Monographs

Why Delusions Matter (2023)

The book was published in August 2023 by Bloomsbury. It is a 2024 Choice Outstanding Academic Title.

When we talk about delusions we may refer to symptoms of mental health problems, such as clinical delusions in schizophrenia, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are implausible and resistant to counterevidence; these can include anything from beliefs about the benefits of homeopathy to concerns about the threat of alien abduction.

Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In the book I argue that, despite their negative reputation, delusions can also play a positive role in people's lives, imposing some meaning on adverse experiences and strengthening personal or social identities. 

Reviews:

• Mike Makin-Waite, Unbelievable? Process North (October 2023).

There is symposium on the book, published in October 2024 in Philosophy of the Mind Sciences (open access).

The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs (2020)

This research monograph, published in June 2020 by Oxford University Press, offers an overview of research conducted during three externally-funded projects, The Epistemic Innocence of Imperfect Cognitions (AHRC) (2013-2014), PERFECT (ERC) (2014-2019), and Costs and Benefits of Optimism (Templeton) (2015-2016).

In the book, I propose a new framework for the assessment of beliefs that are not supported by or responsive to evidence and yet are instrumental to our capacity to overcome crises and sustain our motivation as agents. My hope is to develop the conceptual resources for a more nuanced and sophisticated account of epistemic evaluation for beliefs, acknowledging that some beliefs can be at the same time irrational and epistemically valuable.

Reviews:

• Sahar Joakim for Metapsychology Online (October 2020).

• Awais Aftab for Journal of Constructivist Psychology (February 2021).

• Mandi Astola for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (June 2021).

• Dan Williams for Mind (November 2021).

• Robin McKenna for Analysis (May 2022).

• Dino Jelčić for European Journal of Analytic Philosophy (March 2025).

There is a virtual book launch for the monograph, featuring Kengo Miyazono, Elly Vintiadis, Keith Frankish, Anna Ichino, Chris Letheby, and Anne Meylan. Each philosopher discusses one aspect of the book in a video presentation (see videos below). 

Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (2009)

Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry) was published by Oxford University Press in November 2009. It was awarded the American Philosophical Association Book Prize in 2011.

In the book I attempt to show that the arguments against the doxastic conception of delusions are misleading when they are based on an idealised notion of belief, and I present many examples of irrationality in paradigmatic cases of belief. As a result, I maintain that we should give up (once and for all) the assumption that belief ascription is hostage to the satisfaction of norms of rationality.

Reviews:

• Jennifer Radden for Metapsychology Online (July 2010).

• Peter Langland-Hassan for Psychological Medicine (August 2010).

• Luca Malatesti for Journal of Applied Philosophy (January 2011).

• Femi Oyebode for British Journal of Psychiatry (January 2011).

• Emily Barrett and Cory Wright for Philosophical Quarterly (July 2015).

A symposium on the book appeared in a special issue of Neuroethics (2012) (open access).