan become a completely independent nation, and what is the factor preventing it from its total and absolute freedom? As per usual this article will commence with some basic definitions and other concepts that will allow us to immerse ourselves in this topic.

What is Independence from a political standpoint? Independence is a condition of a person, nation, country, or state in which residents and population, or some portion thereof, exercise self-government, and usually sovereignty, over its territory.

Does Taiwan (Republic of China) have total independence? The simple answer is no and this has been proven by the fact “Mainland China🇨🇳” has been trying to take them back. Formally speaking the Taiwanese government has never had a declaration of Independence nor has their independence been recognized by China.

To the international community, Taiwan is considered independent but China claims “Taiwan is a province of the mainland”. These claims anger Military powers such as the United States, United Kingdom, France and more. After the claims the CCP has made, allied powers from all around the world have decided to patrol and station troops around the South China Sea, in case any conflict were to break out. An example of this would be US Navy super carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and other military vessels touring around in order to “keep an eye” out for the Chinese Military. Apart from this the Australians have decided to purchase nuclear submarines from America in order to protect themselves and their allies.

Before we continue, let’s take a look at the history behind Taiwan, why western nations are willing to protect it and what factors have made us get to the current state of the Taiwanese situation. It all starts in the year 1949 when the Republic of China’s government relocated to Taiwan. They relocated due to the fact they were fighting a civil war with the Chinese Communist Party and had to escape along with their democratic values. Throughout the years the “tug of war” between these two nations has continued. The only difference is that “Big Players” in the defense industry have arrived, which means there is more at steak.

As seen in a previous article, tensions between western nations and China have continued to rise. Recently President Joe Biden (USA) has promised to defend Taiwan in case of any attack or invasion by the CCP. As well as the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has emitted statements in which they mention their full intention of reunification with the island of Taiwan under the “One China Policy”.

For the past couple of years the Chinese Peoples Liberation Air Force and Naval forces, have conducted excursions of the Taiwanese airspace and territorial waters. Most certainly these actions are bold, but are a part of the CCP’s plan to provoke and cause an armed conflict. Since 2007 they have been investing in their military capabilities and expanding their armed forces as a whole.

Currently they count with the worlds largest Navy which seems quite surprising. Although most of their vessels are Frigates and other smaller boats, the numbers are quite impressive. I believe that up to this date, their Navy stands no chance against the United State’s Navy but lets see how the conflict or “Cold War” unfolds. In the next years we will be able to tell for sure if these two “Super Powers” are clashing in war, or if one of them is going to stand down which is unlikely.

Monday October 25, 2021

Hello! I hope you’re all doing well! Today as you can tell by the title of this post, we’re going to be talking about rising tensions between China (Peoples Republic or China) and USA (United States of America).

Overall if you have been paying attention to the news you will notice that tensions between these two nations have been rising. Many have been calling it the start of a new Cold War between the Capitalist western nations and the Chinese Communist Party. Others are calling it the awakening of a sleeping giant meaning China. What truly could be the effects of a “New Cold War” and why are tensions rising? This is exactly what we will try to explain and analyze it from a Foreign Policy and National Security standpoint. 

Before we go into the analysis, what was the Cold War? The Cold War was an ongoing political rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies that developed after World War II. ... It was waged mainly on political, economic, and propaganda fronts and lasted until 1991. This “Cold War“ ended right after the fall of the Soviet Union (USSR). Now that we have this term defined let’s get to know why this conflict could happen and how did we get here?

It all starts when Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party took control of China. They took down the previous leadership and technically replaced everything. Here the US notices a small threat since a Communist Nation had just been born. Although the CCP is already on Americas radar they can’t do anything because they haven’t been provoked. In 1964 the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) holds their first atomic bomb test. Later in February 1972 Nixon visits Mainland China with the purpose of discussing diplomatic issues and try to come to an agreement with Mao Zedong regarding Taiwan and it’s sovereignty. After an “unsuccessful“ trip by POTUS Nixon nothing changes much until 1989. In June of 1989 the Tiananmen Square Massacre occurs, this was an event where university students Beijing were out protesting and the CCP send the military in order to clear the crowds. What ends up happening is the murder of hundreds of protesters. In response to these intolerable acts the US suspends all military sales to China and freezes most relations. 

