The latest versions of these papers are on my website: homervyn.github.io
Could governments be good venture capitalists? I compare Chinese semiconductor firms backed by local government, central government, and private venture capital (VC). Central and private VCs invest in the most productive firms, while local VCs back smaller, less productive local champions. Yet local-backed firms gain about 34% in revenue productivity after investment relative to not-yet-invested firms, while central- and private-backed firms show no detectable change. Local VCs hold smaller portfolios than central VCs, sit closer to their firms, and add directors with graduate degrees and foreign education. In a model of VC selection, firm productivity, capital responses, and import competition, 2023 domestic sales would have been 11.6% lower had private VCs allocated government VCs' deals and 4.0% lower had the central government allocated local investments. Post-investment productivity growth from local government VCs outweighs the selection of central and private VCs on larger, more efficient firms.
Semiconductors dominate today’s industrial-policy debates, which rest on “stylized facts” about the underlying technology and economics. Few of these facts are empirically grounded, because the industry is complex and the data are limited. We combine the specifications of every mainstream CPU and GPU product with a commercial-grade engineering cost model, building a panel of 80,887 chip-quarter observations for 2015–2025 in which physical quantities, the accounting cost of capital, and the manufacturers’ profit margins are recorded separately. Three findings emerge. First, newer capital vintages (process generations, or “nodes”) do not necessarily reduce the cost of a wafer: they raise it for GPUs. They do reduce the cost of a transistor, by roughly a third per generation, because density rises faster than the cost of silicon. Second, most of the measured impacts of the much-celebrated learning-by-doing and scale economies are artifacts of depreciation accounting. Third, cost differences across firms are moderate per wafer but larger per transistor. These results highlight the critical importance of engineering and accounting details in measuring physical productivity growth and its technological determinants.
This paper examines how large industrial policy programs shape firm political spending. We argue that firm-level lobbying rises when large, firm-specific policy rents are at stake, especially when the total size and allocation of benefits remain uncertain. Undistributed benefits also induce firms that had never lobbied to overcome fixed entry costs and begin investing in politics. Event studies of two landmark 2022 industrial policies, the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, show that semiconductor firms increased lobbying expenditures by about 36% between 2019 and 2022, while green-energy firms increased lobbying by about 114%. In both industries, new lobbying firms (the extensive margin) and previously active firms (the intensive margin) each contribute substantially, with entry accounting for about a third of the semiconductor increase and roughly two-thirds of the green-energy increase. The increase persists after enactment, reflecting firms' concerns over ex post subsidy allocation and policy uncertainty from political transitions.
Do export controls and tariffs reduce dependence on a rival, or only move it? We argue that these tools regulate by location, while supply chains are organized by firms, so firms reroute trade around the rules. Using 8-digit Chinese customs data on chipmaking tools by origin, difference-in-differences and event-study estimates show that after the 2022 U.S. controls, China's tool imports did not decline but shifted to Singapore and Malaysia, where U.S. equipment makers operate major plants. Meanwhile, tariffs moved electronics assembly out of China, and Chinese chips followed. By 2025, U.S. imports linked to Chinese chips through third countries matched direct imports from China. Measuring de-risking through direct trade thus overstates decoupling, and weaponized interdependence is limited when firms can reorganize networks around the point of control.