Marina Sforza (Steininger)
I finished my Phd in economics at the Ludwig-Maximilan-University, in Munich. I was mainly working on the general equilibrium effects of pandemics, trade liberalization, and protectionism across countries and sectors.
I have a very deep knowledge of how firms, sectors and countries should position themselves in a world that is changing at an ever faster speed. I am proud to say that my academic research also contributed to important policy discussions and was used as the base for follow-up consulting projects.
Research
PhD Thesis
Essays in International Economics: the Role of Trade Liberalization, Protectionism and Pandemics in a Globalized World
Essays in International Economics: the Role of Trade Liberalization, Protectionism and Pandemics in a Globalized World
Globalization in the Time of COVID-19 - (joint work with A. Sforza)
CESifo Working Paper: CESifo Working Paper No. 8184, CESifo, Munich, 2020,
CEPR Working Paper: COVID 19 Economics, issue 19, 18 MAY 2020
The economic effects of a pandemic crucially depend on the extent to which countries are connected in global production networks. In this paper we incorporate production barriers induced by Covid-19 shock into a Ricardian model with sectoral linkages, trade in intermediate goods and sectoral heterogeneity in production. We use the model to quantify the welfare effect of the disruption in production that started in China and quickly spread across the world. We find that the Covid-19 shock has a considerable impact on most economies in the world, especially when a share of the labor force is quarantined. Moreover, we show that global production linkages have a clear role in magnifying the effect of the production shock. Finally, we show that the economic effects of the Covid-19 shock are heterogeneous across sectors, regions and countries, depending on the geographic distribution of industries in each region and country and their degree of integration in the global production network.
COVID-19, Trade and Inequality
Working Paper Coming Soon
The European Union was faced with various challenges threatening its integrity over the last decades. The diffusion of the COVID-19 virus disease posits an additional severe threat to the resilience of the European Union. In this paper we study the diffusion of the economic shock induced by the COVID-19 pandemic to understand how inequality across European regions is distributed. We use a multi-country, multi-sector Ricardian trade model to quantify the value-added effect of the disruption in production that spread across the world. We propose a methodology to redistribute the counterfactual changes in value-added by country-sector across European regions. The distributional effects of the COVID-19 pandemic disease are heterogeneous across European regions, exacerbating the "core-periphery" divide and the inequality across the European area. We find evidence that the COVID pandemic-19 shock has a stronger impact on the peripheral regions of Eastern and Southern Europe, together with most of the Mediterranean regions and the Atlantic regions of Portugal and Spain. On the contrary, the central European regions of the Netherlands and Germany, together with most Swedish regions experience a much milder effect of the pandemic on their economic structure.
Quantifying Brexit: From Ex Post to Ex Ante Using Structural Gravity - (joint work with G. Felbermayr and J.Gröschl)
Exploiting changes in the geography of economic integration in Europe, we quantify the economic consequences of Brexit using a quantitative general equilibrium model that captures inter- and intranational production networks. We isolate three important layers of EU integration for the UK: First, we distinguish directional treatment heterogeneity in the relation between the UK and the EU27 economies. Second, we disentangle tariff and non-tariff barriers in EU agreements affecting the UK, which show differential effects on the gains from trade. Third, next to European integration agreements, we consider fiscal transfers, which affect the terms-of-trade of countries. The analysis reveals that directional effects matter for the size and distribution of the welfare effects from Brexit. Neglecting asymmetries in EU-UK relations overestimates the costs from Brexit by up to 40%. The welfare costs of Brexit are higher in the UK than in most other EU counties. However, heterogeneity tends to attenuate overall costs while giving rise to substantial heterogeneity between EU27 members and between sectors. We introduce a scenario that could shift the bargaining power and eliminates asymmetries in the costs from Brexit as soon as the UK fully liberalizes its market.
Quantifying the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement - (joint work with G. Felbermayr, F. Kimura, T. Okubo)
Cesifo Working Paper No. 7241 , Cesifo, Munich, 2018
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 51, 110-128, 2018
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 51, 110-128, 2018
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of the new EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the biggest bilateral deal that both the EU and Japan have concluded so far. It employs a generalized variant of the Eaton–Kortum (2002) model, featuring multiple sectors, input-output linkages, services trade, and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). It uses the results of an econometric ex post analysis of a related existing FTA, the one between the EU and Korea, to approximate the expected reductions in the costs of NTBs. This approach yields long-run welfare effects for Japan of about 18 bn USD per year (0.31% of GDP) and of about 15 bn USD (0.10%) for the EU. On average, the agreement does not appear to harm third countries. 14% of the welfare gains inside the EPA stem from tariffs, the remaining 86% from NTB reform, and the services sector account for more than half. In the EU, value added in the agri-food sector goes up most, while in Japan the manufacturing and services sectors gain.
