Marginalized village and slum communities across the developing world use small-scale protests and other forms of contentious collective action to secure resources from policymakers and promote local development. Such action often takes the form of small demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, roadblocks, or temporary occupations of government offices or political-party headquarters responsible for resource allocation.

Are these protests effective at attracting development investment to local communities? My book project examines the relationship among protests, informal institutions, elections, and public-goods provision in Mexico.

I argue that submunicipal protests matter for local policymaking and community welfare. Their effects operate through two key mechanisms. First, protests signal needs and grievances of which politicians may not previously have been aware. They bring pressing issues—such as a failing drainage system during the rainy season or a leaking classroom ceiling—onto policymakers’ radar and prompt responses.

Second, municipal policymakers take protests seriously because they entail potential political costs. Protests do more than convey information; they also make governance failures visible to other citizens. Local protests can signal mismanagement and poor governance, reducing support for incumbent politicians. Contentious action allows communities to pressure officials outside election periods, often leading to increased resource allocation to protesting communities as a pacification strategy.

I test these hypotheses with a mixed-methods research design: a conjoint experiment with local political elites to assess their perceptions of community protests; observational survey data from community leaders and residents; and qualitative interviews with more than 250 community leaders, politicians, and bureaucrats.