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NExT-Game@ICML26
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  • Call for Papers
  • Program
  • Speakers
  • Accepted Papers
  • ACs & Reviewers
  • FAQ
NExT-Game@ICML26
  • Home
  • Organizers
  • Call for Papers
  • Program
  • Speakers
  • Accepted Papers
  • ACs & Reviewers
  • FAQ
  • More
    • Home
    • Organizers
    • Call for Papers
    • Program
    • Speakers
    • Accepted Papers
    • ACs & Reviewers
    • FAQ

Accepted Papers 

Also available on OpenReview: https://openreview.net/group?id=ICML.cc/2026/Workshop/NExT-Game#tab-accept 


Best Paper Award:

  • When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games -- Jerick Shi, Terry Jingchen Zhang, Bernhard Schölkopf, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin

Spotlights:

  • Failure Modes in AI Retraining Dynamics -- Kiarash Banihashem, Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins

  • Strategic Testing in Games -- Angelos Korakitis, Christos Tzamos

  • Towards Learning Representations of Policies in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games -- Kevin A. Wang, Kevin Yang, Arjun Prakash, Amy Greenwald

  • The Price of Over-Delegation: Stackelberg Liability Design for Agentic AI Handoffs -- Tomoya Hoshino

Posters:

  • Bellman-Local Lyapunov Barriers for Exact Stationary Nash Learning in Discounted Perfect-Information Stochastic Games -- Manoj Saravanan

  • AlphaZero in Sparsely Rewarded Games: Limits and Auxiliary Supervision -- Brent Kong, Tejas Ram, Tony Yue YU

  • Beyond Scalar Rewards: Dense Feedback for LLM Policy Synthesis in Sequential Social Dilemmas -- Victor Gallego

  • Learning Bidding Strategies for Karma Economies in Realistic Traffic Settings with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning -- Anastasia Psarou, Kevin Riehl, Matej Jusup, Anastasios Kouvelas, Michail A. Makridis, Rafal Kucharski

  • No-Regret Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games with Unknown Follower Types -- Matteo Bollini, Francesco Bacchiocchi, Samuel Coutts, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi

  • Superhuman AI for Generals.io Using Self-Play Reinforcement Learning -- Matej Straka, Martin Schmid

  • The Symmetry Trap: Parametric Equilibria and the Welfare Cost of Architectural Monoculture -- Siddharth Karuturi, Kaustubh S. Bukkapatnam, Soham Batra, Mithil Shah, Tanush Ajay Shastry, Akshath Sharma, Laksh Patel, Aarav Lala, Andrew Bae

  • Zero Shot Coordination for Sparse Reward Tasks with Diverse Reward Shapings -- Keenan Powell, Peihong Yu, Pratap Tokekar

  • A Minimal Decision Capacity Threshold Prevents Catastrophic Exploitation in Self-Play RL -- Arahan Kujur

  • Neural Algorithmic Reasoning for Nash Equilibrium -- Mateusz Kuba Korytkowski, Dobrik Georgiev Georgiev, Davide Buffelli, Pietro Lio

  • From Risk Scoring to Risk Allocation: A Density-Driven Framework for Diverse Monitoring in Multi-Agent Systems -- Zhaohui Geoffrey Wang

  • Bridging Game Theory and Transformer Routing: Mean Field Equilibria for Mixture of Experts -- Nevroz Sen

  • Parametric Open Source Games -- Aleksandar Todorov, Jesse ten Napel, Alexander Müller

  • PoolBench:Benchmarking Large Language Models on Continuous Physical Action Selection in Eight-Ball Pool -- Prapti Patra, Dhruv Kumar

  • The Clone Game: Strategic Ecology for Monoculture-Resistant AI Agents -- Muhammet Anil Yagiz

  • Do Prompted Strategic Personas Influence Decision Making in Large Language Models? A Chess-Based Experimental Study -- AADIT SHAH, Yash Sinha

  • Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning of Karma Bidding Strategies -- Kevin Riehl, Anastasia Psarou, Robert Müller, Fan Wu, Patrick Langer, Robert Jakob, Gabor Hollbeck, Anastasios Kouvelas, Rafal Kucharski, Michail A. Makridis

  • In-Context Credit Assignment via the Core -- Keegan Harris, Siddharth Prasad, Asher Trockman

  • Learning to Mediate Equilibrium Selection in LLM Games -- Miao Liu, Matthew Riemer, Maria Chang, Murray Campbell, Djallel Bouneffouf

  • The computational complexity of computing refunds -- Stelios Drakontaeidis, Christos Tzamos

  • EMAgnet: Parameter-Space EMA Regularization for Policy Gradient Self-Play in Large Games -- Tristan Maidment, JB Lanier, Chase McDonald, Nathan Tsang, Eugene Vinitsky, Roy Fox, Albert Wang, Wesley N. Kerr

  • Power and Limitations of Aggregation in Compound AI Systems -- Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Meena Jagadeesan

  • Opponent Modeling and Value of Information in Deep Reinforcement Learning for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma -- Oleksii Ignatenko, Nazarii Tkach

  • Beyond Task Success: Evaluating Cooperation in LLM-Based Multi Agent Systems -- Ashish Raj Shekhar, Saniya Mulla, Upasana Biswas, Priyanuj Bordoloi, Vivek Gupta

