Book chapters

Philosophy and public philosophy

• L Bortolotti and S Stammers (2020). Philosophy as a means of empowerment. In E Vintiadis (ed.) Philosophy by Women: 22 Philosophers Reflect on Philosophy and its Value (chapter 1). Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9781003025719-3.

• L Bortolotti and K Puddifoot (2019). Philosophy, bias, and stigma. In D Bubbio and J Malpas (eds.) Why Philosophy? (pp. 51-64). De Gruyter. DOI: 10.1515/9783110650990-007.

Agency and mental health

• L Bortolotti, K Murphy-Hollies, E Byrne. (forthcoming). Epistemic injustice in mental healthcare: new directions. In M Flear and T Harvey (eds.) ddressing Epistemic Injustice: Perspectives from Health Law and Ethics. 

• R McCabe and L Bortolotti (forthcoming). How (not) to talk to people about mental health: Validating distress and avoiding blame. In E Harcourt (ed.) Madness and Mental Health.

• M Larkin et al. (2025). Being Understood: Epistemic Injustice Towards Young People Seeking Support for Their Mental Health. In: Bortolotti, L. (ed.) Epistemic Justice in Mental Healthcare. Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-68881-2_1. Open access book.

• L Bortolotti et al. (2025). Challenging Stereotypes About Young People Who Hear Voices. In: Bortolotti, L. (ed.) Epistemic Justice in Mental Healthcare. Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-68881-2_2. Open access book.

• M Larkin, L Bortolotti and M Lim (2024). Expertise as perspectives in dialogue. In M Farina, A Lavazza and D Pritchard (eds.), Expertise: Philosophical Perspectives (chapter 5). Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198877301.003.0005

• L Bortolotti (2018). Agency without Rationality. In A Coliva, P Leonardi, S Moruzzi (eds.) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History (pp. 265-280). Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-95777-7_12.

Irrational beliefs

• K Murphy-Hollies, L Bortolotti, and M Mameli (2025). Le renard et la chouette: confabulation, complots et régulation de soi. In D. Simonin (ed.) Les Fables de l'homme: pouvoirs de la fabulation. Kimé. 

• L Bortolotti (2025). Extreme beliefs as unshakeable identity beliefs. In R Peels and J Horgan (eds.) Conceptualizing Extreme Beliefs and Behaviors (chapter 1). Oxford University Press.

• L Bortolotti and M Belvederi Murri (2025). Delusion and Adaptiveness. In E Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusions (chapter 3). Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9781003296386-5.

• L Grassi and L Bortolotti (2024). Delusions across and beyond diagnoses. In A Falcato and J Gonçalves (eds.) The Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (chapter 11). Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9781003288992-15.

• A Jefferson and L Bortolotti (2023). On the moral psychology of the pandemic agent. In E. Barbosa (ed.) Moral Challenges in a Pandemic Age (chapter 2). Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9781003310129-3.

• E Vintiadis and L Bortolotti (2022). The role of context in belief evaluation. In J Musolino et al. (eds.) The Cognitive Science of Belief (chapter 4). Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/9781009001021.006.

• L Bortolotti and S Stammers (2020). When the Personal Becomes Political: How Do We Fulfil Our Epistemic Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Public Debates? In S Stapleford and K McCain (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (chapter 16). Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9780429030215-20.

• F Bongiorno and L Bortolotti (2019). The role of unconscious inference in models of delusion formation. In A Nes and T Chan (eds.) Inference and Consciousness (chapter 3). Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9781315150703-4.

• L Bortolotti (2018). Delusions and three myths of irrational belief. In L Bortolotti (ed.) Delusions in Context (pp. 97-116). Palgrave Pivot. DOI: /10.1007/978-3-319-97202-2_4. Open access book.

• L Bortolotti and R Gunn (2017). Delusion. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.

• L Bortolotti, R Gunn and E Sullivan-Bissett (2017). What makes a belief delusional? In I Mac Carthy, K Sellevold and O Smith (eds.) Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture (chapter 3). Legenda. DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv16km1n8.6.

• E Sullivan-Bissett, L Bortolotti, M Broome and M Mameli (2016). Moral and legal implications of the continuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefs. In G Keil, L Keuck and R Hauswald (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry (chapter 10). Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/med/9780198722373.003.0010.

• E Sullivan-Bissett and L Bortolotti (2017). Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief: reviving the teleologist’s dilemma. In E Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds.) Art and Belief (chapter 9). Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198805403.003.0009.

• K Miyazono, L Bortolotti and M Broome (2014). Prediction-error and two-factor theories of delusion formation: competitors or allies? In N Galbraith (ed.) Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning (pp.34-54). Psychology Press. DOI: 10.4324/9781315797861-4.

• L Bortolotti (2009). Delusion. In E Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Revised and updated in September 2018 and May 2022.

• L Bortolotti (2002). Marks of Irrationality. In T Lyons and S Clarke (eds.) Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science (pp. 157-174). Kluwer. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2862-1_8.

• L Bortolotti, R Cox, M Broome and M Mameli (2012). Rationality and self-knowledge in delusions and confabulations: implications for autonomy as self-governance. In L Radoilska (ed.) Autonomy and Mental Disorder (pp.100-122). Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/med/9780199595426.003.0024.

• L Bortolotti (2010). Double bookkeeping in delusions: explaining the gap between saying and doing. In K Frankish, A Buckareff and J Aguilar (eds.) New Waves in the Philosophy of Action (chapter 11). Palgrave. DOI: 10.1057/9780230304253_12.

Epistemic innocence

• A Polonioli and L Bortolotti (2021). The Social and Epistemic Benefits of Polite Conversations. In Chaoqun Xie (ed.) The Philosophy of (Im)politeness (pp.55-71). Springer. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-81592-9_4.

• L Bortolotti and M Aliffi (2021). The epistemic benefits of irrational boredom. In A Elpidorou (ed.) The Moral Psychology of Boredom (chapter 8). Rowman & Littlefield.

• L Bortolotti, E Sullivan-Bissett and M Antrobus (2019). The epistemic innocence of optimistically biased beliefs. In M Balcerak Jackson and B Balcerak Jackson (eds.) Reasoning: Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking (chapter 12). Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198791478.003.0012.

Philosophy of psychiatry (misc.) 

• E Sullivan-Bissett, L Bortolotti (forthcoming). Delusion. Palgrave Encyclopedia of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.

• L Bortolotti and M Broome (forthcoming). Mental illness/ disorder. Palgrave Encyclopedia of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.

• R Ambriz Gonzalez and L Bortolotti (2023). Realismo / antirealismo e psichiatria. In R Campaner and C Gabbani (eds.) Realismo e Antirealismo nelle Scienze (chapter 6). Carocci. 

• J Craigie and L Bortolotti (2014). Rationality, Diagnosis, and Patient Autonomy in Psychiatry. In J Z Sadler, B Fulford, C W van Staden (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics (vol 1, pp. 387-404). Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198732365.013.28.

• Sabbarton-Leary, N, Bortolotti, L and Broome, M. (2014). Natural and para-natural kinds in psychiatry. In P Zachar et al. (eds), Alternative perspectives on psychiatric validation: DSM, IDC, RDoC, and Beyond (pp. 76-93). Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/med/9780199680733.003.0005.

• L Bortolotti (2013). Rationality and Sanity. In KWM Fulford et al. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. (pp. 480-496). Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.013.0030.

Ethics (misc.)

• Bortolotti, L (2010). Can the subject-of-a-life criterion help grant rights to non-persons? In M Hayry et al. (eds.) Arguments and Analysis in Bioethics. Brill. DOI: 10.1163/9789042028036_021