Papers, Drafts, etc. 

Papers

AI, Epistemic Relations, and Testimonial Outsourcing (w/ Nick Nicola)

(Forthcoming) Artificial Intelligence in Research & Education (Special Issue), Artificial Intelligence in Society: Oxford Intersections. Oxford University Press.

Generative AI "companions" are increasingly integrated into higher education as always-available interlocutors that offer feedback, explanation, and encouragement. This paper examines how such systems reshape the epistemic relations through which students speak, are heard, and come to count as knowers.  We argue that companion-style AIs can impair our epistemic relations in systematic ways. Students may become less able, and less willing, to testify on their own in genuinely reciprocal spaces (such as class discussions, office hours, and peer groups), habitually relying on their AI companions instead. We call this phenomenon testimonial outsourcing: a structural tendency to outsource one's testimonial activity, which functions as a kind of self-imposed, technologically mediated analogue of gaslighting. Students come to treat the AI's outputs as more reliable than their own judgment, memory, and expressive capacities, thereby eroding their epistemic and cognitive self-trust. From this, we draw implications for AI design and educational policy, arguing for constraints that preserve "non-mediated" spaces of speech, require explicit AI transparency, and build frictions that redirect students back toward our interpersonal relations.

Counterfeit Persons: AI Should Have Persona, Not Personality

(Forthcoming). In R. Krzanowski (ed.) Personality in AI. Vernon Press.

Debates about “personality in AI” often assume that success turns on an artificial system’s possession of an authentic inner self. This chapter argues that the pursuit of personality, understood as a genuine, unified consciousness, a locus of subjective experience, or a unique personal identity, is a misguided ontological and technical goal. It is misguided not only because such an internal state may be technically impossible or epistemologically unverifiable (i.e., we could never confirm its presence), but because it is functionally unnecessary for the successful integration of AI into human society and, in practice, risks generating harms. Instead, we should redirect our focus toward the cultivation of sophisticated persona: a publicly legible, role-apt performance of personality, oriented to specific social and relational roles. This persona is not a "fake" version of a real self; rather, it is the entirety of the AI's social presentation, analogous to a well-defined character, but one possessing interactive and adaptive capabilities. This stance requires explicit self-presentation (e.g., disclosing that it is an artificial system). Building on this distinction, the chapter introduces and defends the concept of the "counterfeit person." A counterfeit person is an AI agent that is not ontologically a person but is designed to be functionally and behaviorally indistinguishable from one within its designated contexts. 

Robots, Cyborgs, and Synths: Exploring Personhood Through Artificial Beings 

(Forthcoming) In Kellen, N, Sheff, N, and Heter J. (eds) Fallout and Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell

Across the wasteland, we encounter entities constructed from steel and circuits, but who engage in complex thought, possess intricate emotions, and forge meaningful relationships with their environment and fellow inhabitants. Robobrains present particularly unsettling cases, as their mechanical frames house the recycled brains of humans from a bygone era, compelling players to consider whether remnants of human cognition confer full personhood onto these cyborg hybrids. Similarly, Mister Gutsy units and Protectrons demonstrate sophisticated moral reasoning within military or civil protocols, yet their behaviors can be radically reprogrammed at the whim of wasteland survivors wielding rudimentary hacking tools. This chapter argues that the rich tapestry of synthetic beings in Fallout—ranging from empathic Synths striving for freedom, through the disquietingly human Robobrains, to the whimsical and morally nuanced Securitrons—illuminates deep philosophical discussions about memory, reason, psychological continuity, and the importance of physical embodiment. By examining these varied artificial beings and their interactions with the post-apocalyptic environment, we gain insights into enduring philosophical questions about what it truly means to be recognized as a person.

Superhuman Abilities and the Functions of Mysticism

(Forthcoming) In P. Gori & C. Chiurco. (eds.) Dune’s Cinematic Universe: Philosophical Essays. Mimesis International.