  • Seeing Through Distractions: Stable Attribution via the Core -- Sai Ganesh Nagarajan, Toshinori Yamauchi, Hiroshi Kera

  • Nash Bargaining for Gate-Free Mixture-of-Experts -- Abien Fred Agarap, Inigo Miguel Benavides, Sara Ann Venturina

  • Self-Play Reinforcement Learning under Imperfect Information in Big 2 -- Aalok Patwa

  • Stackelberg Mean-Field Games for Adaptive Cancer Therapy -- Arash Mehrjou

  • Preference-Based Distributed Welfare Maximization: A Game-Theoretic Approach -- Antoine Bergerault, Anna Maria Maddux, Andreas Schlaginhaufen, Maryam Kamgarpour

  • Optimism as a Vulnerability: Deceptive Stackelberg Control of UCB Bandit Followers -- Şuayp Talha Kocabay, Kerem Yalçın, Talha Rüzgar Akkuş

  • Non-Linear Strategic Classification Made Practical -- Jack Geary, Henry Gouk

  • Bayesian Persuasion with a Risk-Conscious Receiver -- Yujing Chen

  • Adversarial Training with Large Step Sizes: Implicit Bias and Evolution of Sharpness -- Yi Feng, Andrea Paudice, Stratis Skoulakis

  • The Cost of Blind Confidence: Opponent Modeling under Imperfect Information -- Andrea Menta, Francesca Maifredi, Matteo Papini

  • Signaling in Data Markets via Free Samples -- Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Alireza Fallah, Michael I. Jordan

  • Markov Chain from Human Feedback -- Takuya Koriyama, Tengyuan Liang

  • Fair Robust Strategic Classification under Decision-Dependent Cost Uncertainty -- Sura Alhanouti, Guzin Bayraksan, Parinaz Naghizadeh

  • Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Alpha Discovery: Optimizing Agent Distribution in Heterogeneous LLM Markets -- Ajitabh Kumar

  • Learned Coordination Conventions in Cooperative MARL: Measuring the Translation Gap Between Theory-Informed Roles and Learned Routing -- Yoosung Hong

  • Incentive design in sequential statistical protocols -- Drew T Nguyen, Alireza Fallah, Michael I. Jordan

  • Sequential Minimax Games as Stacked Martingale Optimal Transport -- Ethan Chen

  • AgentSociety: Incentivizing Agentic Social Intelligence -- Aditya Vema Reddy Kesari, Krishna Reddy Kesari

  • EngineLab: Evaluating Strategic Generalization Under Rule Shifts -- Tianyi Evans Gu, Lucas Yuan

  • A Causal Approach to Game Theory -- Aurghya Maiti, Prateek Jain, Elias Bareinboim

  • LERA: LLM-Enhanced RAG for Ad Auction in Generative Chatbots -- Haoran Sun, Xinrui Song, Xinyu Zhang, Zhaohua Chen, Xu Chu, Zhilin Zhang, Chuan Yu, Jian Xu, Bo Zheng, Xiaotie Deng

  • Attention as Natural Gradient: In-Context Mirror Descent for Opponent Modelling -- Alexander Chernyavskiy, Natalia Gusarova, Aleksandra Vatian

  • Scaling Laws for Strategic Interactions -- Joie Zhang, Danqi Chen, Peter Henderson, Lewis Hammond

  • First-Order Efficiency for Probabilistic Value Estimation via A Statistical Viewpoint -- Ziqi Liu, Kiljae Lee, Yuan Zhang, Weijing Tang

  • Poker Arena: Multi-Axis Profiling of Strategic Reasoning and Memory in LLMs -- Pratham Singla, Shivank Garg, VIHAN SINGH

  • MafiaPersona: A Multi-Agent Adversarial Benchmark for Evaluating Persona Persistence in Large Language Models -- Ojaswi Prakash, Dhruv Kumar, Murari Mandal, Mohan Kankanhalli, Yash Sinha

  • PALS: Preference-guided Active Automata Learning for Symbolic Reinforcement Learning in Games -- William Peter Fishell, Sam Kouteili, Mark Paul Santolucito, Christian Scaff

  • Position: Alignment Needs Rule-Class Routing Before Preference Learning -- Zezheng Lin, Jinhao Gan

  • Equilibrium Selection in Multi-Agent Policy Gradients via Opponent-Aware Basin Entry -- Yevhen Shcherbinin, Arina Redina, Maxim Kalpin, Vlad Kochetov

  • Kantian Equilibrium in the Age of Multi-Agent Systems -- Ivan Samoylenko

  • Learning to Diffuse: Mechanism Design in Social Networks with Information Propagation Costs -- Sebastiano Messina, Tatjana Chavdarova

  • GT-HarmBench: Benchmarking AI Safety Risks Through the Lens of Game Theory -- Pepijn Cobben, Xuanqiang Angelo Huang, Thao Amelia Pham, Isabel Dahlgren, Bernhard Schölkopf, Terry Jingchen Zhang, Zhijing Jin

  • Designing Training Objectives for Iterative Reasoning Agents: Dense Supervision as an Adaptive Mechanism -- Bao N Nguyen Truong, Hoyeon Chang, Alexander Rubinstein, Seong Joon Oh

  • Dynamics of Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Model-Based Search Engines -- Xiyang Hu

  • COMRAD: A Benchmark for Embodied Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning -- Khoi H.B. Nguyen, Dimitar Zhivkov Zhekov, Tristan Tomilin

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