Revisiting the Euro’s Trade Cost and Welfare Effects - (joint work with G. Felbermayr)
When, about twenty years ago, the Euro was created, one objective was to facilitate intra-European trade by reducing transaction costs. Has the Euro delivered? Using sectoral trade data from 1995 to 2014 and applying structural gravity modeling, we conduct an ex post evaluation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In aggregate data, we find a significant average trade effect for goods of almost 8 percent, but a much smaller effect for services trade. Digging deeper, we detect substantial heterogeneity between sectors, as well as between and within country-pairs. Singling out Germany, and embedding the estimation results into a quantitative general equilibrium model of world trade, we find that EMU has increased real incomes in all EMU countries, albeit at different rates. E. g. incomes have increased by 0.3, 0.6, and 2.1 percent in Italy, Germany, and Luxembourg, respectively.
Further Publications
Globalisierung nach Covid-19: Die Folgen der Pandemie für die deutsche Wirtschaft - (joint work with L. Flach)
Covid-19 and lockdown-related production disruptions are transmitted across countries by means of global supply chains. The pandemic is also leading to a decline in real income in Germany, although the impact of the crisis is different in the various Länder and sectors. The manufacturing industry is the hardest hit, especially the automotive and pharmaceutical industries and mechanical engineering. Sectors and Länder where employees have greater opportunities for teleworking are less affected by the crisis. It is true that sectors that are more integrated into global value chains are likely to experience greater negative effects. But in a deglobalized world, the negative effects of policy interventions due to Covid-19 would be only marginally smaller. At the same time, Germany’s economic strength would be many times lower than it is today. Renationalization and the recovery of production would lead to significantly higher income losses.
Giving Away Wealth? Trade Effects of the Yuan Devaluation - (joint work with M. Braml)
Giving Away Wealth? Trade Effects of the Yuan Devaluation - (joint work with M. Braml)
CESifo Forum 20 (4), 32-35, ifo Institute, Munich, 2019 (DE, EN)
ifo Schnelldienst, 2019, 72, Nr. 20, ifo Institut, Munich, 2019
ifo Schnelldienst, 2019, 72, Nr. 20, ifo Institut, Munich, 2019
A devaluation of China’s currency during the trade war would lead to more prosperity for Germany, Europe, and the rest of the world. This is the result of a new study by the ifo Institute. Should the yuan devalue by 10 percent, Germany would gain EUR 413 million in real income; if the devaluation were 20 percent, this would go up to as much as EUR 499 million annually, according to calculations from the ifo trade model. The yuan has lost roughly 13 percent of its value against the US dollar since spring 2018.
Quantifcation of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement
As of February 2019, the new economic partnership agreement (EPA) between the EU and Japan has entered into force. It is the largest free trade agreement (FTA) that the EU and Japan have concluded so far. In times of growing protectionism, its conclusion is of strategic importance for both the EU and Japan, and it will most likely be of systemic relevance. What are the economic implications of this new trade deal, and how will it affect both regions? This report summarizes a recently published paper by Felbermayr et al. (2019), which quantifies the welfare, trade, and sectoral value-added effects of the EU-Japan EPA for the EU, Japan, and third countries (i.e., China).
Trump’s trade attack on China − who will have the last laugh? - (joint work with G. Felbermayr)
The publications exploit a modern general equilibrium trade model to simulate the effects of the Chinese-American trade dispute. It finds that the tariffs and countertariffs implemented as of today cost the US €2.6 billion and China €5.7 billion of GDP. Both economies lose, but China loses absolutely and relatively much more. Europe, in contrast, could register a GDP gain of €345 million. Chinese exports to the US go down by €52.1 billion, while US exports to China fall by €37.1 billion, so the US trade balance slightly improves. A full-blown tariff war, where both parties tax all imports by additional 25%, would lower US GDP by € 9.5 billion and Chinese GDP by €30.4 billion. If the objective of President Trump is to use trade policy to increase the economic distance with China, an escalation helps. Such a trade war would increase value added in the US manufacturing sector by 0.6% while the agri-food sector would shrink by 1.22%. In China, manufacturing would decline by 0.8%. Chinese exports to the US would fall by a whopping €171.3 billion, while US exports to China would contract by €51.0 billion. So, the bilateral trade balance of the US with China improves; however, with the EU it deteriorates. Hence, while Europe may benefit slightly from trade diversion effects, its trade surplus with the US becomes even larger – foreboding further transatlantic conflict.
