I work at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy. My current research program focuses on developing a systematic framework for identifying and analyzing the mechanisms by which epistemic and moral wrongs are perpetuated, avoided, and addressed—particularly how performative responses, representational failures, and ideologies (in the pejorative sense) shape our social and political relationships. This systematic framework is essential for understanding why well-intentioned reforms often fail and what genuine solutions require.
Building on this systematic framework, my future research develops positive alternatives for epistemic and moral repair and identifies methods for appropriately engaging in decolonization that can withstand the very mechanisms my earlier work identified. Below you'll find some recent papers and projects of mine.
"The Flawed Ideology and Hostility of Cancel Culture Accusations" Asian Journal of Philosophy [2025]
This paper puts forth two claims. First, cancel culture accusations of censorship are components of a practice that embodies a flawed ideology. Second, as components of a practice that embodies a flawed ideology, these accusations contribute to cultivating a hostile epistemic environment. I spell out the first claim with the help of Jason Stanley’s research on flawed ideology. I highlight how a characterization of cancellation that the conservative, right-leaning demographic find problematic in terms of amounting to a form of censorship, preserves desirable outcomes for the privileged group. Drawing on the work of C. Thi Nguyen on hostile epistemology, I spell out the second claim by showing how these accusations exploit our epistemic trust mechanism such that they undermine the uptake of epistemic goods. If the flawed ideology constrains the intelligibility of our actions, then the concept of cancellation becomes problematic. I close by offering a suggestive approach inspired by work in non-ideal epistemology to counteract the flawed ideology.
"Performative Blame Avoidance" [under review]
Sometimes, we avoid or minimize criticism for our failings by merely performing a symbolic act aimed at addressing (or speaking to) a real or perceived blame allegation. Consider individuals or institutions performing land acknowledgements as a means of box-ticking inclusion without committing to any significant change. Or consider corporations forming advisory committees that lack authoritative power on issues they advise on. Call this performative blame avoidance. After introducing and characterizing this distinctive form of blame avoidance, I argue for its relevance to the ethics of reparations. In particular, I argue that performatively avoiding blame can be a way of falling short in engaging in genuine reparative work. I end by arguing that our theory of performative blame avoidance can usefully shed light on more complex cases in which it subtly operates as well as articulate the relations between how performatively avoiding blame can be a means to achieve settler moves to innocence and perpetuate epistemic exclusion.
"Speaking for Others and Representational Impairment" [under review]
Sometimes, groups of people can collectively perform speech acts through representatives. Most obvious cases of this occur within formalized situations such as when elected congressional representatives speak on behalf of their constituents or when Indigenous Chiefs speak on behalf of their communities. But sometimes, those represented are silenced by being denied the possibility of that form of representation. This can happen for any number of reasons ranging from the represented being disenfranchised to the putative representative being corrupt. I call the mechanism underlying this form of silencing, “representational impairment.” After illuminating aspects of representational impairment, I introduce and argue for a novel theory that can account for this underappreciated form of silencing.
"Do Oppressors Have an Epistemic Advantage?" [under review]
Do oppressors possess an epistemic advantage concerning the workings of oppression? I examine three arguments that answer this question affirmatively. The first contends oppressors incur an epistemic advantage because they do not confront epistemic obstacles that the oppressed face when putting forth knowledge claims. The second argues that oppressors, bombarded with counterevidence to the workings of oppression, are better positioned to identify and reform oppressive ideology. The third claims that oppressors are privileged in affording and receiving recognition in ways that the oppressed are not. All three arguments, I contend, fail. Each argument conflates social power with epistemic privilege while overlooking how oppressors’ perspective generates systematic oversight rather than insight. My analysis advances scholarship by bringing analytic ideology critique and recognition theory into conversation with epistemic advantage literature. I conclude with two implications: the need for pluralism in ideology critique, and requirements that epistemic advantage theories align with epistemic decolonisation.
