How economic downturns affect environmental quality: the role of financial crises [with A. Antoniades, A. Antonarakis and P. Shröeder]
Economic Crises, Debt and the Environment: a Literature Review [with A. Antoniades, A. Antonarakis and P. Shröeder]
Protection for Sale with Consumer Externality: Evidence from Non-Tariff Measures
In this paper, we investigate the e ect of lobbying and consumer externality on the pattern of protection through non-tari measures to trade (NTMs) across United States manufacturing sectors. We first extend the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model, "Protection for Sale", incorporating consumer externality. Externality is intended here as the concern of a government for consumers' safety and the environment, which should result in increased protection through standards and technical measures. In our model, externality adds to interest groups' lobbying activity in determining the increase in non-tariff measures. We test the predictions of our model using a novel database on 2014 stock of NTMs. We measure political organization of industries through lobbying expenditures data, and we identify sectors where government cares the most about consumers' wellbeing using media coverage. Our results suggest that both pressure from interest groups and concerns about safety and environmental issues lead to an increase in the pattern of protection across US manufacturing sectors.
This article investigates the influence of lobbying, electoral incentives, and the ideology of U.S. state governors on environmental expenditures. A theoretical framework is presented, emphasizing that the potential impact of lobbying and messaging from interest groups on environmental policies depends on the ideology of governors. Implementing a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), we identify and estimate the causal effect of state governors on the level of environmental expenditures. We test whether governors tend to deviate from their own political ideology when facing pressures from polluting lobbies and electoral incentives from environmental organizations. The empirical results reveal that, when Democratic governors are in charge, environmental expenditures are, on average, higher. However, in oil-abundant states, Democratic politicians tend to allocate fewer resources to environmental preservation, suggesting that political pressure from lobbying groups matters.
Curzi, Daniele & Pacca, Lucia, 2015. "Price, quality and trade costs in the food sector," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 147-158.
Olper, Alessandro & Pacca, Lucia & Curzi, Daniele, 2014. "Trade, import competition and productivity growth in the food industry," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(P1), pages 71-83.
Olper, Alessandro & Curzi, Daniele & Pacca, Lucia, 2014. "Do food standards affect the quality of EU imports?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 233-237.
D. Curzi & L. Pacca & A. Olper, 2013. "Trade collapse, quality and food exports," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(18), pages 1614-1617, December.