After the events of Tiananmen Square, in March of 1996 Taiwan obtains its first elected president. Lee Teng-Hui from the Nationslist party win, despite China posing as a threat to the Taiwanese people, they elected a pro independence candidate. The threats China was making at the time were related to missle tests and other military actions.

I’m 2007 China makes it clear to the World that their intention is to become a global power and we’ve seen they have achieved that goal. To a certain extent China could be considered a Global Power and a potential threat for American domination. Now that we have studied what have been some of the causes for the upswing tensions between these two nations, we’d like to know what you think? Send us a DM talking about your opinions and if you believe China will become the next sole super power.

The most recent events have occurred in the South China Sea by China claiming ownership and the Taiwan dispute regarding the islands independence. We’ve seen China has achieved the worlds largest Navy and has a strong Cyberspace capability. If tensions are rising we believe that US and their closest Allies see China as a real possible threat to National Security and to our Freedom. Why are else are they seen as a threat and should we prepare for a large scale conflict with them?  This we will discuss in our next blog. Thank you for your attention, remember to like our posts and keep on learning. Have a great day!

-Jay

-Mike

Author: Daryl Hopkins (Instagram: @daryl_the_baryl_ttspecialist)

After the most recent NATO summit in Brussels, President Biden announced that Nato was in the works of dispatching Anti-ship Missiles to Ukraine. However, President Biden did not mention what system would be sent by name. We could speculate that NATO would most likely provide Ukraine with the Naval Strike Missile. An anti-ship missile produced by the Norwegian defense company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace is used by the Norwegian, Polish, and American navies. Since a fatal strike wiped out the Ukrainian Navy in the opening hours of the war and their air force lacks both aircraft and suitable airbases. The Ukrainian Army would most likely field the NSM in the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) configuration, which is the exact configuration of the system the U.S Marine Corps has been trialing. That allows the missile to be mounted on the back of a truck for mobility. 

Suppose NATO does indeed provide Ukraine with the NSM. It would be a huge game-changer in the war. The NSM has an effective range of at least 100km, proven by its most recent test conducted on August 15, 2021, off the coast of Hawaii. In which the Marines Corps sunk a decommissioned frigate. The NSM carries a 125kg warhead and travels at high subsonic speed. As of now, there are hundreds of Russian warships off the coast of Ukraine, well within the range of the NSM. Many of which are launching cruise missiles to strike land targets in Ukraine and provide coastal bombardment for Russian Marines conducting amphibious invasions. With proper implementation of the NSM, Ukraine will challenge Russia for naval supremacy. The Russian navy will no longer enjoy operating off the coast of Ukraine with the NSM guarding its shores. The Russians would likely have to withdraw their scantily armored and armed amphibious warfare ships. Or risk losing hundreds to thousands of Russian Marines and equipment sinking to the bottom of the Black Sea due to NSM strikes.

With the Russian advance into Eastern Ukraine already being halted by greater than expected resistance. The NSM will also provide the Ukrainian military with a well-needed and deserved morale boost created by the sight of burning Russian ships off the Ukrainian coast. The NSM will also thwart Russian strategic aims of capturing coastal cities like Odessa through amphibious invasions. By making the waters too dangerous for amphibious ships to deploy Marine landing elements effectively and would cut those off who were able to land from resupply from naval assets. To NATO, they see providing Ukraine with a powerful weapon such as the NSM as a fair compromise for not providing fighter jets. The NSM may even open the door to more aerial denial weapons systems to be shipped to Ukraine like the THAAD and Patriot missile defense systems.

April 1st, 2022