Yardimci, M. A. (2024). Terrorism, counter‐terrorism, and voting: The case of Turkey. Economics & Politics,1–27.
This paper empirically tests the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism on voting by focusing on the two 2015 general elections in Turkey - and the 2011 general election. This period offers a unique case because, after the first election, the ongoing peace process between the incumbent party (AKP), the political party associated with the perpetrators (pro-Kurdish political party, HDP), and the imprisoned leader of the terrorist organisation (PKK) was canceled. Instead, terror attacks recurred and curfews were implemented as counter-terrorism measures. This enables the impact of curfews and terror attacks on electoral outcomes to be analysed in a difference-in-differences setting. Terror attacks are estimated to reduce the incumbent's vote share by 3.2 percentage points, while increasing the vote share of the party associated with the perpetrators by 3.6 percentage points. Curfews are estimated to cancel out the impact of terror attacks in attacked municipalities and decrease the incumbent's vote share by 4.7 percentage points in non-attacked municipalities.
"Money Talks, Moderation Walks: The Centripetal Impact of Campaign Contributions in the U.S. House." with Andrew Pickering (Reject & Resubmit to Public Choice)
Does campaign money polarize or moderate legislators? Using data on all receipts to members of the U.S. House from 2001 to 2023, this paper distinguishes contributions from PACs and from individuals and links them to subsequent roll‐call behavior. The analysis exploits within‐legislator variation, lagged receipts, and alternative fixed‐effects structures. Results point clearly toward moderation. For Republicans, both PAC and individual receipts are associated with more centrist roll calls. For Democrats, PAC money has no consistent impact, while individual receipts result in small centripetal shifts. Dynamic tests show that these effects accumulate across multiple cycles, and placebo models on non-economic roll calls confirm that moderation is confined to the economic dimension. Overall, campaign money in the contemporary House moderates rather than polarizes, complicating popular accounts of donor influence.
"To be (worried) or not to be? The Causal Impact of Minimum Wage Increases on Aggregate Prices" with Fikret Bilenkisi and Filippos Maraziotis, (submitted)
This paper estimates the causal effect of statutory minimum wage increases on aggregate consumer prices across 29 OECD countries during the synchronised inflationary cycle of 2021–2024. Exploiting staggered minimum wage reviews under a rare quasi-experimental environment of common global shocks, we implement a dynamic, dose-response difference-in-differences estimator that accommodates the cumulative, non-absorbing nature of wage floors and evolving treatment intensity. A 10 percent increase in the minimum wage raises aggregate prices by 0.3 percent over five months, with effects concentrated in food prices. Our estimates fall within the range of prior micro- and sectoral studies, but extend the literature by recovering the full temporal pass-through path. Our design-based approach demonstrates that credible causal inference is attainable in macro panels without micro-level data. The findings clarify the inflationary footprint of wage policies and offer a replicable framework for policy evaluation in macro-labour contexts.
Campaign Contributions and Legislative Moderation with Andrew Pickering, (submitted)
The relationship between campaign contributions and legislators’ ideology remains unsettled. A prominent view holds that donors fuel polarization, while others find little or no systematic influence on roll-call behavior. We revisit this debate using over 20,000 campaign donations exceeding $10,000 to members of the U.S. House between 2001 and 2020. Linking contributions to Nokken–Poole scores and exploiting within-legislator variation, we find that contributions are associated with a centripetal pattern. Republican and split-ticket donations are linked to moderation among Republicans, while Democratic donations show similar patterns for Democrats in competitive races. By focusing on large donors and accounting for persistent legislator traits and broader political cycles, we reconcile mixed findings in the literature and show that, rather than entrenching extremism, campaign money is linked to more stable congressional preferences toward the ideological center.
"Minimum Wage Increases and Incumbency"
"Paternity Leave and Child Outcomes" with Filippos Maraziotis