Programme

Monday 10 June, 2019

• 12:00 Registration, lunch and opening of the workshop
• 13:00 Learning Before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information, Balazs Szentes (LSE)
  • joint with Doron Ravid (Chicago) and Anne-Katrin Roesler (Michigan)
• 14:00 Persuasion meets Delegation, Andriy Zapechelnyuk (St. Andrews)
  • joint with Anton Kolotilin (UNSW Business School)
• 15:00 Coffee Break
• 15:30 Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment, Laura Doval (Caltech)
  • joint with Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin and UCL)
• 16:30 Coffee Break
• 17:00 Price Discovery in a Large Auction with Costly Information, Alp Atakan (QMUL and Koc)
  • joint with Mehmet Ekmekci (Boston College)
• 18:00 Countering the Winner's Curse, Dirk Bergemann (Yale)
  • joint with Ben Brooks (Chicago) and Stephen Morris (Princeton)
• 20:30 Workshop Dinner (Glassboat Restaurant)

Tuesday 11 June, 2019

• 09:30 How Bayesian Persuasion can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior, Zvika Neeman (Tel Aviv)
  • joint with Penélope Hernández (Valencia)
• 10:30 A Theory of Cultural Diversity and Strategic Uncertainty, Willemien Kets (Oxford)
  • joint with Alvaro Sandroni (Northwestern)
• 11:30 Coffee Break
• 12:00 Structural Rationality in Dynamic Games, Marciano Siniscalchi (Northwestern)