This chapter examines the philosophical divergence in the cinematic treatment of Frank Herbert’s superhuman figures by contrasting Denis Villeneuve’s completed films with the vision of Alejandro Jodorowsky’s unmade project. Villeneuve’s universe is deliberately secularized and industrial; mysticism is backgrounded as superstition or an instrument of socio-political management, while superhuman capacities are deflated into trainable techniques and biological events. Jodorowsky, by contrast, sought to sacralize the superhuman and resist bureaucratic capture, aiming to create a "cinematic prophet" that would function as a consciousness-altering, mystical event. Setting out these two models, the chapter analyzes whether superhuman capacities are best understood as administratively produced competencies or as occasions for sacral meaning.

The Ms. Frizzle Approach: A Reflection on Integrating Playfulness and Creativity in Philosophy Teaching

(Forthcoming) In R. Scott (ed) Are We Having Fun Yet? Joy and Playfulness in Teaching & Learning Philosophy, vol. 11 of AAPT Studies in Pedagogy

This paper explores the creation and transformative potential of the "Ms. Frizzle Approach" in philosophy education. Inspired by Montessori pedagogy, and my time spent during undergrad in a philosophy for children program, this approach developed from my own teaching experiences and emphasizes inviting students to “take chances, make mistakes, and get messy.” By fostering trust and encouraging students to lean into their own interests and abilities, the approach reframes assignments as opportunities for exploration, and expression, rather than rigid assessments. Through assignments like the “Philosophy Learning Objects,” students are empowered to convey complex philosophical concepts through diverse media such as videos, graphic novels, and games. 

Semantic Memory, Mnemonic Effort and Mnemonic Habit

In Aldini, A., and Temperini, M. (eds) Cognition: Interdisciplinary Foundations, Models and Applications. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. (2024 Springer Nature)

Semantic memory is typically cast as a warehouse of abstracted facts, filled by unconscious routines of “abstraction” and “generalization.” This paper argues instead for a proceduralist account: semantic knowledge is not stored content but the product of operations that construct task-apt representations in the moment. Drawing on multi-trace frameworks and enactive approaches, I show how distributed, continually re-parameterized traces undermine the storehouse picture and support a view on which similarity-based activation and reconstruction do the explanatory work. I develop a distinction between mnemonic effort (the conscious, task-guided use of prior experience to assemble a representation) and mnemonic habit (fluently compiled, embodied routines that enact knowledge without deliberation), and use it to explain both flexibility and automaticity in semantic cognition. Parallels with contemporary AI—where competence resides in policies, generators, and skill libraries rather than retrieved items—illuminate how knowledge can be borne by procedures while remaining sensitive to context and defeat. On this view, justification tracks the quality of constructive processes (their reliability, calibration, and responsiveness) rather than contact with stored contents. The result is a unified, non-archival account of semantic memory that reframes familiar debates about traces, causation, and the epistemic standing of memory.

Under Review

Humility Pumps: Social Leveling Mechanisms for Egalitarian Stability in Rawlsian Justice

Argues that informal social practices—“social leveling mechanisms”—are necessary complements to Rawls’s institutional model of justice, illustrating through ethnographic examples how humility-enforcing customs sustain equality and self-respect in stable societies.

Panpsychism and Pan-niftyism

Uses the fictional view of “pan-niftyism” to show that panpsychism’s introspective justification leads to metaphysical indeterminacy rather than explanatory progress.

AI, the Alignment Problem, and Video Games

Proposes a novel approach to AI alignment grounded in virtue ethics, arguing that role-playing game simulations can mirror the socialization processes through which humans develop moral character. By training AI systems through interactive, narrative-based environments, it suggests a new path toward cultivating prosocial values and ethical reasoning in artificial agents.

In Progress

Intermodal Deference, Sensorimotor Equivalence, and Affordances: Is Sight Entirely Vision Based?  

Sensorimotor approaches to perception hold that the phenomenal character of a sensory modality is dependent not only on the biological system that produces information but also on the structural features of the organism’s interaction with the sensory stimulation. I use this basic idea to argue that vision may be situated within a web of mutually reinforcing perceptual systems determined by the similarity of sensorimotor contingencies.