"Making Oneself Known and the Ethics of Epistemic Reparations" [under review]
Jennifer Lackey has argued that victims of gross violations and injustices are owed epistemic reparations and have the right to be known. This is roughly the right for these victims to have their stories heard and to be givers of knowledge. Recent work in the field has focused on ways we fail to listen to the stories of victims. Less attention has been paid to the ways in which oppressive systems, like colonialism, distort victims’ self-understandings and the narratives they convey. I argue that if perpetrators and their beneficiaries aim to appropriately engage in epistemic reparations, then victims must first have the conditions to know themselves on their own terms. Drawing on critiques of the colonial politics of recognition, I show why this self-knowledge must precede being known by others. This requires victims to determine—individually and collectively—what self-knowledge amounts to, and to turn away from delegated forms of recognition that reinforce the oppressor’s gaze. Only by establishing this epistemic foundation can genuine reparative work begin, rather than reproducing the very epistemic violence such reparations are meant to repair.
"The Politics of Blame-Seeking and Our Epistemic Relations." Epistemology and the Interpersonal, Special Issue in International Journal of Philosophical Studies [peer-reviewed]
In an ever-growing politically polarized society, we are witnessing an emergence of a new blame game: the politics of blame-seeking. Consider Boris Johnson's statement that Muslim women who wear burkas look like letter boxes. Or consider Bezalel Smotrich's denial of a Palestinian nation. While provoking the left-leaning sections of society, these strategic antagonisms please right-leaning sections of society. In contexts of political polarization, how does epistemic blame-seeking function to maintain, strengthen, or impair our epistemic interpersonal relations? I argue that epistemic blame-seeking can corrupt and weaponize legitimate epistemic blame practices. When agents strategically seek epistemic blame to demonstrate allegiances rather than address genuine epistemic failings, they corrupt our epistemic accountability practices and undermine the trust necessary for maintaining and fostering good epistemic relations. This corruption occurs through the transformation of the very intentions, attitudes, and expectations that shape our epistemic relations – shifting from focus the cultivation and utilization of our epistemic agency to one of social positioning, thereby eroding the interpersonal foundations that make genuine epistemic accountability possible.
"AI, Epistemic Relations, and Testimonial Outsourcing" co-authored with Matthew Watts. Artificial Intelligence in Research and Education, Special Issue in AI & Society, Oxford Intersections (OUP) [peer-reviewed]
Generative AI "companions" are increasingly integrated into higher education as always-available interlocutors that offer feedback, explanation, and encouragement. This paper examines how such systems reshape the epistemic relations through which students speak, are heard, and come to count as knowers. We argue that companion-style AIs can impair our epistemic relations in systematic ways. Students may become less able, and less willing, to testify on their own in genuinely reciprocal spaces (such as class discussions, office hours, and peer groups), habitually relying on their AI companions instead. We call this phenomenon testimonial outsourcing: a structural tendency to outsource one's testimonial activity, which functions as a kind of self-imposed, technologically mediated analogue of gaslighting. Students come to treat the AI's outputs as more reliable than their own judgment, memory, and expressive capacities, thereby eroding their epistemic and cognitive self-trust. From this, we draw implications for AI design and educational policy, arguing for constraints that preserve "non-mediated" spaces of speech, require explicit AI transparency, and build frictions that redirect students back toward our interpersonal relations.
"Decolonizing the Curriculum: Centering Epistemic Relationships.” co-authored with Cameron Boult
Argues for the centrality and significance of epistemic relationships in calls to decolonize the curriculum in higher education.
"Complicity in Ignorance"
Argues that agents can be complicit (and blameworthy for such complicity) in active ignorance when they causally contribute to the systematic conditions of not knowing or misknowing that function to perpetuate oppression or by adopting attitudes that reinforce those conditions.
"The Politics and Epistemology of Narratives"
Argues for the significance of narrative to the ethics and politics of knowledge.