Bilenkisi, F., Maraziotis F., and Yardimci, M. A. (forthcoming). To be (worried) or not to be? The Causal Impact of Minimum Wage Increases on Aggregate Prices. Economic Analysis and Policy.
This paper estimates the effect of statutory minimum wage increases on aggregate consumer prices across 29 OECD countries during the synchronised inflationary cycle of 2021–2024. Exploiting staggered minimum wage reviews under a rare quasi-experimental environment of common global shocks, we implement a novel difference-in-differences estimator that accommodates the cumulative nature of wage floors and evolving treatment intensity. A 10 percent increase in the minimum wage raises aggregate prices by 0.3 percent over five months, with effects concentrated in food prices. Our estimates fall within the range of prior micro- and sectoral studies, but extend the literature by recovering the full temporal pass-through path. Our design-based approach demonstrates that credible inference is attainable in macro panels without micro-level data. The findings clarify the inflationary footprint of wage policies and offer a replicable framework for policy evaluation in macro-labour contexts.
Yardimci, M. A. (2024). Terrorism, counter‐terrorism, and voting: The case of Turkey. Economics & Politics, 36(2), 901–927.
This paper empirically tests the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism on voting by focusing on the two 2015 general elections in Turkey - and the 2011 general election. This period offers a unique case because, after the first election, the ongoing peace process between the incumbent party (AKP), the political party associated with the perpetrators (pro-Kurdish political party, HDP), and the imprisoned leader of the terrorist organisation (PKK) was canceled. Instead, terror attacks recurred and curfews were implemented as counter-terrorism measures. This enables the impact of curfews and terror attacks on electoral outcomes to be analysed in a difference-in-differences setting. Terror attacks are estimated to reduce the incumbent's vote share by 3.2 percentage points, while increasing the vote share of the party associated with the perpetrators by 3.6 percentage points. Curfews are estimated to cancel out the impact of terror attacks in attacked municipalities and decrease the incumbent's vote share by 4.7 percentage points in non-attacked municipalities.
"Money Talks, Moderation Walks: The Centripetal Impact of Campaign Contributions in the U.S. House." with Andrew Pickering (R&R, Public Choice)
Do campaign contributions polarize legislators or induce moderation? Theory allows for both possibilities, with effects likely varying by donor type. Using data on all contributions received by members of the U.S. House of Representatives from 2001 to 2022, this paper examines how Political Action Committee (PAC) and individual donations affect subsequent roll-call voting behavior. The analysis focuses on within-legislator changes in ideological positioning across congressional terms. The results consistently show that increased contributions are associated with greater moderation. Republican legislators shift toward the political center following increases in both PAC and individual donations in the previous congress. Democratic legislators are more ideologically stable, exhibiting relatively modest centrist movement in response to higher levels of individual contributions. Dynamic specifications suggest that these effects accumulate over successive electoral cycles. Additional analyses show that moderation is confined to economic policy votes, with little evidence of change on non-economic dimensions. Overall, the findings suggest that campaign contributions in the contemporary U.S. House are associated with moderation rather than polarization.
"Does Money Move Fathers? Financial Incentives and Paternity Leave Take-Up" with Filippos Maraziotis
Reforms that increase fathers' parental leave-taking typically bundle a use-it-or-lose-it quota with an earnings-related benefit, making it difficult to determine whether the monetary component matters once the institutional incentive is in place. We estimate the financial gradient in paternity leave take-up using Germany's 2007 reform, which introduced both instruments simultaneously. Exploiting individual-level variation in a simulated monthly benefit gain---constructed from pre-conception earnings, household income relative to the pre-reform means-test, and family composition---we find that a EUR~100 increase in the simulated gain raises post-reform take-up by 3.1 percentage points, an estimate that is robust across twelve specifications. The response is concentrated at the quota-compatible short-spell margin: the gradient for spells of at most two months is 3.5 percentage points, while the gradient for extended spells is close to zero. Observable heterogeneity across education, migration background, and household earnings share is limited, and the financial gradient accounts for a bounded share of the 22.4 percentage point aggregate rise in fathers' leave-taking. Financial generosity shifts fathers into the focal short spell; it does not extend leave beyond the institutional minimum.
"Minimum Wage Increases and Incumbency"