Book
Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation. In production at Lexington Press. Projected publication date, January 2022.
This book puts forward a comprehensive interpretation of the relationship of Hume’s scientific project to his skepticism. It argues that Hume is a radical epistemic skeptic who has purely practical reasons for retaining the beliefs that are essential for ordinary life and scientific research. The key to Hume’s epistemology is his conception of philosophy as a normative method of inquiry governing the special sciences. Philosophy approves of the mental faculties that produce reasoning and sensory beliefs. But sensory beliefs and the products of reason themselves face insuperable rational defeater arguments, and because they do, philosophy demands that we suspend these beliefs. Hume’s solution to this skeptical dilemma is to point out the fatal practical consequences of suspending these core beliefs. He advises us not to submit to the demands of philosophy in cases where doing so is neither agreeable nor useful to ourselves or others. Hume’s moderate approach to philosophy recognizes that since our faculties are not created by a beneficent God, the epistemic demands of philosophy and the practical demands of life sometimes diverge.
"Hume on the Defeasible Justification of the Vulgar Belief in Body," History of Philosophy Quarterly, 36(4), October 2019: 359-375.
“Temporal Creation and Cosmological Arguments in Early Modern Calvinism,” Reformation and Renaissance Review, 21(1), 2019: 47-63.
“Hume’s Purely Practical Response to Philosophical Skepticism,” Hume Studies, 43(2), 2017: 3-28.
“Hume and the Implanted Knowledge of God,” Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 13(1), 2015: 17-35.
“Hume’s Rejection of Philosophical Enthusiasm”
“Why Hume Believes in the Duration and Self-Identity of Changeless Objects"
Review of Hsueh M. Qu, Hume’s Epistemological Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), in Journal of Scottish Philosophy, forthcoming.
Review of Scott Yenor, David Hume’s Humanity: The Philosophy of Common Life and Its Limits (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2016), in Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 17(1), 2019: 86-93.
Review of Aaron Garrett, ed., The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2017), in Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 14(2), 2016: 213-218.
Review of Jacqueline A. Taylor, Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and Society in Hume’s Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), in Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 14(2), 2016: 183-187.
“Hume’s Rejection of Philosophical Enthusiasm,” South Carolina Society for Philosophy, April 2021
“Why Hume Believes in the Duration and Self-Identity of Changeless Objects,” 46th Annual Hume Society Conference, University of Nevada-Reno, July 2019.
“Why Hume Believes in the Duration and Self-Identity of Changeless Objects,” South Carolina Society for Philosophy, University of South Carolina, March 2019.
“Hume’s Purely Practical Response to Philosophical Skepticism,” Symposium Session, Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, New York City, January 2019.
“The Vulgar Belief in Body is Defeasibly Justified,” 45th Annual Hume Society Conference, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, July 2018.
“Kin and Country: A Critique of a White Nationalism,” Joint Meeting, South Carolina Society for Philosophy and North Carolina Philosophical Society, March 2018
“Hume’s Merely Practical Response to Epistemic Skepticism,” 44th Annual Hume Society Conference, Brown University, July 2017.
“Hume’s Merely Practical Response to Epistemic Skepticism,” South Carolina Society for Philosophy, Coastal Carolina University, February 2017.
Invited commentator on Taro Okamura’s “Hume on Distinctions of Reason: A Resemblance-First Interpretation,” Hume Society Annual Conference, University of Sydney, Australia, July 2016.
“Reconsidering Friedman’s Neo-Kantian Reading of the Early Carnap,” HOPOS 2016, Annual Conference of the International Society for the History of the Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, June 2016
“Seventeenth-Century Scotland and the Faith Hume Lost,” Scottish Philosophy Before the Enlightenment Conference, Center for the Study of Scottish Philosophy, Princeton Theological Seminary, March 2016.
“Belief about doxastic duty as a precondition for doxastic responsibility,” Joint Meeting, South Carolina Society for Philosophy and North Carolina Philosophical Society, Appalachian State University, February 2016.
“Cleanthes, the Clergy, and Hume’s Polemic against Religiously-Motivated Morality,” Religion and Morality: Hume and his Context International Conference, University of Antwerp, May 2015.
“Against All Enthusiasms: Humean Skepticism and the Ideal of Moderation,” Common Sense and Enlightenment Conference, Center for the Study of Scottish Philosophy, Princeton Theological Seminary, March 2015.
“Hume’s Rhetorical Rationale for Sometimes Talking like an Inductive Skeptic,” Annual Conference of the South Carolina Society for Philosophy, Wofford College, March 2015.
“Hume’s Rhetorical Rationale for Sometimes Talking like an Inductive Skeptic,” Annual Conference of the North Carolina Philosophy Society, North Carolina State University, February 2015.
“Reid’s Response to Hume’s Theory of Natural Belief,” Scottish Common Sense Philosophy Conference, British Society for the History of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, May 2014.
“Hume and the Implanted Knowledge of God,” Religion in the Scottish Enlightenment Conference, Center for the Study of Scottish Philosophy, Princeton Theological Seminary, March 2014.
“Hume’s Broad Foundationalism and his Skeptical Dilemma,” Annual Conference of the North Carolina Philosophy Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, February 2014.
“What’s Wrong with Prejudice? Hume on the Principle of Uniformity and Normative Causal Reasoning,” Annual Conference of the South Carolina Society for Philosophy, Furman University, February 2014.
“Friedman Qualified: Why Carnap’s Aufbau was never intended to be neo-Kantian,” Joint Meeting, South Carolina Society for Philosophy and North Carolina Philosophical Society, Queens University, 2010.