This paper examines whether officers with greater alleged misconduct are more likely to make convictionless arrests (arrests that result in no/dismissed charges or where the defendant is found not guilty). Using the Chicago Police Department's rotational duty calendar to obtain plausibly exogenous variation in the set of officers assigned to work on a particular day, we find that high-misconduct officers are 40% more likely than no-misconduct officers to make arrests that result in no charges and 32% more likely to make arrests with "not guilty" outcomes, with no statistically significant difference in arrests yielding "guilty" outcomes or dismissed charges.

We develop an empirical model of the mechanism used to assign police officers to Chicago districts and examine the efficiency and equity of alternative allocations. We document that the current bidding process, which grants priority based on seniority, results in the assignment of more experienced officers to less violent and high-income neighborhoods. Our empirical model combines estimates of heterogeneous officer preferences underlying the bidding process with causal estimates of the effects of officer experience on neighborhood crime. Equalizing officer seniority across districts would reduce violent crime rate by 4.6 percent and significantly decrease inequality in crime, discretionary arrests, and officer use of force across neighborhoods. Moreover, this assignment can be achieved in a revenue-neutral way while resulting in small welfare gains for police officers, implying that it is more equitable and efficient.