Firms advertise for different motives: (i) to make consumers aware (i.e., the informative motive), (ii) to increase the spending by current customers (i.e., the persuasive motive), and (iii) to limit competitors' expansion by capturing consumers' attention (i.e., the anticompetitive motive). This paper develops a new general equilibrium model in which consumers dynamically become aware of goods, to study how these motives evolve over the firm life cycle and their aggregate effects. The calibrated model shows that the informative motive is the primary driver of advertising and that advertising has an overall positive aggregate effect, not only through financing entertaining media goods, but also through expanding product awareness. Without advertising, firms remain smaller, which in turn reduces the incentives to create new products. Distinct from existing literature, the planner values media goods even when their entertainment value is negligible, as they serve as a vehicle for product awareness. Finally, the model suggests a modest welfare gain from subsidizing advertising.

Draft coming soon!

Characterizing network propagation—whether the total effect of a shock or the centrality of a node—typically requires data on the entire network because feedback can occur throughout it. Yet complete network data are rarely observed. We develop computationally tractable sharp bounds on these quantities when researchers observe only a subset of network links and each node’s weighted degree—information that is routinely available. The framework encompasses prominent network objects: we apply it to Leontief inverses in production networks, Katz–Bonacich centralities in social networks, and welfare effects in spatial networks. The bound width varies considerably across applications, revealing both informative welfare bounds and weakly identified Leontief inverse entries and centrality rankings. Narrow bounds establish robust conclusions from incomplete networks; wide sharp bounds demonstrate the need for additional data or assumptions about missing links.

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous lobbying activities. Lobbying affects growth through two opposing channels. A {barrier effect} reduces the probability that entrants successfully adopt innovations, weakening creative destruction and reducing entry. An {information effect} improves the regulatory environment by reducing distortions and increasing innovation incentives. In equilibrium, the net effect of lobbying on entry, growth, and the firm size distribution depends on the relative strength of these channels: lobbying lowers growth when entry barriers dominate, but can raise growth when informational frictions are sufficiently important.