Regionalanalyse zu den ökonomischen Auswirkungen des Brexit auf das Bundesland Hessen - (joint work with G. Felbermayr, R. Lehmann)
In Folge des Brexit dürfte die reale Wirtschaftsleistung pro Kopf in Deutschland, je nach unterstelltem Szenario, niedriger ausfallen als im Status quo. Hinter diesem gesamtdeutschen Durchschnittseffekt verbergen sich jedoch höchst heterogene Auswirkungen des Austritts auf die deutschen Bundesländer. Auf dem Bundesland Hessen liegt dabei ein besonderes Augenmerk, da in Frankfurt am Main das Herz des deutschen Finanzsektors zu finden ist. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass Hessen und die ökonomisch bedeutende Metropolregion Frankfurt-Rhein-Main von einem Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs aus der Europäischen Union weniger stark betroffen sein dürften als Deutschland insgesamt. Im Falle eines „harten Brexit“ wird das preisbereinigte Bruttoinlandsprodukt von Hessen um -0,17% geringer ausfallen als im Basisszenario (zum Vergleich Deutschland: -0,23%). Die Effekte für die Metropolregion fallen in ähnlicher Größenordnung zu Hessen aus. Sollte hingegen ein ambitioniertes Freihandelsabkommen vereinbart werden („weicher Brexit“), dann verringern sich die Effekte für Hessen und die Metropolregion auf -0,08% im Vergleich zur Ausgangslage (Deutschland: -0,10%). Maßgeblich für die geringere Betroffenheit Hessens sind wirtschaftsstrukturelle Unterschiede. Einerseits vereint das Verarbeitende Gewerbe, jener Bereich, der am stärksten von einem Ausstieg des Vereinigten Königreichs betroffen wäre, in Hessen einen geringeren Wertschöpfungsanteil auf sich als in Deutschland insgesamt. Andererseits sind die Finanz-, Versicherungs- und Unternehmensdienstleister, welche durch den Brexit sogar gewinnen dürften, traditionell stärker in Hessen vertreten als im gesamtdeutschen Durchschnitt.
Worldwide Economic Impact of Increasingly Protectionist US Trade Policy - (joint work with E. Yalcin)
Many countries are facing the problem of rising protectionism. With the appointment of the new US President Donald Trump, this trend reached a new level. This article quantifies the economic consequences of protectionist aspirations by focusing on the scenarios that have been communicated by the US government as potential trade policies. The results of three simulations - 1. The US withdraws from the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA 2. The introduction of a Border Tax Adjustment 3. The USA increases its tariffs - show that neither the USA nor its trade partners stand to benefit from the protectionist measures that the USA is threatening to take.
Quantifying Trump: The Costs of a Protectionist US - (joint work with G. Felbermayr, E. Yalcin)
With the inauguration of the new US-president protectionism in the world of international trade reached a new level. The United States of America is currently the world’s largest single market, in which the US citizens earn one of the highest worldwide per capita incomes of 58,000 US dollars. Due to its economic size, economic policy measures, in particular trade policies, have a far-reaching impact on global economic developments. The consequences of a protectionist US trade policy may not only be limited to economic dimensions, but can also have important political and social implications. Against this background, this article quantifies the economic consequences of US protectionist trade aspirations. Our analysis focuses on trade policy scenarios, which have been communicated by the current US administration as potential new trade policies to date. We draw on the results of a recent study of the ifo Institute conducted on behalf of the Bertelsmann Foundation.
Further Publications:
Global Impact of a Protectionist U.S. Trade Policy - (joint work with G. Felbermayr, E. Yalcin)
ifo Forschungsberichte / 89, 71, ifo Institute, Munich, 2017
ifo Forschungsberichte / 89, 71, ifo Institute, Munich, 2017
Global Impact of a Protectionist U.S. Trade Policy - (joint work with G. Felbermayr, E. Yalcin)
ifo Forschungsberichte / 88, 71, ifo Institut, München, 2017
ifo Forschungsberichte / 88, 71, ifo Institut, München, 2017
On the economics of EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement - (joint work with G. Felbermayr, F. Kimura, T. Okubo, E. Yalcin),
ifo Forschungsberichte / 86, 64 S., Institute, Munich, 2017
ifo Forschungsberichte / 86, 64 S., Institute, Munich, 2017
On the Economics of an EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement
Bertelsmann Foundation; January 2017 - March 2017
Bertelsmann Foundation; January 2017 - March 2017