Research

Powerful and unconstrained leaders often hinder the development of their nations. This phenomenon has often been linked to the commitment issues that result from the lack of constraints facing such leaders. Therefore, restricting the powers of such leaders through constitutions has been widely considered as a potential solution to these issues. Nonetheless, it remains unclear when powerful leaders would be willing to abide by the constraints imposed upon them by such constitutions, particularly when these constraints must be enforced by other self-interested actors. Through a theoretical model I investigate what characteristics ensure that constitutions provide credible constraints on a powerful leader. Specifically, I emphasize the role of constitutions in incentivizing opposition against a leader, and the challenge of designing them to fulfill two conflicting objectives. My investigation reveals why similar constitutions may not always be respected when implemented in different contexts. Moreover, it also reveals a link between majority decision rules and transparency, which helps explain the prevalence of these characteristics in modern constitutions.

Throughout history, states have often been confronted with trying and strenuous circumstances, and while some states face failure or even collapse as a result of these, many others persevere and remain functioning even when presented with similar stress factors. Considering these observations, we inquire, under what conditions are functioning states sustainable? While tackling this general question, we emphasize the role played by executive constraints in improving state resilience. Through the use of a simple theoretical model we show how limited commitment with regards to taxation may lead to state failure. Then, we expound how strengthening executive constraints can help alleviate this issue. Additionally, to corroborate our findings, we present historical episodes which illustrate the mechanisms described in our model.

Do monarchs expecting brief reigns have the incentives to establish democratic institutions? In contrast with prevailing theories in political economy, I argue that the prospect of a short reign may in itself incentivize self-interested monarchs to establish democratic institutions that constrain their powers. To support this argument, I analyze a model of elite-driven democratization, using the reign of Jigme Dorji Wangchuck in Bhutan to illustrate its mechanisms and implications. In this model, absolute monarchy may prove costly and inefficient due to the short time horizons of monarchs who fear death. Consequently, such monarchs may seek to implement democratic institutions which limit their powers, establishing a more efficient constitutional monarchy. In light of this, I highlight how salient signals of a monarch's mortality, such as observable health problems, may act as catalysts for democratic reforms.